Best Broadway musicals

June 13, 2011 • 8:04 am

I really watch only two television programs: the evening network news and 60 Minutes (did you see the profile of Craig Venter last night?).  But last night 60 Minutes was immediately followed by the Tony Awards, so I watched a bit of that.  I found the show much better than the Oscars, and was impressed by Neil Patrick Harris’s hosting job.  His opening number, “Broadway: it’s not just for gays anymore” was hilarious, and I was chuffed to see that the “Best Musical Award” went to the heretical “The Book of Mormon” (This itself shows something about the secularization of American society.  Such a play could never have won an award half a century ago).

At any rate, I starting thinking about my own favorite musicals.  I tend to favor the old-style musicals, not overly sophisticated but with oodles of terrific songs. Yes, I know Stephen Sondheim is feted, but who remembers the music apart from his contributions to West Side Story and the one number “Send in the Clowns”?  And so I provide my list of “best” (i.e., Jerry’s favorite) Broadway musicals, in order (#1 is best).  This is, of course, an eclectic list, and I invite you to give yours—with justifications!

1. Brigadoon. (Lerner and Loewe, 1947). Who remembers this old chestnut from the 1940s?  But my parents had the original cast recording, and I listened to it over and over again as a kid.  And yes, a few of the songs are pretty dire (“Waiting for my dearie”), but the story is absorbing and some of the songs simply sublime.  I’m thinking in particular of “I’ll Go Home with Bonnie Jean,” “The Heather on the Hill,” “There But for You Go I,” and “From This Day On.”  This is really a sentimental favorite, because I think the songs in West Side Story are more consistently great.

2.  West Side Story. (Laurents, Bernstein and Sondheim,  1957).  A great story and a passel of wonderful songs, including the sublime “Maria,” “I Feel Pretty,” “Tonight,” “America,” and my absolute favorite, “Somewhere.”  A monumental musical achievement. Oh, and “Officer Krupke” (“we’re depraved on accounta we’re deprived”).

3.  Camelot.  (also Lerner and Loewe, 1960).  My parents had the original cast album as well, with Richard Burton, Julie Andrews, Robert Goulet, and Roddy McDowell—how can you beat a cast like that?  It’s a relatively sophisticated musical, and the songs, well, they’re terrific and almost uniformly good, with clever and intricate lyrics: “I Wonder What the King is Doing Tonight,” “I Loved You Once in Silence,” “The Lusty Month of May,” “If Ever I Would Leave You,” “Then You May Take Me to the Fair,” “How to Handle a Woman,” and so on.  Goulet, as Lancelot, and Andrews, as Guinevere, were in top voice.

4.  South Pacific. (Rodgers and Hammerstein, 1949).  Ezio Pinza and Mary Martin! Who can forget “Bloody Mary”? Or “I’m Gonna Wash that Man Right Outa My Hair”?  And there’s also “Some Enchanted Evening,” “This Nearly Was Mine,” “There is Nothing Like a Dame,” “I’m in Love with a Wonderful Guy,” and the classical plea for racial tolerance, “You’ve Got to Be Carefully Taught.”

5.  Oklahoma. (Also Rodgers and Hammerstein, 1943).  Another sentimental favorite, nearly tied with South Pacific above.  Yes, it’s as corny as Kansas in August, but it has some great songs, including “Poor Jud is Daid,” (I love that song!), “The Surry with the Fringe on Top,” “Many a New Day,” the romantic high spot, “People Will Say We’re in Love,” and, of course, the title song.

Oh hell, let’s have one song a day from these winners, in order. It’s really hard to find good versions of Brigadoon tunes on YouTube; in fact, there are no recordings from the original cast album, which is by far the best (forget the movie with Gene Kelly).  This version of “It’s Almost like Being in Love,” from the Judy Garland show in 1963, is the best I can do (it’s combined with “This Can’t be Love”).

John Horgan: we do too have free will

June 13, 2011 • 5:51 am

Most of you have heard of John Horgan, a distinguished and widely published science writer (formerly at Scientific American), author of The End of Science and Rational Mysticism: Dispatches from the Border Between Science and Spirituality (I haven’t read the latter; weigh in if you have).  He’s also famous in atheist circles for having criticized the John Templeton Foundation for trying to slant his writings toward accommodationism when he was a journalism fellow.

While trawling around the internet on the topic of free will, I came across a short piece that Horgan wrote for Religion Dispatches (!) six months ago, a defense of free will called “Dear scientists: please stop bashing free will!”  Because it bears a family resemblance to some recent remarks by Eric MacDonald, who also defended free will (I’ll address those tomorrow), I want to briefly reprise and answer Horgan’s arguments.

It’s one of the better defenses of free will I’ve seen by a scientist or science writer, but still fails completely, I think.  Horgan’s defense is tripartite:

1.  “Science had discovered nothing that contradicts free will,” and our deliberations appear to yield choices.

Science has discovered nothing that contradicts free will. To deny free will’s existence is to deny that our conscious, psychological deliberations—Should I ask my girlfriend to marry me? Should I major in engineering or art?—influence our actions. Such a conclusion flies in the face of common sense. Of course, sometimes we deliberate insincerely, toward a foregone conclusion, or we fail to act upon our resolution. But not always. Sometimes we consciously choose to do something and we do it. Correlation does not necessarily equal causation, but it often does.

First of all, Horgan has just spent the first half of his short article showing evidence that does contradict free will, including research demonstrating that our decisions appear to be made before we’re conscious of having made them.  There’s also this interesting tidbit, of which I was unaware:

Neurosurgeons preparing the brain of an epileptic before surgery can make the patient’s arm pop up like an eager student’s by electrically stimulating the motor cortex. The patient often insists that she meant to move the arm and even invents a reason why: She was waving to that nurse walking by the door! Neurologists call these erroneous, post-hoc explanations confabulations. Some scientists argue that whenever we explain our acts as the outcome of our conscious choice, we are engaging in a kind of confabulation, because our actions actually stem from countless physiological causes of which we are completely unaware.

There is, of course, the reams of knowledge about how brain lesions, diseases, stimulation and the like can make someone behave in abnormal ways, yet in ways that the actor and outside observers would consider as results of “choice”.

But to appear to make choices after deliberation does not really mean that those choices were “free”, at least in the sense that one could equally well have chosen otherwise.  Just as those neurosurgery patients fully believe that they chose to do something that was actually physically determined, so we feel (and, indeed, may have evolved to feel) that our choices are free.

Yes, we do take in information from the environment and process it both consciously and unconsciously (see below), but that does not mean that, after processing, we are still free to decide what to do.  And yes, perhaps there are “random” or quasi-random events that affect those deliberations (quantum fluctuations in molecules and the like, which are a). unlikely to influence decisions and b.) can’t be considered part of “free will” anyway), but in the end we are simply federations of molecules, tissues, and neurons whose morphology, physiology, and behavior are determined by interactions between genes and environments.  Where, exactly, does the conscious interposition that goes by “choice” reside? If there is one, it involves not only a rejection of physical determinism, but one that is incoherent. If our thoughts can influence our choices, then that still involves molecules affecting molecules, and these interactions must still obey the laws of physics and chemistry.

Horgan summarizes this argument by saying, “Sometimes we consciously choose to do something and we do it.”  This assumes what he’s trying to prove.

The onus for those who believe in “free will”—as in “I could have done otherwise had I chosen”—is to specify on a physical level how it would work. Horgan, at the end of the article, simply punts on this:

Theologians have proposed that science still allows faith in a “God of the gaps,” who dwells within those shadowy realms into which science has not fully penetrated, such as the imaginary time before the Big Bang banged. In the same way, maybe we can have a free will of the gaps. No science is more riddled with gaps, after all, than the science of human consciousness.

Yes, but there is no God (Horgan says he’s a “Catholic turned agnostic”), so all is molecules.  Even those big gaps in our understanding consciousness will be plugged by things that must obey physical laws.

2.  “Free will must exist if some creatures have more of it than others.” This is a common argument: Eric MacDonald has made it, and in a sense it’s the backbone of Dennett’s argument in Freedom Evolves (granted, Dennett’s thesis is far more complex and sophisticated).

My teenage daughter and son have more free will—more choices to consider and select from—than they did when they were infants. They also have more than our dog Merlin does. I have (on my good days) more free will than adults my age suffering from schizophrenia or obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Yes, we have more responses to stimuli than do dogs or squirrels, but to say that some species have more complex behaviors than others says nothing at all about free will.  It simply conflates the concept of “free choice” with that of “more complex relations between inputs and outputs.” A bacterium can either move toward or away from food or light.  When we move toward food, we can go to  McDonald’s, to Chez Panisse, or to the grocery store.  Does that show we have free will? No, it shows only that we have more varied tastes, as well as the evolved ability to process our environment in ways that cater to those tastes.  The more complex the species, the more choices it will appear to have.  But that doesn’t mean that those choices are free.  It means only that evolution has favored the acquisition and weighting of more and different kinds of environmental information that feed into behaviors.

3.  We need the concept of free will to promote good individual behavior and well-oiled societies.

We also need the concept of free will, much more than we need the concept of God. Our faith in free will has social value. It provides us with the metaphysical justification for ethics and morality. It forces us to take responsibility for ourselves rather than consign our fate to our genes or God. Free will works better than any other single criterion for gauging the vitality of a life, or a society. Choices, freely made, are what make life meaningful.

There are other justifications for morality, ethics, and moral responsibility besides free will.  And what makes life meaningful is not the existence of free choice, but the idea of free choice.  Who can live thinking that they’re a pure automaton—a puppet on the strings of DNA and environments?  I know that I have no free will, but behave as if I do.  I also know that I’m going to die, but if I dwelt constantly on that my life would be miserable (as it is, I do this far too often!).  In this sense we do operate on “belief in belief,” but the difference between religious ideas and that of free will is that I am nearly 100% certain that there isn’t free will, and my life isn’t predicated on thinking that it’s real.

Horgan cites some research:

When people doubt free will, they are more likely to behave badly. After reading a passage from a book that challenged the validity of free will, students were more likely to cheat on a mathematics exam. Others were less likely to let a classmate use their cell phone.

Maybe this is so, but to say free will really exists because that notion makes people behave better is no different from saying that God exists because that idea also makes people behave better. (I know of no evidence God-belief promotes better behavior. But even if it did, it wouldn’t demonstrate the existence of a God.)

I’m starting to see realize there are striking parallels between belief in God and belief in free will.  There is no evidence for the existence of either, and plenty of evidence against both.  Belief in both makes people feel better.  And people argue that belief in both God and free will is salutary—indeed, essential—for society to operate properly.  This hypothesis of parallelism, which is mine and belongs to me, is buttressed by Horgan’s last sentence:

I don’t believe in God—at least, not a God described in any text I know of—but I do believe in free will.

Patrick Leigh Fermor, RIP

June 12, 2011 • 7:00 pm

I didn’t realize that Patrick Leigh Fermor, British soldier, adventurer and travel writer, was still alive, but the New York Times reports that he died Friday in England at age 96.  I doubt that many readers have heard of him, but if you haven’t you have literary treats in store.

I’ve spent a fair amount of time in Greece: I lived there for nearly three years as a young child and have returned half a dozen times, spending a month in a tiny village in Crete, island-hopping in the Aegean (where I discovered Santorini as one of Earth’s most beautiful spots), and wandering in the north and, best of all, in the Peloponnese—the large peninsula that is southern Greece.

Leigh Fermor is the best writer in English on Greece that I know, and I particularly recommend his two books Roumeli (1966) and Mani (1958), about the north and south respectively.  Mani, which evokes the dry, rocky, and haunting southern landscape of the Peloponnese, will make you want to go there, or to return if you’ve been.  It’s one of the finest places I’ve travelled.

A village in the Mani. The tall stone towers were used as fortresses in the internecine blood feuds that consumed the residents, often for years.

A religious interlude in a Darwin show

June 12, 2011 • 11:05 am

An alert reader called my attention to “WhyEvolutionIsTrue’s channel” on YouTube.  I have no responsibility for this, but it has a wonderful collection of documentaries on evolution (scroll around; clicking on each letter reveals a whole host of videos). One of them is the two-hour “Darwin’s Dangerous Idea” show from PBS.  It’s a documentary on Darwin’s life and ideas, interspersed with talking heads like Dan Dennett, Steve Gould, and Darwin biographer James Moore, as well as with explications of modern work on evolution. It’s very well done. . .

. . . BUT, at 1:23:00, the producers are compelled to rudely interrupt the narrative to show that, after all, evolution and religion are compatible. It starts with the death of Darwin’s beloved daughter Annie, thought by many to have destroyed his last vestiges of faith.  Steve Gould then chimes in to underscore this point, and, suddenly, at 1:24:00, we see Ken Miller in a Catholic church, bowing, praying, and assuring the viewer that his “orthodox” Catholicism is perfectly compatible with Darwinism.  He then appears on a talk show in Tennessee, arguing that God does indeed act in the real world, answering prayers and “working in concert with natural laws.” Miller is a theist. We then see him back in church, taking the sacrament and crossing himself.

Dan Dennett then appears, but not to argue the opposite—that faith and science are incompatible. No, all he says is that Darwin dispelled the idea of divinity and divine purpose behind the design of organisms. In toto, the atmosphere is pro-religion and accommodationist.

My question is this: why is any of this in a documentary on Darwin?  Why not stick to his life and to the explication of evolution?  Or, if they’re going to drag in the issue of compatibility, where is the person to argue, contra Miller, that faith and evolution are incompatible?  It’s a disturbing few minutes in an otherwise fine film.  But it’s telling, for it testifies to the stifling religiosity in America that forces producers of such a show to genuflect towards faith.

Why cats are better than dogs

June 12, 2011 • 8:25 am

A bit of juvenile fun provided by Matthew Cobb, who notes, “A kitteh wouldn’t do this.” He’s right.

Note: this is not literal, but a metaphor.  Note that the dog is named “Jerry,” and his owner can represent, well, a lot of things.

Michael Ruse: Adam and Eve didn’t exist, but theology is still in great shape

June 12, 2011 • 8:14 am

Over at PuffHo, Michael Ruse continues to push his strange but fascinating mixture of sense and nonsense.  In a piece sensibly called “Adam and Eve didn’t exist. Get over it!,” Ruse addresses the recent Christianity Today article on how to reconcile science with Adam and Eve (see our discussion here). And, as he shows without reservation, the genetic facts absolutely put the lie to the Biblical story of Adam and Eve.

If Ruse had stopped there, it would have been fine—and a public service.  But of course he can’t, because he’s always compelled to osculate the posterior of faith.  And so, as is his wont, he suggests alternative interpretations of the Bible that better comport with genetics:

Augustine thought that we are all tainted (original sin) because of actual act of disobedience by a real Adam. This cannot be so. But there are alternative theologies at hand. Irenaeus of Lyon (before Augustine) worried that everything rested on the fault of one rather naive man faced with a wily serpent. Instead, he interpreted original sin as part of our general incomplete nature, something that was completed by the Christian drama. Jesus was never “Plan B,” in the sense of sent to earth to clean up the mess created by Adam. His coming and sacrifice were always part of the divine intention.

“General incomplete nature”?  What the bloody hell is that?  And why would an uncompleted drama have anything to do with original sin? No, there has to be some reason why every human is born in sin, not just that he or she becomes a sinner. For only the former interpretation makes scriptural sense—even under liberal Christian theology.

And if Jesus wasn’t “Plan B,” but part of the whole divine intention (as seems clear), then what does that make of God? First he botches the whole thing on purpose, and then tortures his son on a stick to make things right? Why wouldn’t God have just bypassed the entire Adam business and not introduced inherent sinfulness at all, thereby obviating the need to torture and kill his own child?  Under a clear-eyed view of Christian theology, God comes off as some sort of sadistic playwright, one who wrote Eraserhead when he could have given us Mary Poppins.  Such is the senselessness of the Christian faith.

Given a theology like this, the disappearance of a literal Adam and Eve is not only possible but something of a relief. This is not to say that this theology is now the only right one for evermore, but rather that giving up some thoughts in the face of science is not necessarily the end of faith. And there may well be religious (and not just scientific) advantages. The Augustinian scenario always leaves the bad taste about why we should be blamed for the sin of someone else.

A relief? Not to many Christians, as the Christianity Today pieces makes perfectly clear. If we’re not born in sin, then much of what Christians believe—especially Catholics—falls to pieces.  And of course, it makes Jesus die for nothing at all.

Finally, Ruse makes a good point: that science makes theology change, and it’s never the other way around.  Doesn’t that make theology inferior, always malleable to newly discovered facts?  Sadly, Ruse says “no”:

But is there not the uncomfortable worry that religion — theology — is always going to play second fiddle, having to give way in the face of science? And never the other way around. When did a Nobel Prize winner ever change his or her mind in the face of a reinterpretation of the Trinity? It may be true that this is a one-way process, but in no way does this imply that theology is inferior. The changes are part of theology. If we are made in the image of God (and Augustine was right here)*, then we have the power of reason and the ability to learn and understand the world that God created. We have the ability and the obligation. This means doing science, however uncomfortable it may be. We see through a glass darkly. At some point, we will see face to face. But not without a lot of effort by us.

How could theology not be inferior? First of all, it’s all made up, and second, it is a slave to science.  Saying “the changes are part of theology” is simply an accommodationist’s way of saying, “Theology changes only when science or secular reason forces it to”.  If we really used our “power of reason and the ability to learn and understand the world”, we wouldn’t believe in God at all.

Note to Dr. Ruse:  You can give up now.  You’ve tried hard, but the Templeton Prize isn’t going to come knocking.

__________

*Wait—I thought Ruse was an atheist! How could Augustine be “right”?

Liberal Christian rag: creationism and evolution are “competing myths”

June 12, 2011 • 5:44 am

Is evolution a “myth”?  Not according to any definition of “myth” that I can readily find.  The Oxford English Dictionary gives these as the first two definitions:

A traditional story, typically involving supernatural beings or forces, which embodies and provides an explanation, aetiology, or justification for something such as the early history of a society, a religious belief or ritual, or a natural phenomenon.

A widespread but untrue or erroneous story or belief; a widely held misconception; a misrepresentation of the truth. Also: something existing only in myth; a fictitious or imaginary person or thing.

Maybe it could qualify under the third definition, “A person or thing held in awe or generally referred to with near reverential admiration on the basis of popularly repeated stories (whether real or fictitious),” although that’s stretching it.  Evolution is a scientific theory and it’s true. It’s not fictional, as most people (and dictionaries) construe myths, nor does it enjoy “reverential admiration on the basis of popularly repeated stories”.  If evolution is a myth in this last sense, so is gravity.

Nevertheless, in a new article in the online magazine Religion Dispatches, “Creationism and evolution are competing ‘myths’:  creation science as mythic discourse.” Kelly E. Hayes finds it useful to couch these incompatible paradigms as “myths” because, she claims, this sheds light on how they function in American society.  Hayes is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis and an adjunct in gender studies and Africana studies, while Religion Dispatches describes itself as “a daily online magazine dedicated to the analysis and understanding of religious forces in the world today, highlighting a diversity of progressive voices and aimed at broadening and advancing the public conversation.”

When a postmodernist addresses evolution in a “progressive” religious magazine, you expect an earful of nonsense, and that’s pretty much what you get: an overblown article loaded with the usual pomo words like “privileged” and “paradigmatic,” and sentences like this:

Since myth is more than just a coding device through which important information is conveyed but is also an act by which social groupings are constituted, at stake in the debates among defenders of each narrative are not only these structural conflicts but the different social arrangements that each narrative invokes and authorizes.

But on to the content. The thesis of this longish essay can be described briefly: evolution and creationism function as incompatible “myths” that unite their supporters but divide the disciplines.  This means the science/faith “war” is likely to continue, and if scientists want to win they’ll have to do something different.

As H. L. Mencken once observed in another context, this is a penny’s worth of sense wrapped in a bale of polysyllables.  And in my characterization above, I agree with the last sentence but not the first.  Evolution is not a “myth,” even in the sense that Kelly means.  But yes, if we want to vanquish creationism, we have to do more than just promulgate the “myth” of evolution.  Kelly suggests no solutions, but of course the only one that will really work is to loosen the grip of religion on Americans.  My theory about why Kelly goes to such lengths to push such a mundane thesis is twofold: she wants to devalue evolution by putting it in a category with faith (granted, she sort of admits that evolution is probably true), and she wants to pad her c.v. by trying to say something new.

Here’s why Kelly sees evolution and creationism as myths (she frames much of her narrative around Kentucky’s Creation Museum and an upcoming project in the same state, the Ark Experience):

Rather than ridicule or dismiss the Ark Encounter and its theme park sibling the Creation Museum, it’s useful to see them as examples of mythic discourse, using the definition that historian of religions Bruce Lincoln proposed in his book Discourse and the Construction of Society. Myth, Lincoln contends, is most productively understood not as a false story, but as a narrative that has both authority and credibility for a particular audience, for whom it functions as a paradigmatic truth. A particular type of discourse, myth constructs and naturalizes its authority by appealing to some sacred or transcendent realm that is ostensibly beyond the petty interests of individuals. Unlike most other types of discourse, myth is able to engender shared feelings of belonging and purpose among its audience, making it an effective sociopolitical instrument.

So she goes wrong from the outset.  Yes, both religion and evolution have authority and credibility for their adherents, but scientists and rationalists don’t see evolution as appealing to a “sacred or transcendent realm”.  It’s a scientific theory, for crying out loud! If evolution is such a realm, then we might as well also count astronomy, quantum mechanics, and mathematics as myths.  As an evolutionist, my only sense of “belonging” is to a group that accepts the theory, and it doesn’t particularly give me a purpose—except to battle those who try to prevent it from being taught.  The discipline and its findings often fill me with wonder and amazement, but I don’t see that as entering the realm of the “sacred and transcendent.”

Now Hayes does recognize the baleful implications of claiming that evolution is a “myth,” but circumvents them by some fancy but unpersuasive argument:

One could legitimately object that by treating evolution as a myth I effectively concede one of the major claims of the creationist movement: that evolution and creationism are equally persuasive and thus are equally valid understandings of the natural world. To this I would argue that insofar as science itself does not mystify its claims by appeal to a superhuman realm it is not a mythic discourse in the same way as creationism. However, the popular understanding of evolution and the kinds of claims that proponents make about it invest evolution (and by extension the scientific method) with a set of transcendent moral values that, strictly speaking, lie outside of science proper. For example, some argue that because science, as a discipline of logic, empirical investigation, and rigorous testing, is superior to blind faith, evolution teaches the moral imperative to think and question rather than simply accept the claims of received tradition. This claim invests evolution with a set of values that have sociopolitical implications and that mobilize sentiments of affiliation (among proponents of evolution) and estrangement (from proponents of the creationist narrative). In what follows, I hope to show how treating what I am calling the “evolutionist narrative” and the “creationist narrative” as examples of myth (as Lincoln defined it) is useful for thinking about the ways that specific groups appeal to these narratives in practice.

Wrong again.  Who among evolutionary biologists or their supporters says that the field is automatically associated with “transcendent moral values”? That is a claim creationists make about evolution: we’re atheistic, materialistic, cold and scientistic, approving of might-makes-right and so on.  And it’s simply ridiculous to say that evolution “teaches the moral imperative to think and question rather than simply accept the claims of received tradition.” First of all, that’s not an inherent imperative of evolution,  it’s is a methodology that, we have found, is the only reliable way to find out the truth about the universe.  If you don’t practice it, you don’t find out anything.

And it is a moral imperative? Certainly not.  Any scientist who didn’t think, question, and use rational methods of study wouldn’t be seen as “immoral”; he’d be seen as stupid and misguided.  Rationality is not a moral imperative, it is a tool in all empirical studies.  If that makes evolution a “myth”, then so is dentistry, oil exploration, medicine, physiology, air conditioning repair, and plumbing.  Any plumber who accepted on faith his client’s diagnosis of a leak, rather than following the water himself, wouldn’t last very long.  This kind of categorizing is simply something Hayes does, as an academic pomo, to squeeze out something slightly different from everybody else.

But enough.  Hayes goes on to insist that these “myths” are in eternal conflict because a). science can’t address creationism and b). we don’t want to, because that would dignify it:

Such an approach helps address why AiG [Answers in Genesis, who built the Creation Museum] and its sympathizers continue to insist that their literalist interpretation of the biblical creation account is scientifically accurate, despite the fact that any claim about supernatural agency, by definition, can be neither proved nor disproved by science. Indeed, part of the reason that scientists (and other supporters of evolution) have been loath to publicly challenge such assertions is that creationist claims so clearly lie beyond the purview of science that to respond to any suggestion otherwise would dignify an absurdity. So, then, why do Ken Ham and his colleagues persist in advocating the seemingly untenable position that the Genesis story of creation is science and not theology? This is precisely where Lincoln’s notion of myth is helpful in understanding how narratives function, not only as explanatory frameworks but as ideological mechanisms that construct certain kinds of social relations by eliciting powerful sentiments of affiliation or estrangement.

Ah, the old “science can’t touch the supernatural” canard!  The stuff about supernatural claims being refractory to being proven or disproven by science is, of course, pure nonsense.  Science has disproved the supernatural claims that the earth was created by God 6,000 years ago, that there are no transitional forms, that all life was created instantly, that we all descend literally from two human beings who lived at the same time, and so on.  In fact, later on in her piece Hayes implicitly admits that science has falsified creationist claims: she says “Simply put, the evolutionist narrative functions as an established myth [she means “truth” here but won’t say it], while the creationist version holds a lesser status—although it may be authoritative for some, it not not generally accepted as a credible account of past events” [she means “it’s false”].  Why? Because the supernatural claims of creationism have been disproven.  As we all know by now, any empirical claims that derive from supernatural assumptions are manifestly within the realm of science, and their falsification erodes the veracity of the supernatural.

And scientists are “loath” to publicly challenge creationist claims?  Has Hayes been living in Siberia? What have I, Dawkins, Kenneth Miller, the NCSE, and hundreds of other scientists and educators been doing for the past few decades? Hint: not twiddling our thumbs about creationists or their attempts to teach religion in the science classroom.

I don’t see where notions of “myth” are of any help here at all; in fact, I don’t see the usefulness of shoehorning science into that category along with religion. (Religion is, of course, a “myth” in nearly every sense.)  All it does is give us a fancy way of saying that the scientific truth of evolution is repugnant to the faithful because it attacks their false beliefs about the universe. And we already knew that.

In the end, by lumping together evolution and science as “myths,” saying that both come with moral imperatives, and arguing that science cannot address claims about the supernatural, Hayes not only gives a misleading picture of science, but obfuscates rather than clarifies the science-religion controversy.  She could have conveyed the true situation in just a few paragraphs, but nobody would have published it.  And what’s her conclusion? Simply this:

The forthcoming Ark Encounter and the presence of other creationist museums in Arkansas, Texas, California and Florida suggests that the war is far from over. It remains to be seen whether the leaders of the creationist movement will be able to effectively mobilize enough American voters to bring about the kinds of sociopolitical changes for which their paradigmatic model provides a superhuman charter. It is clear, however, that supporters of evolution would do well to implement a new strategy if they wish to counter these challenges to their preferred narrative’s authoritative status.

Now what would that strategy be?  To suck up to believers, as accommodationists suggest? As Hayes makes clear, that won’t work, for their “myth” is strong and magnetic.  Create a “rock stars of evolution” campaign, to lure the faithful using charismatic scientists?  Doesn’t seem likely.  Wait—I have one: dispel religious myths by showing how ludicrous and false they are! If that works, the challenges to our “preferred narrative” will simply vanish.

h/t: Diane G.