Rick Shweder is a cultural anthropologist with the title of Harold H. Swift Distinguished Service Professor of Human Development here at the University of Chicago. Like many of us, Rick is involved in trying to preserve and teach the Chicago Principles of Free Expression as well as the Kalven Report.
His latest effort is a well-written piece for the City Journal about the various types of “free” speech available. He’s concerned mostly with what goes on in private universities like ours, and his message is that both public and private universities should adhere to pure First Amendment free speech, which, in colleges, comes with court-approved “time, place, and manner” (TPM) restrictions. But be aware that his discussion is centered on private universities.
Click below to read:
First, here are Shweder’s three speech options that, he says, are available to private colleges (his words are indented):
Both Columbia and Harvard are private institutions and can set their own speech policies. Such schools, broadly speaking, have three options in crafting their codes. First, they can provide students with speech rights mirroring those guaranteed by the First Amendment. Second, they can prohibit “offensive” or otherwise unwelcome speech. Third, they can require academic manners of speech on campus. Any private institution must choose from, or strike a balance between, those three options.
I’ll take the options separately:
The pure free speech option:
The first option, which we’ll call the “First Amendment model,” is the preferred speech policy at most secular private universities in the United States. That policy protects (and restricts) campus speech much the way our courts protect (and restrict) speech in the public square. Harvard president Claudine Gay likely had this model in mind when she refused to give a categorical “yes” or “no” answer to the genocide-advocacy question.
. . . and how it’s supposed to work:
My University of Chicago colleague, Geoffrey Stone, author of “The Chicago Principles,” explains why a First Amendment–embracing private-university president may have struggled to answer Stefanik’s question:
If the University embraces the principles of the First Amendment for public speech, then advocating the genocide of a group in public discourse could not be punished or prohibited unless it creates a clear and present danger that the conduct that is advocated would in fact occur. That is the lesson the [Supreme] Court learned from decades of allowing speech to be prohibited if it advocates unlawful conduct (such as refusing to comply with the draft or attempting to overthrow the government). The real harm from the advocacy of genocide is not that it is likely to cause genocide, but that it is seen as offensive and hurtful. That is not a sufficient justification for prohibiting speech in public discourse. Another concern is that it might cause people to discriminate against or even physically harm Jews. But that doesn’t satisfy the demands of the First Amendment any more than would public speech accusing people who perform abortions of being murderers.
First Amendment principles distinguish between advocacy (which is constitutionally protected) and likely incitement of an immediate and grave harm (which is not), and between verbal harassment directed at a particular group (which is constitutionally protected) and verbal harassment directed at a particular individual (which is not). If Harvard were committed to upholding the First Amendment model (which is doubtful), Claudine Gay would be right to say that context matters in determining whether a call to genocide constitutes prohibited speech.
No university in America today, however, fully embraces First Amendment principles. For example, heckling and shouting, provided it does not deprive anyone of their right to speak, is constitutionally protected speech in the public square but is banned at most private universities.’
Note, however, that courts make a distinction between what’s said in the public square and what’s said on college campuses, so that heckling and shouting and disruption can be banned in even public universities without violating the First Amendment. The University of Louisville, a public university in Kentucky, emphasizes that TPM restrictions apply to their campus to preserve freedom of speech and do not violate the Constitution:
The First Amendment requires that the government not discriminate against particular viewpoints. The Supreme Court has, however, upheld the idea that speech may be regulated under “Time, Place, and Manner” regulations. The burden of such regulations is still fairly high, requiring the government to show that their restrictions on speech are (1) content neutral (that the government does not outlaw content specific viewpoints), (2) narrowly tailored to serve a governmental interest (i.e., cannot be overly broad to regulate more than what is necessary to achieve government interest like, for example, public safety), and (3) ample alternative means to express ideas. At UofL, for example, the time, place, and manner regulations are a reflection of the value of encouraging diverse ideas, community engagement on campus, and academic freedom while also preserving interests including campus safety.
Students or student organizations have the right of freedom of expression to the extent allowed by law. The University reserves the right to make reasonable restrictions as to time, place, and manner in certain situations as outlines to the Code of Student Rights and Responsibilities.
The government interest in (2) above is in preserving freedom of speech itself by not allowing unwarranted disruptions that could impede discussion.
The prohibition of “offensive” speech.
The second policy option, which acknowledges private schools’ right to regulate the content of on-campus speech, goes beyond most schools’ bans on heckling. This option, which we’ll call the “regulatory approach,” aims to restrict speech that is repellent, alarming, or disparaging of a particular group. Shafik’s recent congressional testimony, in which she endorsed penalties for hurtful or repugnant speech, suggests Columbia embraces the regulatory approach, as private universities are legally free to do.
Is it possible to reduce “offensive” speech without implementing formal sanctions? Harvard professor Danielle Allen thinks so. In the Washington Post, Allen proposed that students abide by the following self-censoring principle: “If the communications you use while protesting would constitute harassment if targeted at a specific individual, the presumption will be that the protest method is likely to create a pattern of generalized intimidation incompatible with a culture of mutual respect.”
But this isn’t a good test, for “offensive” speech need not constitute harassment even if targeted at a specific individual, for specific individuals could claim that they’d be harassed if faced with, for instance, pro-life messages (Shweder’s example), anti-affirmative-action messages, or an infinite number of messages that might offend people but wouldn’t be “harassment” in the normal sense. The showing of paintings of Muhammad at Hamline University, for example, was claimed to create intimidation and harm, but this was perfectly consonant with a college atmosphere that promotes discussion. Nevertheless, the professor who showed the images was let go.
Preservation of “academic manner” of speaking.
As Shweder presents it (and he’s clearly thinking of what has happened on our campus), preserving the “academic manner of speech” overlaps substantially with preserving the TPM restrictions, which themselves create an atmosphere that promotes free discussion:
This third option, which we’ll call the “manners approach,” reflects those principles. It refuses to regulate the content of speech. Instead, it focuses exclusively on the form of speech and procedures of civil intellectual engagement that define and give character to a free-thinking and critically reasoning academic speech environment. Some manners of speech, such as shouting down invited speakers, are widely recognized to be incompatible with the mission of a university.
After all, why should a private school permit a political demonstration in which slogans are shouted at captive audiences in offices or classrooms within earshot? Such speech events are asymmetric, non-cooperative, and dogmatic. Typically, the discourse scene for the event is aggressively controlled by a group of energized and committed true believers, and neither debate nor dialogue nor discussion nor rational argument is invited or welcome. The manners approach invites private universities to distinguish their quadrangles from a public park or a rally ground. One of the many problems demonstrations like those at Columbia present is that they breach the peace of the university and subvert the trust and cooperation necessary to sustain dialogue and debate in a community of scholars.
I would claim that this doesn’t really differ from the First Amendment option, as that option itself regulates TPM, creating an “academic manner” of speech.
Now it’s pretty clear that Shweder believes that all private universities, as well as public ones, should adopt the First-Amendment model, and if Harvard and Penn had done that (they sort of have one, but apply it inconsistently), then the Presidents wouldn’t have gotten the Congressional drubbing they did. It was more the hauteur with which the three Presidents answered, as well as their failure to explain why the “it depends” nature of calls for genocide really can be Constitutional, that brought two of the three down (Gay might have survived had she not committed plagiarism).
At the end, when Shweder asks the question “Which of these three options—the First Amendment, regulatory, or manners approach—should private universities pursue?”, he gives a quote from 1946 by Columbia University President Frank Fackenthal that suggersts that the First Amendment approach is the one that private schools should use, ergo one that all universities should use. (Religious universities may be an exception, but Shweder doesn’t consider them.)
I’m in full agreement with this conclusion but finish with the two quibbles I have with the article. To repeat:
First, I think there is a time and place to use signs and banners, though they’re no replacement for reasoned speech. And they are constitutional. Putting down the megaphones, however, is a good idea, as amplified speech serve only to disrupt campuses. It certainly did here, as some faculty had to move or cancel their classes near the Quad when denizens of the encampment began changing through megaphones outside the permitted hours.
Second, and more important, TPM restrictions are fully consonant with the First Amendment. Therefore, if universities do make rules limiting the time, place, and manner of public speech, and those rules are not unreasonable and meant to further academic discourse, they are still adhering to Constitutional forms of speech. This is important to realize, for a lot of misguided faculty members construe disruptive encampments, sit-ins in buildings, and the use of megaphones, etc. as “free speech”. It is not—at least not according to our Constitution. Thus I disagree with Shweder when he said this:
No university in America today, however, fully embraces First Amendment principles. For example, heckling and shouting, provided it does not deprive anyone of their right to speak, is constitutionally protected speech in the public square but is banned at most private universities.
Heckling and shouting and deplatforming are also banned at many public universities, and, at any rate, deplatformng speakers, heckling and shouting are fully in line with First Amendment principles for some places—including universities. Thus it’s wrong to say that “no university in America today. . . fully embraces First Amendment principles.” Certainly the University of Chicago does, as well as public schools like the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Michigan State, and the University of Texas system.
The realization that the Chicago Principles of Freedom of Expression are the rules most conducive to allowing free academic discourse is why more than 100 U.S. colleges and Universities, both public and private have adopted them.
Free, free speech!



















More from Turley: