The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (BAS) is most famous for its “Doomsday Clock,” which assesses how close we are to a worldwide anthropomorphic catastrophe, including global warming and nuclear war. Right now the clock stands at “90 seconds till midnight,” but it’s gone back and forth over the years and I don’t take that figure too seriously.

But the journal is a serious one dealing with important existential issues for humanity, and I believe it’s widely respected (it was founded by Albert Einstein and participants in the Manhattan project after the nuclear bombings of Japan in 1945).

Well, it was serious—but now, after seeing the article below, we have to worry about ideological capture of yet another organ of science and technology. Why was this published?

Click the headline to read:

The article is a response to “hateful” tweets among comment that “the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation received in response to a December 2022 panel discussion on LGBTQ+ identity in the nuclear weapons space.” The hatefulness is of course bigoted and uncivil, but in response the authors make insupportable statements that we need to “queer” thinking about nuclear weapons to prevent disaster.  Why? Some quotes from the piece (indented):

While the event received an outpouring of vocal and wide-reaching support from some of the best-known figures in the nuclear field, the disparaging tweets illustrated the common belief that queer identity has no relevance for nuclear policy, and that examining the relationship between queerness and nuclear policy is intended to push a social agenda rather than to address substantive issues.

During this Pride Month, we would like Bulletin readers to understand that the visible representation and meaningful participation of queer people matters for nuclear policy outcomes. Discrimination against queer people can undermine nuclear security and increase nuclear risk. And queer theory can help change how nuclear practitioners, experts, and the public think about nuclear weapons.

I’ve never really understood what “queer theory” is, so of course I went to Wikipedia:

The term “queer theory” is broadly associated with the study and theorization of gender and sexual practices that exist outside of heterosexuality, and which challenge the notion that heterosexuality is normal.  Following social constructivist developments in sociology, queer theorists are often critical of what they consider essentialist views of sexuality and gender. Instead, they study those concepts as social and cultural phenomena, often through an analysis of the categories, binaries, and language in which they are said to be portrayed.

. . . Similarly, queer theory remains difficult to objectively define as academics from various disciplines have contributed varying understanding of the term. At its core, queer theory relates to queer people, their lived experience and how their lived experience is culturally or politically perceived, specifically referring to the marginalization of queer people. This thinking is then applied to various fields of thinking

That doesn’t help me much; it seems to be a collection of post facto claims and generalization without much “theory”. At any rate, as you read on, the “theory”, as it relate to nuclear security and disarmament, turns out to be the usual demand for equity in a technical field based on the claim that increased equity will improve the field by bringing in salubrious views:

Equity and inclusion for queer people is not just a box-ticking exercise in ethics and social justice; it is also essential for creating effective nuclear policy. Studies in psychology and behavioral science show that diverse teams examine assumptions and evidence more carefully, make fewer errors, discuss issues more constructively, and better exchange new ideas and knowledge.

I’d check the references (I couldn’t access one of them), for the “diversity” mentioned included exclusively racial diversity and gender diversity sans “queer” diversity. The first reference in fact says that in business the “Theory” hasn’t worked, probably because it’s been misapplied. Here’s a quote from the Harvard Business Review (first link):

These rallying cries for more diversity in companies, from recent statements by CEOs, are representative of what we hear from business leaders around the world. They have three things in common: All articulate a business case for hiring more women or people of color; all demonstrate good intentions; and none of the claims is actually supported by robust research findings.

None of these references include diversity of sexual behavior or sexual identity encompassed in the authors’ call for more LGBTQ+ people, nor do they consider other forms of diversity, like socioeconomic background. While surely LGBTQ+ people should not be discriminated against in this field, and in others, the argument that they have “different ways of thinking,” and thus added representation will help stave off nuclear disaster, is not convincing. More from the BAS article:

When the stakes of making best-informed decisions are as high as they are with nuclear weapons, governments cannot afford to lose out on the human capital and innovation potential of queer people. Informed by their life experiences, queer people have specific skills to offer that are valuable in a policy and diplomacy context. LGBTQ+ people often must navigate being different from those around them; develop the ability to listen and empathize; and mobilize the skill and perseverance to make themselves heard.

This is an assertion without evidence, and the argument would of course apply to any “marginalized” group—were it true.

Again, any bigotry against people of color, women, and LGBTQ+ people in the area of nuclear policy is shameful and should be eliminated, but does it exist? Only one or two anecdotes are given, not a claims of “structural bigotry.”

Further, the article does nothing to dispel the notion that “examining the relationship between queerness and nuclear policy is intended to push a social agenda rather than to address substantive issues.” Indeed, I can’t imagine one could read this article and not conclude that it’s pushing a social agenda:

Here are a few of the putative advantages of creating LGBTQ+ equity (headings are mine):

Better decision making. 

Including a wider range of perspectives in nuclear decision making creates a more comprehensive definition of who or what constitutes a “threat” to nuclear security. An example of this is the threat posed by some white supremacist groups with plans to acquire nuclear weapons or material, which can go undetected when a white-majority workforce does not perceive these groups and their ideological motivation as a relevant threat to their nuclear security mission. Individuals targeted by these kinds of groups—including women, people of color, and the LGBTQ+ community—are more likely to identify these types of behaviors and attitudes as security risks and can play a crucial role in identifying a potential insider threat.

This seems both hypothetic and uber-hyperbolic to me, and again, seems clearly aimed at pushing a social agenda, not ameliorating palpable threats. If you look at the second link in the paragraph above, you’ll find another BAS article that says stuff like this (note that the article is not about white supremacists, as claimed above, but “far-right extremists”:

Inspired by the ideas of accelerationism, the modern breed of violent far-right extremism is becoming more destructive, and nuclear weapons certainly fit into this profile of catastrophic violence.

. . . While some violent far-right extremists are clearly motivated to carry out catastrophic terrorist attacks, a question remains: Do they possess the means and opportunity to conduct an act of nuclear terrorism? There is no public evidence violent far-right extremist groups have obtained the resources or exhibited the requisite operational sophistication to carry out an act of nuclear terrorism.

I can’t say that this really worries me, nor am I convinced that adding more queer people to the field would help us find white supremacists plotting to use nuclear weapons.  In fact, were the instances of theoretical “nuclear terrorism” already mentioned by those on the far right (some aren’t even in the U.S.) detected largely by queer people? We have no data here.  Here are some of the reasons why, say the authors, we must “queer” nuclear policy. Again, quotes from BAS are indented:

The historical legacy of anti-gay discrimination in government. 

Being LGBTQ+ has historically been considered a security risk. Akin to the “Red Scare” anti-communism movement, the “Lavender Scare” was a campaign persecuting and dismissing gay and lesbian federal employees. The linking of homophobia and national security concerns seems to stem from sensationalized case studies of defections of US intelligence specialists to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This legacy of queerness being considered a security risk is still pervasive in the nuclear field.

Read the second link; it’s from 1995 and notes that since 1991 the investigators have found no cases of discrimination against gays procuring security clearances:

. . . .our work disclosed no evidence that sexual orientation has been used as a criterion in the security clearance process for federal civilian and contractor employees since 1991.

In fact, this kind of discrimination is now illegal, and could lead to lawsuits.  Once again, the evidence is distorted seemingly to push a social agenda.

Finally, there’s this claim:

Nuclear facilities don’t create a “welcoming environment: for queer people.

Despite setbacks, public acceptance of the queer community is rising globally, and the supposed links between espionage and homosexuality have been unfounded. However, nuclear facilities still have a reputation for being unwelcoming toward queer people and have failed to investigate allegations of homophobia and harassment. In part, this is due to the lack of diversity in the nuclear field. Homogenous organizations run a higher risk of isolating queer employees, leaving them vulnerable to pressure. Employees in the majority can feel threatened by those they perceive as “different” and exclude them due to discomfort, rather than any legitimate risk factors. Nuclear security practice needs to refrain from treating an individual’s behavior or identity as a risk and focus instead on identifying misbehaviors that indicate malicious intent.

By failing to create a welcoming workplace at nuclear facilities—whether military or civilian—practitioners risk reducing the effectiveness of an organization’s nuclear security culture.

Again, if there is bigotry and discrimination in nuclear facilities against queer people, that’s reprehensible and should be rooted out. But here we need facts, not feelings. Given the welcome and rapid acceptance of queer people into mainstream society and science in particular, the assertion of structural bigotry is questionable. In fact, the authors adduce only one link instance of a failure to investigate homophobic bullying and abuse at one British nuclear site. That’s reprehensible, but is one instance sufficient to indict the entire field and raise a sweeping call for equity?

The Solution:

We need to beef up the number of LGBTQ+ people in nuclear policy—that is, “queer the field”—to reap the substantial benefits of greater queer equity (though the present degree of inequity isn’t specified and is surely not known). Some quotes on the benefits:

Queer identity is also relevant for the nuclear field because it informs theories that aim to change how officials, experts, and the public think about nuclear weapons. Queer theory is a field of study, closely related to feminist theory, that examines sex- and gender-based norms. It shines a light on the harm done by nuclear weapons through uranium mining, nuclear tests, and the tax money spent on nuclear weapons ($60 billion annually in the United States) instead of on education, infrastructure, and welfare. The queer lens prioritizes the rights and well-being of people over the abstract idea of national security. . . [JAC: What is national security but a balancing of well-being and rights against dangers like nuclear weapons?]

. . . Queer theory also identifies how the nuclear weapons discourse is gendered: Nuclear deterrence is associated with “rationality” and “security,” while disarmament and justice for nuclear weapon victims are coded as “emotion” and a lack of understanding of the “real” mechanics of security.

That is another risible assertion without evidence; in fact, no quotes or links are given. It goes on:

. . . Queer theory is also about rejecting binary choices and zero-sum thinking, such as the tenet that nuclear deterrence creates security and disarmament creates vulnerability. It identifies the assumptions and interests these ideas are built on—and imagines alternatives that serve a broader range of interests, including those of the invisible and resource-stripped.

. . . Finally, queer theory informs the struggle for nuclear justice and disarmament. For example, queer artist and writer Jessie Boylan highlights the harm done by nuclear weapons by documenting the social and environmental consequences of nuclear testing in Australia as part of the Atomic Photographers Guild. Queer theory helps to shift the perception of nuclear weapons as instruments for security by telling the hidden stories of displacement, illness, and trauma caused by their production and testing.

As we know, there have been plenty of arguments for nuclear disarmament and depictions of the dangers of nuclear war made by non-queer people, beginning with Albert Einstein and Robert Oppenheimer, both cis physicists who pushed strongly for nuclear disarmament. Citing Jessie Boylan’s work does nothing to support the authors’ general argument.

And so we have Reitman and Nair’s argument, an argument that in principle could be made for any field of endeavor. It’s based on a concatenation of assumptions and  undemonstrated assertions, among them the claim that queer people have a “different way of knowing” and a “different way of thinking” than do non-queer people, and that absorbing these differences could lead to in a substantially better nuclear policy than we have now.

It is an argument based in victimhood and divisiveness, and forgive me if I find it unconvincing. As I said, if you adduce the past evidence of homophobia, which was once pervasive, any field of human endeavor could be subject to this article’s argument: all fields need to be “queered.”

But assuming that each once oppressed group can bring to the table important new “ways of thinking” about policy or science itself is not only unevidenced, but leads to an “otherism” that only serves to divide LGBTQ+ from cis people.

Although the authors claim that they are not trying to push a social agenda, it seems evident that they are. What is that agenda? Simply to bring more LGBTQ+ people into nuclear policy. But given our ignorance of the claimed inequities, and especially of any important “ways of thinking” of queer people that would inform nuclear policy, this seems to be an argument without evidence.

Of course bigotry against queer people in any field is reprehensible, and often illegal, and should be condemned. Equal opportunity for entry should be the rule. But that’s not the same thing as saying that we need more queer people in nuclear policy because they bring something new and important to the table. The whole argument is in fact what the authors deny it is: a pastiche of dubious claims that add up to a social agenda.

The’ comments by the article’s readers also show that, by and large, they aren’t buying it. Have a look after the article. Here are two:

That one deals with the “merit versus ideology” dichotomy, and, as always, I’m going with merit.