You can pretty much be sure that when the New York Times carries an op-ed discussing either the genesis of ISIS or potential solutions to its brutality, religion will be downplayed. Well, yesterday’s op-ed by writer Aatish Taseer, called “ISIS and the return of history,” is a welcome exception, though as usual I have a few beefs with it. (I clearly have a gene for petulance).
The good part is that Taseer’s piece is pretty sensible, pointing at the rise of modernity and the hatred thereof as a cause of Muslim disaffection, and pointedly ignoring the regressive Left’s self-blaming based on Western imperialism. As he notes:
Perhaps more surprising is that in all those places where a modern nation has been grafted onto an ancient culture, history has returned with a vengeance. From Confucian China to Buddhist Myanmar to Hindu India, history has become the source of a fierce new conservatism that is being used to curb freedoms of women and stoke hatred of minorities. As the ultimate source of legitimacy, history has become a way for modernizing societies to procure the trappings of modernity while guarding themselves from its values.
Taseer’s on to something here, of course, there are a couple of problems. One is a problem of omission: why do the youths of these modern states act so disaffected? He says only that “a certain dispiriting experience of modernity, felt often as the loss of a sense of self and of old ways, exacerbates these demands. This is what lies behind this violent need to reclaim history.” But that’s not very convincing, for there are plenty of societies (China and Taiwan come to mind) that have made the transition to modernity without needing to reach back at an imagined past. To me, a better explanation is that the disaffection comes from dysfunctional societies: the kind of societies where ISIS, the Taliban, and Boko Haram arose. Modernity isn’t so dispiriting if you’ve benefited from it!
Also, Taseer’s vision of an ancient and more benign Islam may be relatively accurate, but for nonbelievers the areas it conquered were hardly the paradisiacal and multicultural society Taseer paints:
The jihadists in Syria and Iraq, Mr. McCants [William McCants, author of The ISIS Apocalypse] told me, are “infatuated” with Harun al-Rashid, the great Abbasid caliph whose court reportedly inspired “One Thousand and One Nights.” “They see him as the pinnacle of success, and the caliphate that he ruled over as the golden age,” Mr. McCants said, “but they elide all those parts of his rule that don’t mesh with their own.” The eighth-century caliph being idolized by the Islamic State practiced a far more lenient rule than Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi does. Harun was tolerant of Shiites and religious minorities. His court would engage in freewheeling debates over matters of faith. “You could play musical instruments,” Mr. McCants said. “He loved to drink wine, he loved men.”
Jews and Christians in these communities (people called dhimmis) were allowed to live, and even practice their faiths (inconspiculously), but had restrictive freedom and were taxed. But let’s grant Taseer the fact that modern extremist Islamists are indeed practicing behaviors not seen in earlier parts of the Caliphate. The question is why.
And here’s where Taseer gives religion a pass, blaming “history” rather than faith. As he says, this return to the past is not unique to extremist Islam, but is present elsewhere, including Buddhist and Hindu societies:
When I was in Sri Lanka in 2013, the Bodu Bala Sena, a radical Buddhist nationalist group, had conjured up a prudish Buddha who scolded young girls about their clothes and told them what time they should be home at night. In reality, the Buddha, like many Eastern thinkers, was generally reticent on the subject of sexual morality
. . . Similarly, in India, a breach has appeared between a sensuous and liberal past and an ugly, puritanical present. In my daily reading of Sanskrit poetry, there are women with disheveled hair, half-open eyes and cheeks covered in sweat from the exertion of coitus. But turn on the television and the minister of culture, who says that the Hindu holy books are ideal texts for teaching moral values, informs modern Indians that “girls wanting a night out” may be all right elsewhere, but it is “not part of Indian culture.”
Note that in India, imperialism can’t be blamed for the rise of extremist Hinduism. That’s a fairly recent development, and the British quit India in 1947. (Note as well that Indian protests against British occupation were by and large nonviolent, and, despite pervasive poverty, India never developed a movement like ISIS. What happened during Partition was not the killing of the British, but the wholesale slaughter of Hindus and Muslims by each other, and almost entirely on the basis of religion.Trains full of Muslims were slaughtered by Hindus, for example, after the penises of males were inspected—Muslims practice circumcision and Hindus don’t.)
But, after a brief allusion to the fact that the Qur’an might be a bit nastier than other scripture in inspiring violence, Taseer still claims that the “return to history” is the main problem:
Islam, with its rich textual history and detailed recordings of the life and times of the Prophet Muhammad, offers the faithful an especially aggressive blueprint for turning the past into a weapon against the present. But the return of history is not specific to Islam. All over the old world, the spread of modernity and the wearing down of tradition have led to a frantic need to repossess the past. But this act of reclamation, through an ever-closer adherence to text without context, does not give back what was lost. It creates something radical and new — and dangerous.
But the history that Islamist and Hindu nationalists aspire to return is one soaked in religion. After all, it’s the dictates of scripture that shaped those societies, inspiring, for instance, ISIS to adhere to a literal Qur’an and behaviors derived from the hadith. The West, too, has had to cope with modernity, but hasn’t been so shaken up by “the shock of the new” that Americans long for the days of the frontier and its violence. The aspects of the past that are so odious to opponents of ISIS or Hindutva come from scripture.
I’m not saying that the secular past was all beer and skittles: as Steve Pinker argues, morality has increased most everywhere in the last five or six centuries, and bad treatment of the poor, women, and animals was simply part and parcel of society. But imagine if there was no religion—not just now, but in the past. What would regressive Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists be grasping for?
In that way Taseer manages to exculpate religion, and I don’t think he’s 100% correct. But at least he’s free from the tiresome self-blaming of the Western Left.