If you read the New York Times yesterday and happened to glance at the op-ed section, you would have seen a surfeit of articles on religion and the power of faith. I don’t think this is due entirely to yesterday’s holiday; rather, the Times seems really soft on religion these days, publishing dozens of goddy op-eds for every secular one. Two of yesterday’s articles were particularly unctuous.
Maureen Dowd, who can’t seem to shake her Catholicism, asks the question, “Why, God?”, a question that the faithful raise again after America’s two sets of Christmas murders. (This is, of course, a question that atheists needn’t ask, since there’s nobody to answer.) But seeking answers, Dowd calls upon a family friend, Father Kevin O’Neil, who has spent his life consoling the downcast and dying. O’Neil apparently wrote the rest of the column.
After a column of agonized pondering, the good father admits he doesn’t know the answer:
The truest answer is: I don’t know. I have theological training to help me to offer some way to account for the unexplainable. But the questions linger. I remember visiting a dear friend hours before her death and reminding her that death is not the end, that we believe in the Resurrection. I asked her, “Are you there yet?” She replied, “I go back and forth.” There was nothing I wanted more than to bring out a bag of proof and say, “See? You can be absolutely confident now.” But there is no absolute bag of proof. I just stayed with her. A life of faith is often lived “back and forth” by believers and those who minister to them
. . . I will never satisfactorily answer the question “Why?” because no matter what response I give, it will always fall short. What I do know is that an unconditionally loving presence soothes broken hearts, binds up wounds, and renews us in life. This is a gift that we can all give, particularly to the suffering. When this gift is given, God’s love is present and Christmas happens daily.
There is one response, though, that won’t fall short, although it’s inappropriate for dying believers: if you’re a nonbeliever, this stuff just happens. And yes, love can soothe broken or grieving hearts—as with the “love” that mandates lying for the dying—but what evidence is there that that love comes from God? Indeed, it doesn’t—it’s pure human love (of which O’Neil has an admirable surfeit). And if there is “no absolute bag of proof,” then where are Father O’Neil’s doubts?
Theodicy is the Achilles Heel of faith. There is no reasonable answer to the problem of gratuitous evil (i.e., the slaughter of children or mass killings by natural phenomena like tsunamis), and the will to continue believing in the face of such things truly shows the folly of faith. For those evils prove absolutely either that God is not benevolent and omnipotent, or that there is no god. (Special pleading like “we don’t know God’s mind” doesn’t wash, for the same people who say such things also claim to know that God is benevolent and omnipotent). Both nonbelief or belief in malicious or uncaring God are unacceptable to the goddy. Ergo, any rational person who contemplates gratuitous evil must become an agnostic, an atheist, or someone who rejects the Abrahamic God. It is a touchstone of rationality.
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Writer Ann Hood, in “A prayer at Christmas,” offers a piece whose only point seems to be that, after a lifetime of rejecting the church, she is drawn back in again. It’s a completely pointless essay—unless it’s there to show believers that others also share their silly conversations with God:
As I turned to walk to the subway, a sign caught my eye: ST. PATRICK’S IS OPEN. I read it again. ST. PATRICK’S IS OPEN. Although I quickly realized the sign was there because of all the scaffolding around the church, I still couldn’t help but feel that it was also there just for me.
A church that was open! I crossed the street and went inside. The grandeur of St. Patrick’s is nothing like the little stucco church of my childhood in West Warwick, R.I. And even on a Tuesday afternoon, it was crowded with tourists. But the candles flickered, and the smell of wax and incense filled me. I dipped my fingers in the holy water, and walked slowly up the long center aisle to the altar. Around me, people snapped pictures of the manger with their phones. A woman holding a baby in a Santa suit rushed past me. When I got to the front pew, I lowered the kneeler, and I knelt. I bowed my head and I prayed.
In the years since I’d done this simple act in church, I have prayed at home and in hospital waiting rooms. I have prayed for my daughter to live, for the bad news to not be true, for strength in the face of adversity. I have prayed with more desperation than a person should feel. I have prayed in vain.
This prayer, though, was different. It was a prayer from my girlhood, a prayer for peace and comfort and guidance. It was a prayer of gratitude. It was a prayer that needed to be done in church, in a place where candles flicker and statues of saints look down from on high; where sometimes, out of nowhere, the spiritually confused can still come inside and kneel and feel their words might rise up and be heard.
Hood doesn’t seem to care if anybody up there is listening.
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At the Time‘s site The Stone, there’s a confused piece by British philosopher Simon Critchley called “The Freedom of Faith: A Christmas Sermon.” Critchley is the moderator of The Stone site, which presents the lucubrations of philosophers and is only occasionally good. His essay doesn’t improve it.
Critchley poses a Christmas Dilemma: do we accept the “freedom” of faith or the security of obedience authority? (Actually, it’s not clear, as you’ll see below, whether the security comes from obedience to state/church authority or simply the ability to pursue material comforts.) At any rate, Critchley begins by recounting how Jesus rejected the threefold temptations of Satan, and then segues to the famous tale of “The Grand Inquisitor” from The Brothers Karamazov. In that tale, you’ll recall, Dostoevsky presents a fable about Christ returning during the Spanish Inquisition. After working a few miracles, Jesus is promptly clapped in jail, since the “freedom” he offers will disturb the authority and peace established by the Catholic Church.
. . . for the Grand Inquisitor, “Man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he can hand over that gift of freedom with which the miserable creature of born.” Give people the miracle of bread, and they will worship you. Remove their freedom with submission to a mystery that passeth all understanding, and they will obey your authority. They will be happy. Lord knows, they may even believe themselves to be free in such happiness.
Freedom as expressed here is not the rigorous freedom of faith, but the multiplication of desires whose rapid satisfaction equals happiness. Freedom is debased and governed by a completely instrumental, means-end rationality. Yet, to what does it lead? In the rich, it leads to the isolation of hard hedonism and spiritual suicide.
Okay, so freedom represents the satisfaction of “base” desires, the production of “hard hedonism and spiritual suicide”. It’s not clear, of course, whether satisfying non-goddy desires equals spiritual suicide. That’s an unjustified conclusion that Doestoevsky makes and Critchley apparently endorses. But then Critchley reconceives freedom so that, in the mind of the Grand Inquisitor, it’s also freedom of faith:
For the Grand Inquisitor, what Jesus brought into the world was freedom, specifically the freedom of faith: the truth that will free.
Which is it: freedom to get bread or to go to heaven? But what kind of “freedom” is the freedom to believe in God and Jesus—or be damned if you don’t? Critchley says that this is the “freedom of conscience”:
Jesus rejected bread for the sake of freedom, for the bread of heaven. Jesus refuses miracle, mystery and authority in the name of a radical freedom of conscience. The problem is that this freedom places an excessive burden on human beings. It is too demanding; infinitely demanding,
But Jesus wrought miracles, and adumbrated mystery and proclaimed his own authority (remember his admonition: “I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man comes unto the Father, but by me.”). Jesus doesn’t refuse that stuff!
But what about the freedom to reject faith—to abnegate those things that aren’t supported by evidence—the only course a rational person should take? Critchley ignores that kind of freedom. His essay then degenerates into a mush of tortured navel-gazing, winding up with Critchley punting completely and wishing us all a happy holiday. Such is the vocation of philosophers with too much time on their hands.
. . . And this choice conceals another, deeper one: truth or falsehood? The truth that sets free is not, as we saw, the freedom of inclination and passing desire. It is the freedom of faith. It is the acceptance — submission, even — to a demand that both places a perhaps intolerable burden on the self, but which also energizes a movement of subjective conversion, to begin again. In disobeying ourselves and obeying this hard command, we may put on new selves. Faith hopes for grace. . .
To be clear, such an experience of faith is not certainty, but is only gained by going into the proverbial desert and undergoing diabolical temptation and radical doubt. On this view, doubt is not the enemy of faith. On the contrary, it is certainty. If faith becomes certainty, then we have become seduced by the temptations of miracle, mystery and authority. We have become diabolical. There are no guarantees in faith. It is defined by an essential insecurity, tempered by doubt and defined by a radical experience of freedom.
. . . .The Grand Inquisitor’s dilemma is, finally, tragic: he knows that the truth which sets us free is too demanding for us, and that the lie that grants happiness permits the greatest good of the greatest number. But he also knows that happiness is a deception that leads ineluctably to our damnation. Is the Grand Inquisitor’s lie not a noble one?
. . . To be perfectly (or imperfectly) honest, I don’t know the answer to this question. Which should we choose: diabolical happiness or unendurable freedom? Perhaps we should spend some days and nights fasting in the desert and see what we might do. Admittedly, this is quite a difficult thing to sustain during the holiday period.
Happy Holidays!
Oy vey! Who can be happy after such a dog’s breakfast of confusing ideas? (Perhaps I’m not savvy enough to understand Sophisticated Philosophy™.) The freedom of faith is the freedom of lunacy: the ability to believe whatever makes you feel good, no matter how silly those beliefs. The only freedom to be found there is the freedom from rationality, from having good reasons for what you believe.
To Critchley, nonbelief is not an option. But then again, it’s Christmas, folks! To be sure, he does mention doubt, but only in a confusing way: in effect praising doubt as a “God-like position”:
To be clear, such an experience of faith is not certainty, but is only gained by going into the proverbial desert and undergoing diabolical temptation and radical doubt. On this view, doubt is not the enemy of faith. On the contrary, it is certainty. If faith becomes certainty, then we have become seduced by the temptations of miracle, mystery and authority. We have become diabolical. There are no guarantees in faith. It is defined by an essential insecurity, tempered by doubt and defined by a radical experience of freedom.
This is a noble and, indeed, God-like position. It is also what Jesus demands of us elsewhere in his teaching, in the Sermon on the Mount, when he says, “Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you or persecute you.”
Certainty the enemy of faith? Shades of 1984! Here Critchley is acting more like a theologian than a philosopher, for theologians are good at turning necessities into spiritual virtues.
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The only palliative in this lineup of faith-soaked newsprint is, surprisingly, found in an article by the ever-tedious Stanley Fish: “Religious exemptions and the liberal state: a Christmas column.” Actually, Fish doesn’t give his own opinion in the column (an uncharacteristic stance), but merely rehashes the thesis of a new book, Why Tolerate Religion? by Brian Leiter, a professor at the University of Chicago’s law school. But in the Fish stew there is one toothsome morsel:
Indeed, if there is anything special about religion, Leiter contends, it is the special danger it poses by virtue of its other chief characteristics, the categorical insistence on the obedience of believers and a declared independence of evidence and rationality as defined by common-sense and science. (Needless to say, this list of religion’s characteristics is controversial, and has often been critiqued by theologians and philosophers.) If existential consolation is what you’re looking for, you might better find it, Leiter declares, in “philosophical reflection … meditation … therapeutic treatment,” all relatively harmless compared to the “potentially harmful brew of categorical commands and insulation from evidence.”
The conclusion is inevitable: “[T]here is no apparent moral reason why states should carve out special protections that encourage individuals to structure their lives around categorical demands that are insulated from the standards of evidence and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute constraints on judgment and action.”
I’ve always thought this to be the greatest danger of trying to accommodate science and faith. It’s the toxic combination of absolute certainty about God’s will, combined with the willingness to believe things without evidence, that makes religion much more than just “another way of knowing.” We don’t turn scientific findings into law (except for things that help us all, like mandatory vaccination), nor do scientists have the absolute certainty of the believer. If we think that faster-than-light neutrinos exist, we look for them. and if we don’t find them we reject them. But if we believe that God exists, and, after looking for evidence, we fail to find any, we continue to accept him. Further, thinking that we know his will, many faiths try enforce it on everyone else.
Religion is not just the enemy of rationality, but the enemy of democracy.