Articles: odds and ends

May 11, 2015 • 9:45 am

Professor Ceiling Cat is a bit low today for reasons I’ll describe in the next post. The upshot is that my brain hurts and I have nothing substantive to say, at least for a few hours. In light of that lacuna, let me call your attention to three articles that you may want to read.

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The first is Brother Jeffrey Tayler’s regular Sunday Sermon in Salon, a feature that you should be looking for and, though I don’t sanction Church Replacements for atheists, this beats all of them. As usual, it’s larded with anti-theism, but also with sound arguments for why we should be afraid of even “moderate” Islam. Tayler’s piece is “The left has Islam all wrong: Bill Maher, Pamela Geller and the reality progressives must face.” His subject is the first six words of the title: how progressives have had their brains co-opted by the “Islamophobia” meme because of our otherwise admirable concern for the oppressed. He suggests, and I now agree, that we need to dispense completely with the word “Islamophobia,” and when we see it we must press those who use it to describe exactly what they mean. The term, after all, has become a grab-bag for disparate issues, including dislike of Islam, dislike of individual Muslims (which can be justified if they espouse bad things), and general, unjustified bigotry of people simply because they’re Muslims.

Here are few excerpts, and we should all absorb this first one—especially the second paragraph (my emphasis):P

The canonical glorification of death for the sake Islam, or martyrdom, similarly belies those who would argue that the religion’s nature is pacific.  If you, as a progressive, do not believe in the veracity of the Quran, then you have to accept Arthur C. Clarke’s diagnosis of those who “would rather fight to the death than abandon their illusions” as complying with the criteria of “the operational definition of insanity.”  Insanity hardly engenders peace.

All those who, à la Reza Aslan, maintain that Muslims today do not necessarily read the Quran literally have lost the argument before it begins. What counts is that there are those (ISIS, say, and al-Qaida) who do, and they are taking action based on their beliefs.  To the contention, “ISIS and al-Qaida don’t represent Islam!” the proper response is, “that’s what you say.  They disagree.”  No single recognized Muslim clerical body exists to refute them.

and this:

This is no call to disrespect Muslims as people, but we should not hesitate to speak frankly about the aspects of their faith we find problematic.  But it’s not up to progressives to suggest how an ideology based on belief without evidence might be reformed.  Rather, we should cease relativizing and proudly espouse, as alternatives to blind obedience to ancient texts, reason, progress, consensus-based solutions, and the wonderful panoply of other Enlightenment ideals underpinning our Constitution and the liberties characterizing Western countries.

. . . In doing as he urges [the call of Charlie Hebdo editor Gérard Biard to keep debating, writing, and satirizing religion], we will give the terrorists too many targets to attack and convince them that we will not surrender, not cede an inch.  That means the media needs to begin showing Charlie Hedbo’s Muhammad cartoons.  We must stop traducing reason by branding people “Islamophobes,” and start celebrating our secularism, remembering that only it offers true freedom for the religious and non-religious alike.  And we should reaffirm our humanistic values, in our conviction that we have, as Carlyle wrote, “One life – a little gleam of time between two eternities,” and need to make the most of it for ourselves and others while we can.  There is nothing else.

If Tayler isn’t yet a “horseman” (horseperson?), he’s got one foot in the stirrup.

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The other day, a friend told me she was an admirer of Karen Armstrong, and was about to start reading Fields of Blood, Armstrong’s widely-lauded book whose theme is that religion has never given rise to anything bad—ever. Anything that superficially looks like religiously-engendered violence, like the 9/11 terrorism, is, to Armstrong, the result of colonialism, disaffection, or other “political” factors. Just as Steve Gould defined “religion” tautologically in Rocks of Ages so that it could never say anything about reality (stuff like creationism he dismissed as “not real religion”), so Armstrong sees any religious views promoting terrorism as “not canonical religion”.  It’s a duplicitous and tautological ploy, but because Armstrong writes what people want to hear (religion is benign at worst, but usually helpful), people osculate her rump.

The cure for the common but dangerous desire to apply one’s lips to Armstrong’s gluteus—a disease known as Tippett’s Syndrome—is, as I told my friend, to read David Nirenberg’s new, long, and critical review of her book in The Nation,Power and piety.” There Nirenberg calls out Armstrong for her rhetorical trickery and double standards vis-à-vis politics vs. religion. I’m curious why other reviewers haven’t picked up on this, but of course many are blinkered by “belief in belief”. The review is mandatory reading for anyone who’s read, admired, or is contemplating reading Fields of Blood. I can give only one except; do read Nirenberg’s whole article:

Armstrong’s argument is simple: “From the first, it seems, large-scale organized violence was linked not with religion but with organized theft.” By “organized theft,” she means the activities of the kings, aristocrats, warriors, and other leaders of the agrarian societies that began to appear in written records in Mesopotamia in the third millennium bce. In other words, not religion but politics—the struggle for power to seize the fruits of others’ labor—has always been responsible for violence. Yet in making this claim, Armstrong draws the very distinction between religion and nonreligion that she insists cannot be made before the modern period. This is a substantial inconsistency (Cavanaugh would call it incoherent), but it needn’t necessarily compromise her broader argument, which seems to be, here and throughout the book, that religion only becomes complicit with violence when it is captured and deformed by politics, or when believers are oppressed by injustice, poverty, and violence, or, more recently, when the faithful are humiliated by atheists.

According to this argument, in their origins and essences, religions are a benign and fundamental source of empathy, love of the other, and cognitive comfort in an otherwise incomprehensible cosmos. “The world’s great religious traditions share as one of their most essential tenets the imperative of treating others as one would wish to be treated oneself,” Armstrong writes. If religious movements become violent, it is either because they are driven to extreme measures by oppression and injustice, or because their teachings have been misinterpreted and so are blasphemous and not truly religious.

As an example, consider Armstrong’s account of the religious attitudes of Mohamed Atta and his accomplices in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and other targets. “The hijackers themselves certainly regarded the 9/11 atrocities as a religious act but one that bore very little resemblance to normative Islam.” (Armstrong’s grammar here is confusing; what she means is that although the hijackers understood their Islam as normative, according to her interpretation it was not.) True, the hijackers prayed constantly and repeatedly recited certain passages of the Koran during the attack, but according to Armstrong their thought must be categorized as “magical,” “primitive,” “superstitious,” or “psychotic” rather than “religious,” because it does not achieve what she understands as “the principal imperative of Islamic spirituality”: tawhid, or making one. The terrorists divided their mission into segments, whereas “Muslims truly understand the unity of God only if they integrate all their activities and thoughts.”

Armstrong’s point is that although Atta and his colleagues may have thought of themselves as religious, their actions proved them to be blasphemous and paranoid. We need not accept her definition of “true Islam” as total “integration” of all thoughts and actions, a definition that seems bizarre. By this standard, very few if any humans of any faith could be considered truly religious. But even if we were to reject her definition and pinpoint the ways in which Atta’s faith contributed to his acts, Armstrong would simply regard such complicity as proof of a (perhaps misguided) Muslim response to “the structural violence of the American-dominated Middle East.” Armstrong is fond of the phrase “structural violence,” by which she seems to mean something like the inequality created by political power, which is to say, oppression.

This is more or less the same tactic used by Gould to exculpate religion in Rocks of Ages.

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Finally, one of our readers, John Farrell, as written an analysis of Catholic dogma on evolution for Aeon magazine: “Still seeking Omega.” (Omega, you may recall, is the teleological “goal” of theistic evolution envisioned by Catholic theologian Teilhard de Chardin.) Farrell runs through the history of the Vatican’s love-hate relationship with evolution, noting that the only “official” statement about it comes from Pope Pius XII’s 1950 document Humani Generis, which reaffirms the historicity of Adam and Eve as the actual physical progenitors of all modern humans. (I discuss this inFaith vs. Fact.)

This, of course, creates a tension between science and the Vatican, for no scientist believes that the human species was ever as small as two individuals, much less the eight on Noah’s Ark (genetic evidence rules this out completely).  While some later Popes issued “nonbinding” opinions that either promote or criticize evolution, Catholic doctrine as it stands flies in the face of science—something regularly ignored by accommodationists.  By desperately trying to comport Adam and Eve with the facts, some Catholic theologians are skirting that doctrine.

The upshot is that the Church is confused about what to say about evolution, but can’t quite bring itself to endorse the facts, much less give up its silly view that humans differ from other species by possessing an immortal soul.  Farrell sees this reluctance to embrace evolution as dangerous to the Church, and a cause for its attrition in many places. I’m not sure I agree about the reasons for attrition (the Church’s retrograde views on sexuality, marriage, and abortion surely must contribute), but I do agree with Farrell on the intellectual vacuity of accepting Adam and Eve in an age of science:

Perhaps in the end, the Vatican cannot integrate evolutionary science because it really is too threatening. It would require a thoughtful reinterpretation of the Church’s understanding of the doctrine of original sin – the fundamental idea that Adam and Eve’s epic act of disobedience wounded human nature for all who came after.  Theologians from St Paul and St Augustine down to the present day have viewed the life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth as God’s ultimate response – the redemption for this sin.

Can such a theology be maintained within an evolutionary understanding of human origins? The few, scattered Catholic theologians exploring the issue largely believe that it can. But the Vatican’s long silence on the question suggests that it doesn’t agree.

And there’s a price to be paid for stalling. Millions of people are walking away from the Church. Not just because of the clerical abuse scandal, and not just because of disagreement over points of morality such as gay marriage or abortion. But because the Church no longer speaks to people in a way that is meaningful to humanity in this scientific age.

The result is a slow but steady implosion. The Church is slowly collapsing from within, in a sort of progressive diminution. ‘Instead of evolving, it is devolving,’ Delio writes, ‘its very presence is thinning out to the extent that in some areas of the world, such as parts of western Europe, it is dissolving into history.’

The Church has accepted the Big Bang, the start of the world’s evolutionary journey – but this isn’t enough. It must follow in Teilhard’s footsteps. Unless it embraces not just the evolution of the Universe, but the evolution of all life, including humans, and reclaims a truly cosmic view in which the faith makes sense, the Church is pulling the wool over its own eyes as its people continue to file out the door.

I suggest that the last thing the Church wants to do is follow exactly in Teilhard’s footsteps, since he envisioned a teleological, goal-directed view of evolution that contradicts everything we know about the process.

Readers’ wildlife photographs

May 11, 2015 • 7:50 am

Reader Russell Collins sent a bunch of photos from southern Africa taken in 2011. I’ve put them below with his captions, but he hastens to add that some of the species identifications may be wrong, and welcomes corrections:

Angolan Giraffe (Giraffa camelopardalis angolensis) Etosha N.P., Namibia. Giraffes are perhaps my favourite (non-predator) ‘safari’ animal. They are surprisingly graceful, and they seem to have a curiosity about their world.

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Black-backed Jackal (Canis mesomelas) Etosha N.P., Namibia. Sorry for sending you a picture of a canid, but I thought it was rather striking how well the colours and markings match the habitat.

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Black Rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis) Etosha N.P., Namibia. Sad to think how close we are to losing the magnificent, grumpy beasts.

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A young Oryx/Gemsbok (Oryx gazella) Etosha N.P., Namibia.

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Burchell’s Zebra (Equus quagga burchellii) Etosha N.P., Namibia.

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African Bush Elephant (Loxodonta africana) Etosha N.P., Namibia. [JAC: The forest elephant of Africa has been considered a separate species.]

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Bull elephant seen from our makoros on the Okavango Delta, Botswana.

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Greater Kudu (Tragelaphus strepsiceros) with Red-billed Oxpecker (Buphagus erythrorhynchus) Chobe N.P., Botswana.

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Finally, Stephen Barnard of Idaho sends us this Turkey vulture (Cathartes aura), and yes, you can see through the nose. Now that seems maladaptive! In one hole and out the other!

The beak is adapted for tearing apart carrion. The head is naked for sanitation. Their sense of smell , unusual in birds, is acute for rotting flesh. Few birds match the Turkey Vulture for soaring efficiency. And you can see through its nose. 🙂

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As I believe I note in WEIT, food doesn’t have an inherent flavor: our brain and sensory system are evolved to find things tasty if they gave our ancestors a selective advantage. This is why we find sugar delicious but cats can’t detect it: sugar was a valuable asset for our ancestors in Africa.  I also say in the book that, to a vulture, rotting animal flesh probably tastes as delicious as an ice cream sundae does to us.

A trickster God

May 11, 2015 • 7:00 am

When reader Ben Goren sent me the latest strip from Wiley Miller’s Non Sequitur, he asked me if Miller had received an advance copy of my book. And indeed, I’ve used the “moving stars into words” trope before as one of the things that could help convince me that there was indeed a god. (Some anti-theist readers would reject this as convincing evidence, saying that it could be a trick by space aliens.)

Unfortunately, I wasn’t so clever as to invent this form of “evidence”. As far as I know, it first appears in Carl Sagan’s The Demon-Haunted World as one of the things that God could have done to convince us of his existence (I think Sagan hypothesized God spelling out “I am that I am in Hebrew”). If you reread that book, or especially The Varieties of Scientific Experience, you’ll find that Sagan was far more of a “strident” atheist than people recall.

But I digress; here is Miller’s cartoon, and it’s a good one:

Non Sequitur
Non Sequitur

The woodpecker-riding weasel gets its own sign

May 11, 2015 • 6:32 am

Last March I posted about what may turn out to be the most famous natural-history photograph of all time. It’s this one, taken by Martin Le-May in Hornchurch Country Park, and shows a stunning encounter between a European green woodpecker (Picus viridis) and a weasel who tried to jump it, probably a least weasel (Musetla nivalis). The woodpecker did escape, by the way (see an update here).

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Despite all the naysayers who pronounced the photo a fake (see my earlier post), it did turn out to be real. And now Hornchurch Country Park, a former RAF base, has a sign commemorating the photo! This tw**t from Ravenstone Press was sent to me by Matthew Cobb:

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Monday: Hili dialogue

May 11, 2015 • 5:04 am

And so another week begins, with three more weeks left of school in Chicago (we’re on the quarter system and start in early October). My daily back report: a bit worse than yesterday because, feeling much better, I was not sufficiently careful to avoid moving in injurious ways. It’s clear this will take a while to heal, although it’s much improved from a week ago. Meanwhile in Dobrzyn, Hili mourns the lack of easy access to noms:

Hili: Why do starlings build their nests so high?
A: I have no idea.

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In Polish:

Hili: Dlaczego szpaki zakładają gniazda tak wysoko?
Ja: Nie mam pojęcia.

Hiroko’s book on “Neko Shirt”

May 10, 2015 • 3:45 pm

Hiroko Kubota, a crack embroidery artist who made my beautiful Hili shirt, has now come out with a book of her creations called “Neko Shirt” (“neko” is Japanese for “cat”).  It’s available only from Amazon Japan, so unless you have a yen for it (LOL) you won’t be able to order it. (I, however, am getting one because the Hli shirt appears on pp 50-51.)

Perhaps some Japanese-speaking reader can translate the book’s description.

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The Hili Shirt:

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The Hilii Shirt with model:

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You can see more of Hiroko’s creations here.

Salon pulls out all the stops in dissing New Atheists

May 10, 2015 • 1:30 pm

If you want to see every shopworn criticism of New Atheism rolled up into one splenetic article, then it’s this one (in Salon, of course): “New atheism’s fatal arrogance: The glaring intellectual laziness of Bill Maher & Richard Dawkins.” The writer is Sean Illing, a graduate student in political science at Louisiana State University, who professes to be an atheist. And, like Maru, this is a box I cannot help but enter.  I will try to be brief, but will probably fail.

So what exactly is the intellectual laziness of Bill Maher and Richard Dawkins? It is one of Illing’s several accusations leveled at New Athiests, which I’ll summarize below:

1. New Atheists are just too stupid to realize that religion isn’t about truths, but about fictions that make people feel good, and structure their lives.  Yes, Illing appears to be a nonbeliever, and sees religion as promulgating untruths, but that doesn’t matter, for those untruths give people meaning. This is a variant on the “Courtier’s Reply” trope, in which believers fault us for not tackling the Most Sophisticated Forms of Theology™ (the so-called “best arguments”). In this case, defenders of faith like Illing simply admit that religious “truth claims” are all bogus, but they don’t really care. In fact, the people who are at fault are not the believers who structure their morality and behavior around those bogus claims, but the atheists who take believers at their word, apparently thinking erroneously that believers really believe. That, says Illnig, is the fatal weakness of Maher and Dawkins (my emphasis):

But there’s something missing in their critiques, something fundamental. For all their eloquence, their arguments are often banal. Regrettably, they’ve shown little interest in understanding the religious compulsion. They talk incessantly about the untruth of religion because they assume truth is what matters most to religious people. And perhaps it does for many, but certainly not all – at least not in the conventional sense of that term. Religious convictions, in many cases, are held not because they’re true but because they’re meaningful, because they’re personally transformative. New Atheists are blind to this brand of belief.

It’s perfectly rational to reject faith as a matter of principle. Many people (myself included) find no practical advantage in believing things without evidence. But what about those who do? If a belief is held because of its effects, not its truth content, why should its falsity matter to the believer? Of course, most religious people consider their beliefs true in some sense, but that’s to be expected: the consolation derived from a belief is greater if its illusory origins are concealed. The point is that such beliefs aren’t held because they’re true as such; they’re accepted on faith because they’re meaningful.

 The problem is that the New Atheists think of God only in epistemological terms. Consequently, they have nothing to say to those who affirm God for existential reasons. New Atheist writers tend to approach religion from the perspective of science: They argue that a particular religion isn’t true or that the empirical claims of religious texts are false. That’s easy to do. The more interesting question is why religions endure in spite of being empirically untrue. There are, of course, millions of fundamentalists for whom God is a literal proposition. Their claims concerning God are empirical and should be treated as such. For many [JAC: How many? Most?], though, God is an existential impulse, a transcendent idea with no referent in reality. This conception of God is untouched – and untouchable – by positivist science; asking if God is true in this sense is like asking how much the number 12 weighs – it’s nonsensical.

Now, really? How many religious people wouldn’t give a hoot if they were told that what they believed was false? Would they say, “I don’t care: I have existential reasons for believing in God.” As I wrote yesterday:

Sadly, the data show that while religion does have these other functions, it’s simply not the case that truth is irrelevant. Even theologians (the honest ones) admit that without an underpinning of beliefs about what’s really true about the universe, religion crumbles. Where would Christianity be if adherents thought that Jesus’s divinity, crucifixion, and resurrection were just a fictitious but convenient framework on which to hang their emotions? Would Mormons wear their sacred underwear if theyknew Joseph Smith was really a con man who fabricated those plates? Do the Sophisticated Critics really believe that if Muslims knew for certain that Muhammed didn’t get the Qur’an from the mouth of God, via an angel, but made it up himself, that Islam would have the sway it does? Get serious.

I challenge Illing to stand on the steps of any mosque in Pakistan or Iran and tell believers that it doesn’t matter whether what they think about Muhammad or the inerrancy of the Qur’an is irrelevant; all that matters is that the beliefs motivate their behavior. I suspect his longevity would be severely reduced. And there are 1.6 billion Muslims on this planet.

Note as well that Illing really does admit that believers must undergird their behavior with acceptance of factual propositions, for he says this:

“Of course, most religious people consider their beliefs true in some sense, but that’s to be expected: the consolation derived from a belief is greater if its illusory origins are concealed.”

I’m not sure what he means by “true in some sense”, but I suspect that the 57% of Americans who think that Jesus was born of a virgin take it as a real fact that Mary was not penetrated by a human male before baby Jesus was born. And I think the 42% of Americans who think that humans were created by God in their present form within the last 10,000 years are really thinking of actual years and an actual creator God. (By the way, if the facts here aren’t all that important, why do creationists keep trying to get this stuff taught in public schools?)

And what about this?:

The point is that such beliefs aren’t held because they’re true as such; they’re accepted on faith because they’re meaningful.

Illing has not thought this through.  What is accepted on faith is the religious epistemology: statements about the existence of God and Jesus, Mohammed or Moroni, and the moral codes that stem from the scriptures. They may not look at these propositions too closely, but they believe them, and they undergird the faith of everyone except for the highly rarefied and well-fed theologians who eschew the need for truth.

But really, religion is not treated like fiction. Religious people don’t act like all of scripture is fictional, nor do they act like they don’t care whether scripture is fictional.  At least some truths matter. (For Christians, the one non-negotiable is the salvific effect of Jesus’s death and resurrection.) You don’t see people basing their lives and hopes and morality and meanings on things that are palpably untrue, like the Harry Potter series or even The Brothers Karamazov. If you’re a normal person (i.e., not Karen Armstrong or David Bentley Hart), you must accept some fundamental truths about your faith if it’s to inspire you.

Hell, this is kindergarten stuff, realized even by theologians. I’ll give a few quotes, starting with the Bible itself:

But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen:And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain.—Paul, 1 Cornithians 15:13-14

A religious tradition is indeed a way of life and not a set of abstract ideas. But a way of life presupposes beliefs about the nature of reality and cannot be sustained if those beliefs are no longer credible.—Ian Barbour

I cannot regard theology as merely concerned with a collection of stories which motivate an attitude toward life. It must have its anchorage in the way things actually are, and the way they happen.—John Polkinghorne

Likewise, religion in almost all of its manifestations is more than just a collection of value judgments and moral directives. Religion often makes claims about ‘the way things are.’ —Karl Giberson & Francis Collins

That’s only a small sample; I have more for Illing if he wants them. And here is what Americans actually believe to be true (percentage of all Americans accepting the propositions below). This is not a small minority of Americans—it’s MOST OF THEM:

A personal God concerned with you 68%

Absolutely certain there is a God  54%

Jesus was the son of God  68%

Jesus was born of a virgin  57%

Jesus was resurrected  65%

Miracles  72%

Heaven  68%

Hell and Satan 58%

Angels  68%

Survival of soul after death 64%

2. Without the (false) verities of religion, people’s lives will lose meaning. 

For [Dostoyevsky’s] part, God was a bridge to self-transcendence, a way of linking the individual to a tradition and a community. The truth of Christ was therefore less important than the living faith made possible by belief in Christ. . .

“I’ve never seen anyone die for the ontological argument,” Camus wrote, but “I see many people die because they judge that life is not worth living. I see others getting killed for ideas or illusions that give them a reason for living.” Today is no different; people continue to kill and die in defense of beliefs that give their lives meaning and shape.

. . . The New Atheists don’t have a satisfactory alternative for such people. They argue that religion is false; that it’s divisive; that it’s unethical; that it makes a virtue of self-deception; that it does more harm than good – and maybe they’re right, but if they don’t understand that, for many, meaning is more important than truth, they’ll never appreciate the vitality of religion. To his credit, Sam Harris’ most recent book, “Waking Up,” grapples with these issues in truly fascinating ways. Indeed, Harris writes insightfully about the necessity of love, meaning and self-transcendence. But he’s a fringe voice in the New Atheist community. Most are too busy disproving religion to consider why it is so persistent, and why something beyond science will have to take its place in a Godless world.

What we see here is the incredibly arrogant and condescending Little People Argument: while rationalists like Illing can easily reject religion’s truths and get along fine without them—he says, “It’s perfectly rational to reject faith as a matter of principle. Many people [myself included] find no practical advantage in believing things without evidence”—the Little People can’t. They need their faith! I guess the Little People who populate much of Northern Europe don’t count.

Let us make one thing clear: it is a benefit to humanity to rid it of false beliefs, even if you have nothing to put in their place. Many people in the South structured their lives around the implicit assumption that whites were far superior to blacks, and that a decent society demanded the subjugation of blacks. Did the civil rights movement offer something to replace the need of Southern whites to feel superior? Nope; the movement simply rid society of a false and invidious notion that people were inherently unequal and thus should be treated unequally.

Likewise, New Atheists rid society of the belief that it’s being monitored and tended by a celestial dictator. That alone is a good, for it’s better to see the truth. I don’t see it as an inherent responsibility of atheists to replace religion with something else that gives people meaning, for I think that most people (as they have in atheistic Europe) will find such meaning for themselves, and that it will differ from person to person. I bet if you asked most Swedes how they can possibly find meaning in their lives without religion, they’d just look like you were crazy.

Which brings us to the last point:

3. New Atheists should be faulted for attacking religion without at the same time suggesting replacements for religion.

The New Atheists have an important role to play. Reason needs its champions, too. And religion has to be resisted because there are genuine societal costs. One can draw a straight line between religious dogma and scientific obscurantism or moral stagnation, for example. That’s a real problem. But if religion is ineradicable, we have to find a way to limit its destructive consequences. Satire and criticism are necessary, but they’re not sufficient.

People like Harris and the late Christopher Hitchens make a powerful case for a more humanistic ethics. Harris writes admirably about the need to be more attentive to the present, to the suffering of other human beings. I agree. But if we want to encourage people to care about the right things, we should spend as much time encouraging them to care about the right things as we do criticizing their faith.

Here we see more arrogance—not from the New Atheists but from Illing. Who is he to tell us how to spend our time? In fact, some of us criticize religion, while others, like Phil Kitcher, Chris Stedman and Alain de Botton—spend their time finding the substitutes for religion. Isn’t that just as good as all of us spending our time doing both?

After all, we have the principle of comparative advantage at work: let each of us do what he or she is good at. I am not good at suggesting religion substitutes because I don’t believe that we need formal substitutes, and the evidence from modern Europe supports me. Nor do we have good studies to show a). what will count as a religion substitute for people, and b). whether people really need those things to have a meaningful life. Since I think that religion is on balance a harmful superstition, standing in the way of rational discourse, and as a scientist who’s read theology I can do something about that, that’s what I do. I’m not keen on finding religion substitutes, and neither Illing nor I (nor anyone, I think) is well qualified to tell people what can replace church. As water finds its own level, so will people find their own meaning.

In the end, it’s not the New Atheists who are arrogant. How could we be, if we’re wedded to rationality, doubt, and the use of evidence? Who asks themselves more often questions like, “Could I be wrong?”, or “How would I know if I were wrong?” Hint: it’s not the believers.

No, it’s Illing who’s the arrogant one, for he presumes that he, who sits proudly at the Big People’s Table and can dispense with the need for religion, must preach to all of us that those Little People at the Children’s Table must have their pabulum faith—or a substitute for it. It is he who doubts the ability of people to live without convenient fictions. I have more faith in humanity than that, and I use the word “faith” as a metaphor.

h/t: Barry