Why Evolution is True is a blog written by Jerry Coyne, centered on evolution and biology but also dealing with diverse topics like politics, culture, and cats.
This is one of the most amazing performances of someone under fire I’ve ever seen, and even though the video was long for me (45 minutes), I watched the whole thing, mesmerized as well as stunned by how well the “victim” answered questions coolly and eloquently.
In one corner: Natasha Hausdorff, British barrister (lawyer) with an expertise in international law. She’s also Jewish and the legal director of UK Lawyers for Israel. Her credentials are impeccable:
A graduate of Oxford University and Tel Aviv University, Hausdorff practised with the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, and clerked for the chief justice of the Israeli Supreme Court. She was a former fellow at Columbia Law School in the National Security Law Program. She is also the legal director of the NGO UKLFI Charitable Trust.
In all the other corners (it’s a hendecagon, with 11 corners) are the hostile opponents: the members of the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Dame Emily Thornberry. This interview grilling was part of the Committee “conducting an inquiry into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, asking ‘how the UK and its allies can help to achieve a ceasefire and lasting end to the war in Gaza and Lebanon’.”
Remember that the UK government, though nominally supporting Israel, refused to sell arms to the Jewish state. But here, its members are basically asking Hausdorff to defend every action of Israel. And she basically does. The hostility of the committee towards Israel seems ubiquitous (Hausdorff was one of several experts, including Palestinians, but I was unable to find any YouTube videos of Palestinians testifying at this hearing.) What is amazing about Hausdorff is that she not only doesn’t lose her cool despite the clearly anti-Israel inquisitors, but always has the facts at her fingertips. And when she doesn’t know something, she says so.
I highly recommend that you watch this video, if for no other reason that to see a stupendous performance. But you will also hear how someone who’s pro-Israel deals with canards and misconceptions about the war. Or listen to just fifteen minutes.
After watching this, Malgorzata (who called it to my attention) said, “Natasha Hausdorff is a force of nature and a world class treasure.” I agree; Hausdorff is one of my rare heroes.
This is really breaking news, and apparently settles a roiling controversy in the UK that was most intense in Scotland. Today the UK’s Supreme Court, overturning rulings in Scotland, said that, in law, a “woman” is “a biological woman;” and a trans woman, even with a “gender reassignment certificate” does not legally qualify as a “woman”. Below are three real-time news summaries. Excerpts are indented below the headlines.
First, a Scottish law apparently kicked off the controversy. From Reuters:
Wednesday’s British judgment followed legal action by a campaign group, For Women Scotland (FWS), against guidance issued by the devolved Scottish government that accompanied a 2018 law designed to increase the proportion of women on public sector boards.
The guidance said a trans woman with a gender recognition certificate was legally a woman. FWS, which was backed by lesbian rights groups, had lost its case in the Scottish courts, but the Supreme Court ruled in its favour.
This appeal arose in response to the definition of the term “woman” in the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018 (“ASP 2018”) and associated statutory guidance. This legislation created gender representation targets to increase the proportion of women on public boards in Scotland. The ASP 2018 and the original statutory guidance defined “woman” as including people: (i) with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment; (ii) living as a woman; and (iii) proposing to undergo / undergoing / who have undergone a gender reassignment process. In 2020, the Appellant, a feminist voluntary organisation that campaigns to strengthen women’s rights in Scotland, challenged this guidance. The Inner House found that this statutory definition was unlawful as it involved an area of law reserved to the UK Parliament (equal opportunities) and therefore fell outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament (“FWS1”).
In all the stuff I was able to read this morning, I was unable to find the definition of a “biological woman”, save that it refers to one’s natal sex, though they don’t mention gametes. The ruling does refer to the binary nature of sex (see below). And the ruling implies as well that the word “man” can mean in law only a “biological man” (see below).
The UK supreme court has ruled that the terms “woman” and “sex” in the Equality Act refer to a biological woman and biological sex, in a victory for gender critical campaigners.
Five judges from the UK supreme court ruled unanimouslythat the legal definition of a woman in the Equality Act 2010 did not include transgender women who hold gender recognition certificates (GRCs). In a significant defeat for the Scottish government, their decision will mean that transgender women can no longer sit on public boards in places set aside for women.
It could have far wider ramifications by leading to much greater restrictions on the rights of transgender women to use services and spaces reserved for women, and spark calls for the UK’s laws on gender recognition to be rewritten.
Lord Hodge told the court the Equality Act (EA) was very clear that its provisions dealt with biological sex at birth, and not with a person’s acquired gender, regardless of whether they held a gender recognition certificate. That affected policy-making on gender in sports and the armed services, hospitals, as well as women-only charities, and access to changing rooms and women-only spaces, he said.
Hodge urged people not to see the decision “as a triumph of one or more groups in our society at the expense of another”. He said all transgender people had clear legal protections under the 2010 act against discrimination and harassment.
Gender critical campaign group For Women Scotland, which is backed financially by JK Rowling, celebrated outside the supreme court in London, alongside other campaigners, after the ruling was announced.
The Scottish government had argued that transgender people with a gender recognition certificate (GRC) are entitled to sex-based protections, while For Women Scotland argued they only apply to people that are born female
“The terms woman and sex in the Equality Act 2010 refer to a biological woman and biological sex.”
In fewer than 20 words, Lord Hodge settled a legal debate that has raged in British society for years. It also drove a stake through the heart of a central tenet of the trans lobby: that trans women are women.
The 88-page ruling will be pored over by lawyers. The implications for Westminster and beyond will be vast.
. . .Scotland’s first minister has said the Scottish government “accepts” the ruling of the UK Supreme Court on biological sex, and added that “protecting the rights of all” will inform its response.
In a post on X, John Swinney said: “The Scottish government accepts today’s Supreme Court judgment.
“The ruling gives clarity between two relevant pieces of legislation passed at Westminster. We will now engage on the implications of the ruling. Protecting the rights of all will underpin our actions.”
. . .The certificated sex interpretation would have “rendered meaningless” a section of the 2010 Equalities Act dealing with protection from discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, according to the ruling.
This interpretation would mean “a trans woman (a biological male) with a GRC (Gender Recognition Certificate) who remains sexually oriented to other females would become a same-sex attracted female, in other words, a lesbian” and would lead to an “inevitable loss of autonomy and dignity for lesbians” as well as impacting lesbian clubs and associations.
The judgment continues: “Read fairly, references to sex in this provision can only mean biological sex. People are not sexually oriented towards those in possession of a certificate.
. . .Kemi Badenoch has said the “era of Keir Starmer telling us women can have penises has come to an end”.
The Conservative leader said: “Saying ‘trans women are women’ was never true in fact, and now isn’t true in law either.
“This is a victory for all of the women who faced personal abuse or lost their jobs for stating the obvious. Women are women and men are men: you cannot change your biological sex.
“Well done to For Women Scotland!”
The full judgement is here (you can also click on the title page below to see the 88-page ruling), and although I haven’t read it carefully, I’ve quoted four bits that seem relevant.
First, the court emphasizes binary nature of sex, but unfortunately doesn’t give a definition of sex, though it claims that it does (my bolding). The court holds to the “ordinary” meaning of “those plain and unambiguous words”, a meaning that corresponds to the biological characteristics that create a binary. One can interpret that, as I would, as the gametic definition of sex, which is the only definition that creates a dichotomy that, with a few hundredths of a percent of exceptions, conforms to a binary:
171. The definition of sex in the EA 2010 makes clear that the concept of sex is binary, a person is either a woman or a man. Persons who share that protected characteristic for the purposes of the group-based rights and protections are persons of the same sex and provisions that refer to protection for women necessarily exclude men. Although the word “biological” does not appear in this definition, the ordinary meaning of those plain and unambiguous words corresponds with the biological characteristics that make an individual a man or a woman. These are assumed to be self-explanatory and to require no further explanation. Men and women are on the face of the definition only differentiated as a grouping by the biology they share with their group
I Interpret this next part to mean that it’s legal to prohibit trans-identified men (“transwomen”) from competing against biological males. They don’t talk about trans-identified women, but this presumably holds for them, too. If so, that means a strict separation of athletic competition by sex, but perhaps sports in which the sexes perform equally on average could be an exception. The fate of trans-identified women in sports is not really discussed or spelled out, at least not that I can see, but if one holds to a biological definition of sex, the legal fate of trans-identified women would be the same as that of trans-identified men.
236. On the other hand, a biological definition of sex would mean that a women’s boxing competition organiser could refuse to admit all men, including trans women regardless of their GRC status. This would be covered by the sex discrimination exception in section 195(1). But if, in addition, the providers of the boxing competition were concerned that fair competition or safety necessitates the exclusion of trans men (biological females living in the male gender, irrespective of GRC status) who have taken testosterone to give them more masculine attributes, their exclusion would amount to gender reassignment discrimination, not sex discrimination, but would be permitted by section 195(2). It is here that the gender reassignment exception would be available to ensure that the exclusion is not unlawful, whether as direct or indirect gender reassignment discrimination.
The part below implies that the ruling also holds for the word “man”, which has to mean “biological man” rather than a biological woman who has a GRC or identifies as a man.
264. For all these reasons, this examination of the language of the EA 2010, its context and purpose, demonstrate that the words “sex”, “woman” and “man” in sections 11 and 212(1) mean (and were always intended to mean) biological sex, biological woman and biological man. These and the other provisions to which we have referred cannot properly be interpreted as also extending to include certificated sex without rendering them incoherent and unworkable.
Finally, this last part disposes of the Scottish government’s regarding one’s sex as being that given on a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC). That means that, in Scotland and all over the UK, a transwoman is not identical to a biological woman, nor a transman to a biological man. The mantras “a transwoman is a woman” and a “transman is a man” now hold no legal meaning.
. . . 266. For all these reasons, we conclude that the Guidance issued by the Scottish Government is incorrect. A person with a GRC in the female gender does not come within the definition of “woman” for the purposes of sex discrimination in section 11 of the EA 2010. That in turn means that the definition of “woman” in section 2 of the 2018 Act, which Scottish Ministers accept must bear the same meaning as the term “woman” in section 11 and section 212 of the EA 2010, is limited to biological women and does not include trans women with a GRC. Because it is so limited, the 2018 Act does not stray beyond the exception permitted in section L2 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act into reserved matters. Therefore, construed in the way that we have held it is to be construed, the 2018 Act is within the competence of the Scottish Parliament and can operate to encourage the participation of women in senior positions in public life.
In toto, the ruling seems fair to me, as I never thought that, say, a “transwoman is a woman” and the same for transmen, as I’ve always adhered to the biological sex definition, which gives an almost 100% binary based on one’s evolved system for either producing large, immobile gametes (women) or small mobile gametes (men). This binary holds for all species, but the terms “woman” and “man” have been reserved for humans. It does not “erase” trans people, giving them the same rights as everyone—with the exception of a person of one sex inhabiting spaces that properly belong to people of the other sex (sports, jails, locker rooms, etc.) And as I’ve said endlessly, in all situations where you don’t need sex-specific spaces, trans people should have all the rights of everyone else, and should be treated like everyone else.
As I noted yesterday, Biden has commuted the sentences of all but three federal prisoners on death row; they’ll now be serving life behind bars without parole instead. I insisted that this was an excellent decision, as I have never seen the sense of the government killing a prisoner. Here are the pros and cons of capital punishment as I see them.
Pro: People feel that somebody who does a bad crime deserves to be killed for it. The idea is that because the criminal made the victims suffer, he, too, should suffer as retribution for what was inflicted on his victims. It’s retribution, Jake!
Cons: Because of litigation fees and the length of time before execution, as well as execution costs, it actually costs more to execute a prisoner than to keep him in prison until he dies.
If exculpating evidence surfaces, you can retry or free a living prisoner, but not one who’s been executed.
Evidence shows that the death penalty is not a deterrent to crime.
Capital punishment is purely retributive and, in the end, seems selfish as it satisfies the wishes of people to see other people dead.
The state should not be in the business of killing people. That is reserved for one’s opponents in wartime.
Prisoners sentenced to death have no opportunity to be rehabilitated. And surely some of them could be released eventually and become productive citizens, and enjoy the rest of their lives in freedom.
To a determinist, prisoners who commit capital crimes had no choice in the matter, and you don’t execute people for “making the wrong choice” if they didn’t have one.
Anyone who wants retribution should be able to find it in the idea that someone will spend the rest of his life in prison, which is a harsh punishment in itself.
Note that the cons heavily outweigh the pros. And that is surely why the U.S, is the only Western country to have the death penalty (Japan also has it, though it’s not really “Western”).
My question: is there ANY benefit to society in having the death penalty? It seems to hang around because it to afford a ghoulish kind of closure to those who feel strongly about what should happen to someone who commits a horrible crime. One of the most barbaric things I have seen is the crowd of people massed outside a prison on the eve of an execution, baying for blood.
I’ve mentioned before Robert Sapolsky’s recent book Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will, a 528-page behemoth that at times is a bit of a slog and at other times an inspiration. (See here, here, here, and here for previous posts about it.) I found his argument against libertarian free will convincing, but of course I already believed that there is no good argument for libertarian (“you-could-have-done-otherwise”) free will (LFW), so I was on his side from the outset. I’m a hard determinist, and that’s based on seeing that the laws of physics obtain everywhere. But people are still maintaining not just that we can confect some form of free will despite the truth of determinism (these people are called “compatibilists”), but that we have real libertarian free will. They are wrong.
The video below, arguing for LFW, came in an email from Quillette touting their most popular articles of 2024. But this was a short (4.5-minute) video, not an article, and I don’t think the video was one of the top items. Perhaps the note referred to a Quillette article by Stuart Doyle (below) on which the video is based, but that article was published in 2023.
At any rate, listen to the video first, and then, if you want to see what I consider an unconvincing argument against free will (though it does make some fair criticisms of Determined), click on the headline below to read Doyle’s argument that we have “not disproven free will.”
The narrator of the video isn’t named, but she pretty much parrots what’s in Doyle’s essay, emphasizing an argument for free will that Doyle considers dispositive, but to me seems irrelevant.
You may notice some problems with the “rebuttal” described in the video. For example, it seems irrelevant to argue that “just because a neuron doesn’t have free will doesn’t mean that the bearer of a collection of neurons (a person) doesn’t have free will.” This is an argument that the emergent property of LFW can still appear even if neurons themselves behave according to physical law (a large argument in Sapolsky’s book). Also, if quantum physics is truly and fundamentally unpredictable (and we don’t know this for sure), that itself, says the narrator, poses a problem for free will, because it means that, at any given moment, a quantum event may change your behavior.
There are two problems with the quantum-indeterminacy argument. First, nobody ever maintained that quantum events like the movement of an electron can result from one’s volition (“will”), so unpredictability at a given moment does not prove volition. Further, we don’t even know (and many of us doubt) that a quantum event can change human behavior or decisions on a macro level. Some people have calculated that it can’t. So the whole issue of quantum unpredictability is irrelevant to the main problem: whether, at a given moment, you can, through your own agency, have behaved or decided differently.
This brings up the problem of predictability. The narrator’s (and Doyle’s) argument is that if you cannot predict someone’s behavior or decision—even with perfect knowledge of everything—then we have free will. As I just said, quantum physics may cause such fundamental unpredictability, but doesn’t support the notion that we have LFW Yet the video and Doyle suggest there is another form of fundamental unpredictability that can cause a lack of predictability despite perfect physical knowledge: computational undecidability. Both the narrator and Doyle accuse Sapolsky of complete ignorance of this concept, which, they say, constitutes “a major flaw in Sapolsky’s argument.” The narrator says that if human behavior is fundamentally unpredictable, then it supports the idea that free will exists. The premise of this criticism is, of course, is that if you can’t predict human behavior and decisions, even with perfect physical knowledge, then you can’t say that we lack free will. But these arguments using predictability are flimsy arguments against determinism, and, in fact, we’ll never have the perfect knowledge we need to predict behavior.
The problem is that quantum mechanics can in principle wreck perfect predictability of behavior, but that possibility doesn’t support free will. So does “computational undecidability”, another thing that impedes prediction, leave room for free will? I don’t think so (see below).
The essay by Stuart Doyle on which this video is based can be accessed by clicking the link below, or you can find it (archived here). Doyle is a graduate student in psychology at the University of Kansas.
Let me start by saying that Doyle’s essay, while it makes its points clearly and strongly, seems almost mean, as if Doyle takes great joy in telling us how stupid Sapolsky is. And this is coming from someone (me) who’s been accused of the same thing. (I plead not guilty, at least for my published work.). But for a scholar publishing a rebuttal on a major site, it seems to me uncharitable to say stuff like this:
Sapolsky’s conclusions about morality and politics stand on nothing beyond his personal tastes. His book was marketed with such authoritative headlines as “Stanford scientist, after decades of study, concludes: We don’t have free will.” In contrast to the hype, Determined is ultimately a collection of partial arguments, conjoined incoherently. And Robert Sapolsky is to blame.
Sapolsky is to blame? Well, yes, of course he is, he’s the author, but the concept of blaming someone for writing a book they don’t like, and and accusing them of incoherence (I disagree) is not civil discourse. But let’s move on.
The observation that every object in the universe obeys physical law does directly imply that there is no amorphous “will” that can affect the laws of physics, something that physicist Sean Carroll (a compatibilist) has emphasized. To me, this puts the onus on those who accept LFW to tell us what aspect of human volition is independent of the laws of physics.What form of nonphysical magic can change the output of our neurons? So far, nobody has done this. Thus, to a large extent, I think, one can tentatively accept determinism simply from knowing that every physical object obeys well-known laws and, as Carroll has written, “The laws underlying the physics of everyday life are completely understood.” Carroll:
All we need to account for everything we see in our everyday lives are a handful of particles — electrons, protons, and neutrons — interacting via a few forces — the nuclear forces, gravity, and electromagnetism — subject to the basic rules of quantum mechanics and general relativity. You can substitute up and down quarks for protons and neutrons if you like, but most of us don’t notice the substructure of nucleons on a daily basis. That’s a remarkably short list of ingredients, to account for all the marvelous diversity of things we see in the world.
So yes, Carroll is a determinist in a way that refutes libertarian free will, but in the link saying he’s a compatibilist, you’ll see that he says that we have a sort of free will instantiated in the emergent properties of humans acting as agents and expressing preferences. (Of course our tastes and preferences are also formed in our brain by the laws of physics.) Well, there is no real emergence that defies the laws of physics: emergence may not be predictable from lower-level phenomena, but it is consistent and derives from lower-level phenomena. Saying, as Doyle does, that “The ‘mechanism’ that produces deliberative choices is the whole person” is to say nothing that refutes determinism.
As I reread Doyle’s paper, I realized that although he does point out some contradictions in Sapolsky’s arguments, Doyle does nothing to dispel determinism. What appears to be the central contention of his essay is that there is another way that physical objects can behave unpredictably beyond quantum mechanics, and that way is computational decidability. But that supports LFW no more than does any unpredictability of quantum mechanics.
Here’s what Doyle says:
So what could give us the ability to surprise Laplace’s demon? Computational undecidability. This is a term describing a system that cannot be predicted, given complete knowledge of its present state. This fundamental unpredictability shows up in algorithmic computation, formal mathematical systems, and dynamical systems. Though an unpredictable dynamical system may evoke the concept of chaos, undecidability is a different sort of unpredictability. As described by one of the greatest living information theorists, C.H. Bennett:
For a dynamical system to be chaotic means that it exponentially amplifies ignorance of its initial condition; for it to be undecidable means that essential aspects of its long-term behavior—such as whether a trajectory ever enters a certain region—though determined, are unpredictable even from total knowledge of the initial condition.
If a system exhibits undecidability, then it is unpredictable even to Laplace’s demon, while a system that is merely chaotic is perfectly predictable to the demon. Chaos is only unpredictable because the initial conditions are not perfectly known. So it would be fair to dismiss that kind of unpredictability as mere ignorance—an epistemological issue, not an ontological reality. But the delineation between the epistemic and the ontic falls apart when we talk about what Laplace’s demon can’t know. An issue is “merely” epistemological when there is a fact of the matter, but the fact is unknowable. There actually is no fact about how an undecidable system will behave until it behaves. For a fact to exist, it must be in reference to some aspect of reality. But nothing about present reality could ground a fact about the future behavior of an undecidable system. In contrast, the exact actual state of present reality grounds facts about the future of chaotic systems. We just can’t know the exact actual state of present reality, thus unpredictability is “merely” epistemological in the case of chaos, but not in the case of undecidability.
Arguably, human behavior is undecidable, not just chaotic. And that would mean that human choice is free in exactly the way we’d want it to be; determined—by our own whole selves, with no fact of the matter of what we’ll choose before we choose it. But Sapolsky seems unaware of undecidability as a concept. He mislabels cellular automata as chaotic, rather than recognizing the truth that they exhibit undecidability. This is a major factual error on Sapololsky’s part.
First of all, from what I’ve read of computational undecidability, it is a phenomenon not of physical objects, but of philosophy combined with mathematical concepts and models. As Wikipedia says (and yes, I’ve read more than that article):
There are two distinct senses of the word “undecidable” in contemporary use. The first of these is the sense used in relation to Gödel’s theorems, that of a statement being neither provable nor refutable in a specified deductive system. The second sense is used in relation to computability theory and applies not to statements but to decision problems, which are countably infinite sets of questions each requiring a yes or no answer. Such a problem is said to be undecidable if there is no computable function that correctly answers every question in the problem set. The connection between these two is that if a decision problem is undecidable (in the recursion theoretical sense) then there is no consistent, effective formal system which proves for every question A in the problem either “the answer to A is yes” or “the answer to A is no”.
Two points here. First, Doyle gives not one example of a biological system in which “computational undecidability” would obtain. If there was one, why didn’t he mention it? It seems to me solely a mathematical/logical concept, and my (admittedly cursory) readings have turned up nothing in biology or physics that seems “computationally undecidable”, much less in a way that would give us free will.
Second, even if there is a fundamental and non-quantum form of unpredictability in physics and biology, that doesn’t open up the possibility of free will. That would depend on whether our “will” could, in some non-physical way, affect the behavior of molecules. If it cannot happen with quantum mechanics, then how can it happen with computational undecidability? Unless Doyle tells us how this mathematical/logical idea can somehow affect our behavior according to our “will”, he has no argument against determinism and thus has no argument for free will.
Now it’s true that belief in “physical determinism—folding into that term quantum and other unpredictable effects not affected by our volition)—is largely a conclusion from observing nature. But just because we cannot absolutely prove determinism of behavior from science, we can still increase determinism’s priors by various experiments. These include recent studies showing that you can predict, using brain scanning, binary decisions that people make before they are conscious of having made them. For example, if people are given a choice of adding or subtracting two numbers, scanning their brains shows that you can, with substantial probability (60-70%), predict whether they’ll add or subtract up to ten seconds before they are conscious of having made a choice. And this is from crude methods of measuring brain activity (e.g., fMRI). Perhaps by measuring individual neurons or groups of neurons we could predict even better. But the experiments so far imply that decisions are made before people are conscious of them, and that raises the Bayesian priors that people’s behaviors are determined by physics, not by their “will”.
And there are various other experiments showing that you can both increase or decrease people’s sense of volition. Electrical stimulation of the brain can make people think that they made a decision when in fact it’s purely the result of stimulating certain neurons. This causes people to make up stories of why they did things like raise their hand when a part of their brain is stimulated (“I decided to wave at that nurse”). But that sense of volition is bogus. This kind of post facto confabulation, which occurs very soon after you decide something or do something, is what makes us think what we have LFW. Further, there may be evolutionary reasons why we think we have libertarian free will, but I won’t get into those. Suffice it to say that I think that our feeling of having LFW is merely a very powerful illusion—an illusion that may have been installed in our brains by natural selection.
On the other hand, you can make people think that they didn’t have volition when in fact they did. A Ouija board is one example: people unconsciously move the “cursor” around to make words when they think that it’s moving independently of their will. There are other experiments like these, all showing that you can either strengthen or weaken people’s sense of volition and will using various psychological tricks. And they all go to refute the idea of libertarian free will
So yes, I think Sapolsky is right. His determinism agrees with nearly all the scientists (including compatibilists) who think that the notion of libertarian free will is bogus. To think otherwise is to believe that there is some kind of non-physical mental magic that can change the laws of physics.
One final point. Arguments about free will are not just philosophical wheel-spinning, for they play directly into an important part of society: reward and punishment—especially punishment. If the legal system truly embraced determinism of behavior, we could still have punishment, but it would be very different. We would punish to keep bad people off the streets, to give people a chance for rehabilitation (if they can be rehabilitated), and to deter others. But what we would not have is retributive punishment: punishment for having made the wrong choice.
Legal systems are grounded on the notion that we are morally responsible, but under determinism we’re not. Yes, we can be responsible for an act, but “moral” responsibility is intimately connected with libertarian free will; it’s the idea that we have the ability, at any given time, to act either morally or immorally (or make any any other alternative decision, even if it doesn’t involve morality). Yes, I know there are some who think that the justice system already implicitly accepts determinism, but they are wrong. For if it did, we wouldn’t have any form of retributive punishment, including capital punishment.
As for rewarding good behavior, well, yes, you couldn’t have done otherwise than, say, saved a drowning person. But rewarding people who do good is a spur for other people to do good. Even if the rewarded people don’t “deserve” plaudits in the sense that their accomplishments didn’t come from LFW, handing out rewards for things that society approves of is simply a good thing to do—for society.
Oh, a p.s. Because people feel so strongly that they do have libertarian free will, I have faced more opposition when touting determinism than when touting the truth of evolution. As I always say, “It’s much harder to convince a free-willer of the truth of determinism than to convince a creationist of the truth of evolution.” People feel so strongly that they have LFW that I have suffered two unpleasant consequences for touting determinism. I’ve told these stories before, but a big jazz musician nearly attacked me for implying that his solos were not truly extemporaneous, and that he could not have played a different solo, and on another occasion an old friend kicked me out of his house because he couldn’t abide the notion of determinism. No creationist has ever treated me in those ways!
This WaPo article below (click headline to read, or find the piece archived here), discusses the new case about gender transitioning being adjudicated by the Supreme Court. It’s judging the constitutionality of a Tennessee law that, according to the paper, “bans the use of puberty blockers and hormones for gender-transition treatments in minors on the grounds that it unlawfully discriminates based on sex.” (23 other states have similar laws). I’m not sure how a ban on blockers can discriminate on the basis of sex if the hormones are banned in both males and females, but I’ll leave that up to the lawyers.
What’s important here is that the dispute about the blockers is now being discussed openly, in an Editorial Board op-ed in the Washington Post, while previously such discussion was taboo. Even questioning the use of such “affirmative treatments” was seen as “transphobic,” though there wasn’t good clinical evidence that they had good outcomes. They could even have been harmful, and in light of a lack of efficacy, they’re now banned in the UK and regarded as experimental treatments in much of Europe.
What we need, as the paper says, are “gold standard” studies: large controlled studies (double blind ones would be impractical given that the drugs have easily discernible effects) over a fairly long period of time.
Read below, and I’ll give some quotes (indented):
This unresolved dispute is why Tennessee has a colorable claim before the court; it would be ludicrous to suggest that patients have a civil right to be harmed by ineffective medical interventions — and, likewise, unconscionable for Tennessee to deny a treatment that improves patient lives, even if the state did so with majestic impartiality. The issue is subject to legal dispute in part because the medical questions have not been properly resolved.
“Children’s healthcare must always be evidence-led,” British Health and Social Care Secretary Wes Streeting said in a press release. “The independent expert Commission on Human Medicines found that the current prescribing and care pathway for gender dysphoria and incongruence presents an unacceptable safety risk for children and young people.”
An early Dutch study of blockers showed “promising results”, but the sample was too small to give definitive results, and wasn’t replicable:
Yet as other doctors began copying the Dutch, clinical practice outraced the research, especially as treatment protocols rapidly evolved. A British study attempting to replicate the Dutch researchers’ success with puberty blockers “identified no changes in psychological function” among those treated.
Some clinicians appear reluctant to publish findings that don’t show strong benefits. The British lackluster results were published nine years after the study began, after Britain’s High Court ruled that children younger than 16 were unlikely to be able to form informed consent to such treatments.
And here is the unconscionable censorship on the part of both the American government and the WPATH organization that I haven’t yet written about:
Internal communications from the World Professional Association for Transgender Health [WPATH] suggest that the group tried to interfere with a review commissioned from a team of researchers at Johns Hopkins University
Johanna Olson-Kennedy, medical director of the Center for Transyouth Health and Development at Children’s Hospital of Los Angeles, told the New York Times that a government-funded study of puberty blockers she helped conduct, which started in 2015, had not found mental health improvements, and those results hadn’t been published because more time was needed to ensure the research wouldn’t be “weaponized.” Medical progress is impossible unless null or negative results are published as promptly as positive ones.
Weaponized? WEAPONIZED? The study is done, but the results aren’t ideologically pleasing to gender activists, and so the study languishes, unpublished. That is unethical, for whether or not one uses blockers can have permanent effects on the well being and future fertility of adolescents.
And so we have one more example of science being suppressed because it didn’t give the results activists wanted. But this story isn’t over. As the Post recommends, Congress should fund larger and wlll-conducted trials of blockers with followups on adults who have gone on to estrogen or testosterone therapy. Given the increasing number of people who want to transition, such studies are imperative. But now we lack evidence, and without that the use of blockers should, I think, be stopped. Anecdotal evidence is not enough.
Despite the calls of both Presidential candidates to “unite America”, the calls of many to “reach across the aisle” and confect bipartisan legislation, and the advice of some that it’s time to discuss America’s differences instead of hating one’s opponents, we are now hearing calls from Democrats and liberals to boot those who voted for Trump out of our lives.
I disagree. I know some of those people, and although I don’t like the way they voted, I don’t think that’s sufficient to avoid them forever, or to give them sharp lectures that they are fascists and tried to ruin America and our livelihood. There are, as I’ve pointed out in the nooz over the last few days, a diversity of reasons why people voted for Trump: wokeism of the Left, their own economic problems due to inflation, immigration, and so on—reasons that can be debated but not dismissed.
Sadly, we have some on the Left becoming haters like this. One such person is discussed in a column on by Jonathan Turley written on his website. Turley is a professor at George Washington University Law School, an attorney, a legal scholar. and, I believe, a libertarian. As noted below, Turley wrote a recent column in The Hill about the “liberal rage” that is spreading now that Democrats have started to internalize the election debacle. In that piece Turley made a reasonable point:
It is important to note at the outset that there is no reason Democratic activists should abandon their values just because they lost this election. Our system is strengthened by passionate and active advocacy.
No, not everyone who voted for Trump is a fascist racist, or misogynist. (For crying out loud, a huge number of women voted against Harris.( In fact, more than half of all Americans voted for the Orange Man, since Harris apparently lost the popular vote. I am embarrassed before the world that we chose Trump to hold the most important job in the country, but there it is.
Ergo the rage. In his new column, Turley note a particularly striking and offensive (to me) example of that rage: a resident in psychiatry at Yale. Turley’s words:
With women pledging to break up with their boyfriends and divorce their husbands over the Trump victory, Yale University chief psychiatry resident Dr. Amanda Calhoun is advising that it may also be necessary for your mental health to cut off your family and friends who supported Trump. In that way, you can avoid being “triggered” by opposing political views — much like Yale itself.
As academics, we are dealing with the election on campuses across America. After the election, I had some valuable discussions with students who supported Harris and some who supported Trump. I wish there would be more interaction between the two groups. That is why this story stood out for me. I do not believe that further separation or isolation will help this country or these individuals.
Dr. Calhoun went on MSNBC’s Joy Reid to offer the curious take on good mental health. Reid has spent the week condemning the majority of voters (particularly minority voters) in the nation as racists and misogynists for the Trump victory.
Reid joined a rising tide of rage, which I discussed in my column this weekend. Dr. Calhoun added her voice to the madness.
“So, if you are going into a situation where you have family members, where you have close friends who you know have voted in ways that are against you… it’s completely fine to not be around those people and to tell them why…
…You know, to say, ‘I have a problem with the way that you voted because it went against my very livelihood, and I’m not going to be around you this holiday. I need to take some space for me.’ I think you should very much be entitled to do so, and I think it may be essential for your mental health.”
There is another possibility. You can try to resolve those feelings with people who you previously liked or loved. It may actually help to discuss these issues outside of the echo chamber of your political associations.
If you want to hear Calhoun, who is African-American, actually say what she said above, click on the screenshot below, which will take you to the Fox News column showing a video of Calhoun speaking to Joy Reid on MSNBC. Yes, the words she said are indeed the ones above:
Turley adds this and touts his book, which I haven’t read:
Across the country, women have been cutting their hair and joining the Korean 4B movement—bihon (no marriage), bichulsan (no childbirth), biyeonae (no dating), and bisekseu (no sex). One is quoted as saying, “I fear The Handmaid’s Tale will become our reality.”
It is a curious response since figures like Reid blame white women for the loss. Trump won white women voters by eight points at 53 percent. Harris actually fell slightly in the support of women overall. Conversely, roughly 43 percent of men voted for Harris. Yet I watched one deranged voter say that she is thinking of buying a “Glock” and shooting the first man who comes near her. If so, she would have an over 4 out of 10 likelihood of shooting a fellow Harris supporter.
None of this is good for our nation’s mental health and suggesting that people retreat further into their silos does not make for particularly healthy advice.
As discussed in my book, The Indispensable Right, we have become a nation of rage addicts. Taking another hit of rage will do little to break that addiction.
Now I didn’t vote for Trump, of course, but I am not prepared to either lecture people who did, telling them that they were attacking my livelihood, or telling them that I don’t want to associate with them. I suppose it’s okay to say that “I want to take some time for myself right now,” without giving the reason, and then trying to have a discussion later.
Of course people can sever any relationship they want over the election, but that sort of attitude doesn’t seem to me conducive to mental health—even though Calhoun is a shrink—and it’s certainly not good for the Democrats. After all, a common element in post-election analyses is the idea that the elitism of Democrats, combined with their characterizing their enemies as yokels or fascists, are factors that turned off centrists and leftish Republicans.
There will be some lively discussion around the Thanksgiving and Christmas groaning boards, but Calhoun’s table will be emptier than usual.
This I didn’t expect, and it’s a decision by a 6-3 vote, with Jackson, Kagan, and Sotomayor dissenting. Trump is now apparently shielded from prosecution for official acts, but not private ones. That’s going to cause great confusion, but it’s also going to delay his trials, making it easier for him to win November’s election.
From the NYT; click the headlines to read (archived here, but the feed changes):
An excerpt as things unroll in real time:
The Supreme Court ruled on Monday that former President Donald J. Trump is entitled to some level of immunity from prosecution, a decision that will almost surely delay the trial of the case against him on charges of plotting to subvert the 2020 election past the coming election in November. The vote was 6 to 3, dividing along partisan lines.
Mr. Trump contended that he was entitled to absolute immunity from the charges, relying on a broad understanding of the separation of powers and a 1982 Supreme Court precedent that recognized such immunity in civil cases for actions taken by presidents within the “outer perimeter” of their official responsibilities. Lower courts rejected Mr. Trump’s claim, but the Supreme Court’s ruling may delay the case enough that Mr. Trump would be able to make it go away entirely if he prevails in November.
Here’s what to know:
The ruling: The justices said that Mr. Trump is immune from prosecution for official acts taken during his presidency but that there was a crucial distinction between official and private conduct. The case returns to the lower court, which will decide whether the actions Mr. Trump took were in an official or private capacity.
The charges: The former president faces three charges of conspiracy and one count of obstructing an official proceeding, all related to his efforts to cling to the presidency after his 2020 loss. He was indicted last August by the special counsel, Jack Smith, in one of two federal criminal cases against him; the other relates to the F.B.I. raid on his private club, Mar-a-Lago, in August 2022 that recovered missing government documents.
The trial timing: The prospects for a trial in the 2020 election interference case before the election seem increasingly remote. If Mr. Trump prevails at the polls, he could order the Justice Department to drop the charges. The bottom-line effect of the court’s ruling appears to be that the trial judge in Washington, Tanya S. Chutkan, is going to have to hold an evidentiary hearing on many, if not most, of the allegations in the special counsel’s indictment of Mr. Trump. The fact-finding process the court has ordered could take a while not only to conduct, but also to prepare for.
Lower courts ruled against Trump: Judge Chutkan of the Federal District Court in Washington denied Mr. Trump’s immunity request in December. “Whatever immunities a sitting president may enjoy, the United States has only one chief executive at a time, and that position does not confer a lifelong ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ pass,” she wrote. A unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed in February.
Apparently the January 6 case will go back to an appellate court for further consideration, and that means that a lot of time will pass (way past the election) before this case is decided.
Click to read the ruling as a pdf that you can download:
We are well and truly screwed: the President can commit as many crimes as he wants so long as they are “official acts”, and he has nothing to lose by doing that. And if he gets elected in November, a prospect that seems increasingly likely, he could simply order the Justice Department to drop the whole case against him.
If you’re a lawyer or legal eagle, weigh in below.