While I’m bashing the New York Times today, let me add this beef.
It amazes me how people can discuss the origins of ISIS-like brutality, and even allude to the influence of the “potent doctrine” that fuels and channels it, without mentioning religion itself. It’s part of the same mentality that makes Obama shy away from mentioning Islam as an influence on terrorism, or grudgingly recognize it by saying that ISIS is a “perversion of Islam.” The whole object is to avoid saying anything bad about any religion. To that my response is this: “If you say that religion can inspire good acts, why are you so reluctant to say that it can inspire bad ones?”
David Brooks is one of the stable of New York Times op-ed writers who refuses to mention the I- and M-words when discussing ISIS. In his new column “How ISIS makes radicals” (curiously, the original title was “How radicals are made”), Brooks manages to discuss the origins of violent Islamism while alluding to religion as a contributing factor, but avoiding all mention of religion except for one sentence in his thesis:
But the crucial issue, it seems to me, is what you might call the technology of persuasion — how is it that the Islamic State is able to radicalize a couple living in Redlands, Calif.?
Yes, the only mention of religion is the name “Islamic State.”
Brooks’s analysis of its origins draws heavily on Eric Hoffer’s famous book The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, which I read in college. Brooks’s response is in fact Hoffer’s thesis: that mass movements are often a response to a dysfunctional society that impels disaffected youth to turn to a greater cause. But at least Brooks recognizes that ISIS and similar movements aren’t just the result of Western oppression, and in general what he says is sensible. Here are some excerpts (my emphasis):
. . . The purpose of an organization like ISIS is to get people to negate themselves for a larger cause.
Mass movements, [Hoffer] argues, only arise in certain conditions, when a once sturdy social structure is in a state of decay or disintegration. This is a pretty good description of parts of the Arab world. To a lesser degree it is a good description of isolated pockets of our own segmenting, individualized society, where some people find themselves totally cut off. [JAC: note that, as I’ve discussed often, increased religiosity is recognized by sociologists as a ubiquitous response to social dysfunction.]
The people who serve mass movements are not revolting against oppression. They are driven primarily by frustration. Their personal ambitions are unfulfilled. They have lost faith in their own abilities to realize their dreams. They sometimes live with an unrelieved boredom. Freedom aggravates their sense of frustration because they have no one to blame but themselves for their perceived mediocrity. Fanatics, the French philosopher Ernest Renan argued, fear liberty more than they fear persecution.
And here’s where religion begins to creep in, at least as I see it:
The successful mass movement tells such people that the cause of their frustration is outside themselves, and that the only way to alter their personal situation is to transform the world in some radical way.
To nurture this self-sacrificing attitude, the successful mass movement first denigrates the present. Its doctrine celebrates a glorious past and describes a utopian future, but the present is just an uninspiring pit. The golden future begins to seem more vivid and real than the present, and in this way the true believer begins to dissociate herself from the everyday facts of her life. . .
. . . Next mass movements denigrate the individual self. Everything that is unique about an individual is either criticized, forbidden or diminished. The individual’s identity is defined by the collective group identity, and fortified by a cultivated hatred for other groups.
What better way to take advantage of these disaffected youth than to lure them with the golden promise of religion, perhaps even a Caliphate? That is a cause far beyond oneself. And here Brooks ventures solidly onto religious ground, but still refuses to recognize the territory:
These movements generate a lot of hatred. But ultimately, Hoffer argues, they are driven by a wild hope. They believe an imminent perfect future can be realized if they proceed recklessly to destroy the present. The glorious end times are just around the corner.
Glorious end times? Could that possibly be the Final Showdown Against Unbelievers that, says ISIS, will occur in the Middle East when the expanding Caliphate provokes the West?
And then Brooks quotes Hoffer in service of this thesis:
Hoffer summarizes his thought this way, “For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change they must be intensely discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that by the possession of some potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they have access to a source of irresistible power. They must also have an extravagant conception of the prospects and potentialities of the future. Finally, they must be wholly ignorant of the difficulties involved in their vast undertaking. Experience is a handicap.”
Well, what is that “potent doctrine” but Islam? Who is the “infallible leader “but Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (channeling Muhammed)? What is the “prospect of the future” except the Caliphate?
At the end Brooks suggests the way to get rid of ISIS is to ameliorate the social dysfunction of its adherents, defeat them militarily, and “offer positive inspiring causes to replace the suicidal ones.” That sounds good, though it’s a long row to hoe. But how can we replace the “suicidal cause” unless we recognize what it is? Surely the prospect of Paradise is in there somewhere.
I’m not sure any of the NYT op-ed writers, including conservatives like Douthat, have ever explicitly mentioned that Islamic doctrine is a prime motivating force for ISIS. What a breath of fresh air it would be to see that said out loud!