The Guardian tries to pwn Dawkins

September 7, 2010 • 7:56 am

In his blog On Art in today’s Guardian, Johnathan Jones, whoever he is, makes an invidious and ill-informed comparison between Dawkins and Darwin:  “Natural selection: Give me Darwin over Dawkins any day.

To Jones, Darwin was the moderate Victorian gentleman, presenting evidence without bashing creationism, while Dawkins (of course) is strident and arrogant, putting off his biology audience by touting atheism.  This is Mooneyism at its best:

Darwin is the finest fruit of English empiricism. His modest presentation of evidence contrasts, I am sorry to say, with the rhetorical stridency of Richard Dawkins. Visit the famous atheist’s website and you will see two causes being pushed. Dawkins is campaigning with other secular stars against the pope’s visit to Britain. Meanwhile he is touring the paperback of his book The Greatest Show On Earth: The Evidence for Evolution. The trouble with this book is that it lacks Darwin’s empirical style. Where the Victorian writer presented masses of evidence, and let his astonishing, earth-shattering theory emerge from common-sense observations of nature, Dawkins lacks the patience, at this point in his career, to let natural history speak for itself. He has become the mirror image of the theological dogmatists he despises.

He just can’t separate science from the debate he has got into with religious people.

I don’t know what book Jones read, but it’s not the same one I reviewed in The Nation. The Greatest Show on Earth has chapter after chapter of solid biology, natural history, genetics, evo-devo, and the like. Yes, Dawkins takes some slaps at creationists, but Darwin wasn’t dealing with a 150-year history of entrenched religious opposition to his ideas.

Jones apparently hasn’t read The Origin, either, since Darwin by no means let the data “speak for itself.” Over and over again, Darwin contrasts the data with what one would expect under creationism, showing that the religious “theory” was grossly wrong.  If Darwin published this today, he’d surely be accused of insensitivity to the feelings of the faithful. (Remember all those people, like Josh Rosenau and Michael De Dora, who said that while it’s okay to tell people that the Earth is 4.5 billion years old, it’s not okay to tell them that this shows that the Earth isn’t 6,000 years old?)

Let’s take just a few examples from one chapter—Chapter 12, on biogeography.

In St. Helena there is reason to believe that the naturalised plants and animals have nearly or quite exterminated many native productions. He who admits the doctrine of the creation of each separate species, will have to admit, that a sufficient number of the best adapted plants and animals have not been created on oceanic islands; for man has unintentionally stocked them from various sources far more fully and perfectly than has nature. . .

This general absence of frogs, toads, and newts on so many oceanic islands cannot be accounted for by their physical conditions; indeed it seems that islands are peculiarly well fitted for these animals; for frogs have been introduced into Madeira, the Azores, and Mauritius, and have multiplied so as to become a nuisance. But as these animals and their spawn are known to be immediately killed by sea-water, on my view we can see that there would be great difficulty in their transportal across the sea, and therefore why they do not exist on any oceanic island. But why, on the theory of creation, they should not have been created there, it would be very difficult to explain. . .

The naturalist, looking at the inhabitants of these volcanic islands in the Pacific, distant several hundred miles from the continent, yet feels that he is standing on American land. Why should this be so? why should the species which are supposed to have been created in the Galapagos Archipelago, and nowhere else, bear so plain a stamp of affinity to those created in America? There is nothing in the conditions of life, in the geological nature of the islands, in their height or climate, or in the proportions in which the several classes are associated together, which resembles closely the conditions of the South American coast: in fact there is a considerable dissimilarity in all these respects.

This is surely not letting the facts speak for themselves: it is using the facts as a club to beat back the most prevalent alternative theory to Darwin’s, creationism.  Yes, Richard uses language a bit stronger than Darwin’s, but the intent is precisely the same.  And let us not forget Darwin’s bulldog—T. H. Huxley—whose  vociferous and “strident” attacks on religious opposition to Darwin went a long way to promote acceptance of evolution in Britain.

And the accusation that Dawkins’s biology is devalued by his atheism is completely unfair.  Has Jones read The Selfish Gene? The Extended Phenotype? The Blind Watchmaker? If he has, I don’t know how he can accuse Dawkins of “patronising his audience.” This is popular science writing at its best: it carries the reader along step by step, but never talks down to her, and when you’ve finished one of those books you’ve absorbed an amazing amount of biology.  But I needn’t tell you that.

Jones is clearly out of his element here, which is writing about pictures of dogs playing poker. In his haste to defend faith against the depredations of Dawkins, he makes a complete fool of himself.

h/t: Matthew Cobb

Does religion need evidence?

September 6, 2010 • 6:45 am

In a strange Opinionator piece in today’s New York Times, “Mystery and evidence,” Tim Crane announces that, in insisting that religious belief rests on evidence in the same way science does, Gnu Atheists are misguided.

Give him one thing:  Crane, a professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge, at least recognizes—unlike “sophisticated” theologians like Karen Armstrong and Mark Vernon—that religious claims are at bottom claims of fact:

It is absolutely essential to religions that they make certain factual or historical claims. When Saint Paul says “if Christ is not risen, then our preaching is in vain and our faith is in vain” he is saying that the point of his faith depends on a certain historical occurrence.

Theologians will debate exactly what it means to claim that Christ has risen, what exactly the meaning and significance of this occurrence is, and will give more or less sophisticated accounts of it. But all I am saying is that whatever its specific nature, Christians must hold that there was such an occurrence. Christianity does make factual, historical claims. But this is not the same as being a kind of proto-science.

So then why are Dawkins & Co. so misguided when they point out the absence of evidence for these historical claims? First of all, because existence claims aren’t scientific claims:

Speaking for myself, it is because I reject the factual basis of the central Christian doctrines that I consider myself an atheist. But I do not reject these claims because I think they are bad hypotheses in the scientific sense. Not all factual claims are scientific hypotheses. So I disagree with Richard Dawkins when he says “religions make existence claims, and this means scientific claims.”

This is bizarre.  Why aren’t religious existence claims scientific?  Crane has a very strange view of science, saying that it’s a “very specific and technical kind of knowledge,” requiring “patience, pedantry, a narrowing of focus and (in the case of the most profound scientific theories) considerable mathematical knowledge and ability.”  He contrasts this with religious belief, which “does not require years of training”, and is “not specialized” and “not technical.”  This is a curious argument, since science is surely just a subspecies of rational inquiry.  Whether or not it takes math to prove the existence of a resurrected Jesus is irrelevant: it takes the same kind of rational, evidence-based inquiry that all scientists and anthropologists use when reconstructing the past.

But the main reason Crane sees religion as unscientific is because no matter what the evidence shows, the faithful will always cling to their beliefs:

When the devout pray, and their prayers are not answered, they do not take this as evidence which has to be weighed alongside all the other evidence that prayer is effective. They feel no obligation whatsoever to weigh the evidence. If God does not answer their prayers, well, there must be some explanation of this, even though we may never know it. Why do people suffer if an omnipotent God loves them? Many complex answers have been offered, but in the end they come down to this: it’s a mystery.

It’s a mystery, and the faithful like it that way, for that mystery imparts meaning and purpose to their lives.  So, although they’d greedily cling to evidence if it supported their beliefs, they disregard counterevidence:

Religion, on the other hand, attempts to make sense of the world by seeing a kind of meaning or significance in things. This kind of significance does not need laws or generalizations, but just the sense that the everyday world we experience is not all there is, and that behind it all is the mystery of God’s presence. The believer is already convinced that God is present in everything, even if they cannot explain this or support it with evidence. But it makes sense of their life by suffusing it with meaning. . .

I have suggested that while religious thinking is widespread in the world, scientific thinking is not. I don’t think that this can be accounted for merely in terms of the ignorance or irrationality of human beings. Rather, it is because of the kind of intellectual, emotional and practical appeal that religion has for people, which is a very different appeal from the kind of appeal that science has.

Crane is wrong in saying that scientific thinking isn’t widespread, at least if you construe “scientific thinking” as “the species of thinking that demands evidence for assertions.”  People trust their doctors to have evidence for their treatment, they trust their plumbers to find a leak using principles of hydraulics rather than faith, they expect journalists to have ascertained the facts, they fix their cars using principles of physics and engineering, and when you tell them their wife is cheating, they want evidence.  And not all believers, as Crane implies, will cling to their faith regardless of the facts.  There are many, like Dan Barker, who realize the empirical poverty of religious dogma and abandon their faith.  But Crane is on the mark in explaining religion’s appeal.

Viewed this way, religion is not wholly unscientific.  It’s not oblivious to fact:  as Crane notes, Christianity would founder if people absolutely understood that Jesus wasn’t resurrected. Rather, religion resembles bad science.  Like creationism, it makes claims about the world that are immune to refutation.  In that sense—how they view the value of evidence—religion and real science are incompatible.

But maybe the argument about whether religion is “scientific” is a semantic one. What’s not semantic is that they use incompatible methodologies and philosophies in arriving at “truth.” As Crane says “religion and science are very different kinds of attempt to understand the world.” Another incompatibility is incompatibility itself: there is only one science, but dozens of religions, all making incompatible claims about what is true. In this sense, religion is demonstrably not a way to find truth.

This is why science and religion can never have the constructive and fruitful dialogue so beloved of accommodationists and so heavily funded by Templeton.  Religion has nothing to contribute to science, and the only thing science can contribute to religion is the falsification of its claims.  But that has no effect on most believers.  (It does, however, force the more sophisticated ones to fine tune their theology.)

Crane’s piece is a curious one.  It doesn’t say much that’s new, or have a new take on the issues.  After all, we all know that showing fossils to creationists doesn’t change their minds, and we know that’s not because they’re somehow unable to understand evidence.  And although Crane is an atheist, and insists that he’s not arguing “for religion,” if you read his piece in its entirety it looks like nothing other than belief in belief.  And that’s surely why the Times published it.

Did evolution give us God?

September 5, 2010 • 5:45 am

I’m all in favor of religious studies, but by that I mean studies that dissect the historical basis of religion and try to explain its prevalence.  Writers like Pascal Boyer and Dan Dennett, and of course all the religious scholars who trace the origins of sacred books, have made important contributions to understanding this greatest of psychological engines.  And I’m also in favor of teaching the nature and background of religion in public school, though I’m really, really dubious that it could ever be done objectively and without rancor. (Imagine, for example, how Catholics or Muslims would squabble about how the teachings of their faith should be “objectively” presented to kids!)

Lately, however, attempts to understand religion seem to elide into justifications for religion, particularly studies that purport to reveal religion’s evolutionary roots.  When you read about these studies, you can sense, bubbling beneath, the naturalistic fallacy that if something evolved it must therefore be good for us—prompting what Dennett calls “belief in belief.”  Indeed, some folks seem to go even further, thinking that that if a belief in God evolved, then maybe there is a God. Regardless, many of those wishing for a rapprochement between science and faith find hope in evolutionary studies of religion.

I saw this again on this week’s version of NPR’s “All things considered” hosted by Alix Spiegel:  “Is believing in God evolutionarily advantageous?” Surprisingly (at least to me), NPR seems to have a weakness for faith.  It hosts the abysmal Krista Tippett and her “Speaking of Faith,” and gives little airplay to the godless.  This week’s show could easily have been Tippett’s.  Here’s a summary:

Why religion might well be an evolved adaptation.  Answer: because it’s everywhere, and everyone has it to some degree.  The show starts with psychologist—and atheist—Jesse Bering’s sudden experience of the numinous on the night when his mother died:

The wind chimes outside his mother’s window started to chime.  Bering remembers waking to the tinkle of these bells, a small but distinct sound in an otherwise silent house. And he remembers thinking that those bells carried a very specific message.

“It seemed to me … that she was somehow telling us that she had made it to the other side. You know, cleared customs in heaven,” Bering says.

The thought surprised him. Bering was a confirmed atheist. He did not believe in any kind of supernatural anything. He prided himself on being a scientist, a psychologist who believed only in the measurable material world. But, he says, he simply couldn’t help himself.

“My mind went there. It leapt there,” Bering says. “And from a psychological perspective, this was really interesting to me. Because I didn’t believe it on the one hand, but on the other hand I experienced it.”

Bering claims that these Goddy experiences are universal, even among athiests:

“I’ve always said that I don’t believe in God, but I don’t really believe in atheists either,” Bering says. “Everybody experiences the illusion that God — or some type of supernatural agent — is watching them or is concerned about what they do in their sort of private everyday moral lives.” . . .

In fact, Bering says that believing that supernatural beings are watching you is so basic to being human that even committed atheists regularly have moments where their minds turn in a supernatural direction, as his did in the wake of his mother’s death.

Bering’s support for this is what evolutionist J. B. S. Haldane called Aunt Jobiska’s Theorem: “It’s a fact the whole world knows.” Note to Bering: never in my life, even before I gave up faith in my teens, have I ever for one moment experienced the feeling of being watched by a supernatural agent.  And I suspect a lot of my readers won’t have, either.  And of those who have had those experiences, how many would still have if they hadn’t been inculcated with religion since they were children?

But Bering’s big mistake, and that of Spiegel, is to claim that the ubiquity of a behavior suggests that it has evolutionary roots:

In the history of the world, every culture in every location at every point in time has developed some supernatural belief system. And when a human behavior is so universal, scientists often argue that it must be an evolutionary adaptation along the lines of standing upright. That is, something so helpful that the people who had it thrived, and the people who didn’t slowly died out until we were all left with the trait. But what could be the evolutionary advantage of believing in God?

Okay, let’s stop right there.  A behavior that is widespread, or universal, need not have evolved, or been selected for directly.  Let’s take a common one: masturbation.  Surely self-pleasuring is as widespread as faith and spiritual experience, but I seriously doubt that we have a evolved “wanking module” that mandates this specific behavior.  Indeed, masturbation could be seen as maladaptive, since it quenches your sexual impulses in a nonreproductive way.  In fact, masturbation is almost certainly a byproduct of evolution: we’ve evolved neurologically-based sexual pleasure and orgasms that impel us to reproduce, we’ve evolved a big brain that helps us learn, and, voilà, we learn that we can have orgasms without a mate.

There are lots of behaviors that are nearly universal but probably not evolved, at least in the sense of natural selection having favored genes promoting those behaviors.  Brushing our teeth, dancing, writing poetry, telling jokes: all of these are evolutionary in the trivial sense that they’re productions of a highly evolved brain, but probably not behaviors that were selected for directly.  Curiously, there’s not the slightest mention in the NPR piece that the ubiquity of faith could largely reflect the fact that we’re taught to believe. If religion were an evolved, hard-wired phenomenon, it should spontaneously appear if you could somehow bring up a group of children without exposing them to faith or its manifestations in modern life.  We can’t do this, of course, but it tells you what’s required to substantiate the “hard-wired” explanation.

And so might religion also be a byproduct—a byproduct (as Pascal Boyer posits) of behaviors like intentionality and curiosity that themselves were either favored directly by natural selection or were byproducts of consciousness and intelligence. Religion’s ubiquity?  It could reflect either cultural inheritance or the fact that independent societies, with the same cerebral armament, hit on similar behaviors.

How did religion evolve? There’s no behavior too arcane (or even maladaptive) to defy an evolutionary-psychology explanation.  Religion is an easy one! Here’s what Spiegel says:

Through the lens of evolution, a belief in God serves a very important purpose: Religious belief set us on the path to modern life by stopping cheaters and promoting the social good . . .

In those early human communities when someone did something wrong, someone else in the small human group would have to punish them. But as Johnson points out, punishing itself is often dangerous because the person being punished probably won’t like it.

“That person has a family; that person has a memory and is going to develop a grudge,” [Dominic] Johnson says. “So there are going to be potentially quite disruptive consequences of people taking the law into their own hands.”

On the other hand, Johnson says, if there are Gods or a God who must be obeyed, these strains are reduced. After all, the punisher isn’t a vigilante; he’s simply enforcing God’s law.

“You have a very nice situation,” Johnson says. “There are no reprisals against punishers. And the other nice thing about supernatural agents is that they are often omniscient and omnipresent.”

That wasn’t hard, was it?  Of course, it’s tinged with group selection, and there’s no explanation about why cheaters, who pretend to believe in God but don’t really, wouldn’t subvert the system, but never mind.  There are two big problems with this explanation.  The first is the complete lack of evidence (besides its ubiquity, which proves nothing) that there’s a hard-wired genetic basis to religious belief.  More about that in a minute.

The second is that there are alternative, non-evolutionary reasons for religion. (I mean “non-evolutionary” in the sense that there are no genes specifically promoting belief in the supernatural.  Of course, all human behaviors can be considered evolutionary in the trivial sense that they’re performed by an evolved brain).  Pascal Boyer outlines some of these in Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origin of Religious Thought.  In short, Boyer believes that religion is simply a byproduct of evolved human cognition and sociality: things like guessing the motives of others, adopting an intentional stance, and so on.

Another explanation, which I believe Dawkins discusses in The God Delusion (I don’t have my copy here), is that religion is parasitic on our evolved credulity, particularly as children.  We are evolved to follow authority because authority has generally been good for us, especially when we’re young, and so society culturally supplements that authority with a sky-god. That’s similar to the NPR explanation except there’s no genetics and no evolution of religious belief per se.  And then of course there’s another byproduct of evolution: we are probably the only creatures who know we’re going to die.  We don’t like that, so we infuse many faiths with immortality and heavenly reward.

Now we don’t know which of these explanations, if any (or all!) is true.  The point is that there are purely social and cultural explanations for religious belief, explanations that don’t require genes for God.  All of these piggyback on some of our evolved traits, but in none is there direct selection for belief in gods.  In these theories, religion has the same relationship to evolution as masturbation does to sex.

But isn’t there evidence for “God genes,” you might ask?  Not really.  A while back there was evidence that VMAT2, a gene involved in neurotransmission, was present in two forms, one of which correlated with higher performance on psychological assays of spirituality.  But the effect was very weak, and was never replicated by other scientists (see Carl Zimmer’s critique).  But even if there were such a gene, with a weak effect on promoting spirituality, it says virtually nothing about whether spirituality is hard-wired in our genomes.  For one thing, the gene was segregating: it was found in some individuals and not others.  Why this variation if we’re all hard-wired for faith?

More important, segregating genetic variation says nothing about the evolutionary basis of a trait.  To belabor the masturbation analogy, let’s suppose there was a genetic analysis of the frequency of masturbation in males.  You might indeed find some segregating genes that affect the trait: individuals who have higher titers of testosterone, for instance, might pleasure themselves more frequently.  Or genes that make one physically unattractive, and unable to get mates, might have as their byproduct a more frequent need for wanking. So we have genetic variation for the trait, but this says nothing about masturbation as a behavior favored by evolution. You could find this variation whether the behavior was a direct product of selection or only a byproduct of other traits that evolved.

So we have no evidence for a genetic basis of believing in God, and plenty of alternative explanations that don’t involve natural selection.  How did NPR deal with these serious objections?

The caveats.  In a piece of 2288 words, NPR devotes 96 of them—just 4% of the total—to “differing views”. Here’s their “critique” in its entirety:

Of course there are plenty of criticisms of these ideas. For example one premise of this argument is that religious belief is beneficial because it helped us to cooperate. But a small group of academics argue that religious beliefs have ultimately been more harmful than helpful, because those religious beliefs inspire people to go to war.

And then there are the people who say that cooperation doesn’t come from God — that cooperation evolved from our need to take care of family or show potential mates that we were a good choice. The theories are endless.

That’s really lame. Not a word about genetics or other non-evolutionary explanations for religion.  No other experts were recruited to criticize NPR’s evolutionary story—and believe me, there are plenty of them.  So when Spiegel’s piece ends with this:

Unfortunately it’s not possible now to rewind the movie, so to speak, and see what actually happened. So these speculations will remain just that: speculations.

you can forgive the listener for ignoring a few words of reservation after an enthusiastic boost for the God-was-selected theory.

As a whole, the NPR piece is irresponsible science reporting, leading the public to think that scientists are really on to a new Darwinian explanation for faith.  We aren’t:  we have tons of theories and few ways to distinguish among them. (I, for one, would love to see a generation of children brought up completely insulated from religion. That’s impractical, of course, but if it were done I doubt that religion would suddenly reappear.)

The origins of faith, lost in either our evolutionary or cultural past, may simply be one of those questions we’ll never resolve. It’s still worth trying, but in the interim let’s not pretend that we’re even close to understanding the connection between evolution and God.  True, that connection—though despised by many of the faithful—is welcomed by faitheists and other accommodationists.  It seems to bring about a harmony between science and faith.  But the whole purpose of science is to keep us from mistaking what we’d like to be true for what really is true.

Colorado paper: P. Z. = Bin Laden

September 4, 2010 • 4:57 pm

PeeZee must be busy, because he hasn’t yet responded to something that hits close to home: an editorial in the Colorado Springs Gazette accusing him, and other atheist/Darwinists, of fomenting violence and murder (think Columbine shootings and Discovery Channel standoff):

Those who commit atrocities to fight for the cause of Darwin are similar to those who commit atrocities for the sake of Jesus or Muhammed. They are con men, striking out in hatred and justifying their acts with figures greater than self. . .

Just as James Dobson and other evangelists cultivate audiences in order to spread their beliefs, so do atheist evangelizers. The bigs are Britons Christopher Hitchens, who is battling cancer, and Richard Dawkins, who turns 70 in March. Myers, who grabbed attention by vandalizing sacred religious property, is a young and energetic American evangelist on track to become the James Dobson of atheism. . .

The more atheists push their beliefs — through terror or preaching — the more they appear as another evangelical movement with faith in a philosophy that can never be proved or disproved. Atheists, welcome to the club. All you’re lacking are orphanages, AIDS hospices, missionaries, and thousands of charitable foundations. Get on it.

The author of this screed is Wayne Laugesen, a notorious conservative/libertarian. I won’t do the heavy lifting on this one—that rightfully belongs to its target. But here’s the theme song for the children’s prayer/brainwashing videos that Laugesen and his wife co-produce, “Holy Baby!“:

If you want to see a nauseating 24-minute “Holy Baby!” video, go here.

Oh, and there’s a poll about whether atheists are as charitable as believers. Curiously, it seems to have already been Pharyngulated.

Science pushes back theology a bit more

September 4, 2010 • 10:03 am

There’s been a lot more brouhaha than I expected about Stephen Hawking’s declaration this week that the universe had a perfectly naturalistic, non-Goddy origin.  I suppose it’s because of Hawking’s big name, which gives his pronouncements the gravitas of a latter-day Einstein.  So now that the idea of “multiverses”—multiple universes—is becoming more mainstream, and the origins of our own universe are swimming into scientific ken, what’s a believer to do?  Over at the Guardian, physicist and Templeton Prize winner Paul Davies is on the case, doing the religious two-step:

1. Nothing new here! Just trot out our favorite Accommodater, the ever-prescient St. Augustine:

. . . there was no time “before” the big bang. The idea is by no means new. In the fifth century, St Augustine of Hippo wrote that “the universe was created with time and not in time”.

Religious people often feel tricked by this logic. They envisage a miracle-working God dwelling within the stream of time for all eternity and then, for some inscrutable reason, making a universe (perhaps in a spectacular explosion) at a specific moment in history.

That was not Augustine’s God, who transcended both space and time. Nor is it the God favoured by many contemporary theologians.

2. There’s still room for God! He’s in the laws of physics!

According to folklore the French physicist Pierre Laplace, when asked by Napoleon where God fitted into his mathematical account of the universe, replied: “I had no need of that hypothesis.” Although cosmology has advanced enormously since the time of Laplace, the situation remains the same: there is no compelling need for a supernatural being or prime mover to start the universe off. But when it comes to the laws that explain the big bang, we are in murkier waters.

And when those murkier waters clear, revealing no god in the depths, Davies will find Him somewhere else.

A correlation between poverty and religiosity

September 4, 2010 • 8:09 am

A Gallup poll out this week finds, among 100 nations surveyed, a very strong correlation between religiosity and poverty.  As you might expect, the poorest countries (rated by average per-capita GDP) are the most religious (rated by the proportion of people who say “yes” to the question, “Is religion an important part of your daily life?”).  Here’s a nice figure from the New York Times showing this correlation (click to enlarge):

Note that the United States is an outlier, far more religious (65% say “yes”) than its prosperity would suggest (average GDP about $46,000). If we were on the line, we’d be about as irreligious as Hong Kong (24% yeses). Of course the interpretation of the negative correlation isn’t clear.  The Gallup folks say this:

Social scientists have put forth numerous possible explanations for the relationship between the religiosity of a population and its average income level. One theory is that religion plays a more functional role in the world’s poorest countries, helping many residents cope with a daily struggle to provide for themselves and their families. A previous Gallup analysis supports this idea, revealing that the relationship between religiosity and emotional wellbeing is stronger among poor countries than among those in the developed world.

Why is the U.S. an outlier? Also unclear.  Greg Paul, of course, has suggested a modification of the theory mentioned above: religiosity is higher not just when average income is low, but when average life security is low.  If you plot religiosity against what Paul calls the “successful societies scale,” which takes into account dysfunctionalities like corruption, suicide, marital stability, and so forth, the U.S. is no longer an outlier.  We’re a rich society, but Paul’s metric shows that we’re not such a successful one.

The poll also affirms what most of us know: the U.S. is appreciably more religious than most other prosperous nations.  Here’s the proportion of people in various countries who claim that religion is an important part of their daily lives:

Sweden:  17%

Denmark: 19%

Japan:  24%

UK:  27%

France:  30%

Germany: 40%

Canada: 42%

Spain: 49%

U.S. 65%

Italy 72%

But the figures hearten me somewhat.  When people say, “Religion is here to stay,” I respond, “It didn’t stay in Denmark and England!”