The Shroud of Turin: why religion is a pseudoscience

February 20, 2014 • 10:32 am

A recent article by Carpinteri et al. (no link or free download, but judicious inquiry may yield you a pdf) demonstrates the two ways that religion is a pseudoscience.  The first is that it relies on empirical claims to buttress its dogma. While Sophisticated Theologians™ may argue that God is beyond all evidence, being some imperceptible and numinous “thing” that can neither be defined nor seen as interacting with the cosmos, that’s not what believers think.  So, for example, claims that Jesus was born of a virgin, died, was resurrected, or that Mohammad went to heaven on a horse, or that Joseph Smith received the golden plates in New York and translated them, or that 75 million years ago Xenu loaded his alien minions onto planes resembling DC-8s, or that there is an afterlife, and that good people go to Heaven, or that God hears and answers prayers, and is benevolent and all-powerful, are claims about the way the world is. And many of those claims are testable, though all have been refuted. In the prescientific era, these claims constituted a sort of science.

But as real science arose in the 15th and 16th centuries, and began eroding religion’s claims, religion began turning into a pseudoscience. That is, it still made empirical claims, but immunized itself against refutation of those claims using a variety of devices—the same devices used by other forms of pseudoscience like ESP, UFOlogy, homeopathy, and astrology. These include arguing that the propositions themselves are untestable, using poor standards of evidence (including reliance on “revelation” as a “way of knowing”), reliance on a priori personal biases that are not to be tested but merely confirmed, refusing to consider alternative hypotheses, and engaging in special pleading when religious tenets are disconfirmed.

We can see all of these—but especially in the last—in a paper by A. Carpinteri et al. on the Shroud of Turin, a paper that’s gotten a lot of publicity. It’s an attempt to defend scientific radio-carbon dating of the Shroud, which showed it to be a medieval forgery, by special pleading invoking earthquakes.

First, a short review. You almost surely know that the Shroud of Turin is a sheet of linen in a cathedral in Turin, Italy, bearing the likeness of a man who is said to be Jesus. The cloth is, indeed, supposed to be the burial shroud of Jesus. Here’s what it looks like: the image is much clearer in negative form than as a positive. Here’s the body (pictures from Wikipedia; there are actually two images on the shroud, as if the body had been enfolded):

Shroudofturin1

The face in negative and positive:

Shroud_positive_negative_compare

Although scientists and artists aren’t yet sure how the image was made (it appears to include AB blood, suggesting, since Mary was a virgin, that God carried either an A or a B Landsteiner allele (or both), but what is not in dispute is that radiocarbon dating of the linen shroud by three independent labs puts the date at between 1000 AD to 1260 AD. In other words, the shroud was medieval, and could not have been Jesus’s burial shroud.

While religionists have raised numerous reasons why the dating could be wrong—foremost among them is the claim that the dated sample was taken from a piece of cloth used to patch the shroud much later—none of these appear credible. The Vatican itself takes no position on the authenticity of the shroud, which of course means that believers are free to think the Church thinks it could be real.

Science has thus debunked this as Jesus’s shroud.  But religionists, in their pseudoscientific way, won’t give up.  They have now raised a new ad hoc hypothesis to explain why the dating was wrong—earthquakes! To be specific, an earthquake occurring after Jesus’s body was wrapped produced a bunch of neutrons by shaking up the rocks. Those neutrons were captured by Nitrogen-14 to produce Carbon-14, the parent material used in radiometric dating. (This is in fact how Carbon-14 is formed in the atmosphere.) But Carbon-14 also degenerates back to nitrogen by emitting an electron. Carbon 12, the more common isotope of carbon, does not decay. Since a carbon-containing sample will have, when it is made or when its possessor died (like an old piece of wood), the same ratio of Carbon-14 to Carbon-12 present in the atmosphere at the time of manufacture or death, the Carbon-14 will gradually decay (no more carbon can be absorbed from the atmosphere). At the end, if we know the rate at which Carbon-14 decays (its half-life is 5720 years), we can estimate the age of a sample by simply measuring the ratio of C-14/C-12.

You can see, then, that if a sample were to somehow be able to be infused with extra Carbon-14 after it died or was manufactured, it would look younger than it was: as if the original amount of radiometric carbon had not sufficiently decayed to give it a lower and time-appropriate C-14/C-12 ratio.

And that is what Carpinteri et al. suggest: an earthquake around the time of Jesus’s death (33 A.D.) caused a huge emission of neutrons; those neutrons were captured by the nitrogen in the shroud, producing a higher level of C-14 than would have been there if the shroud were really made at the time of Jesus. That, in turn, would make the shroud look younger than it really was. In other words, they’re suggesting the original dating was wrong because the assumption (that no C-14 had gotten into the shroud) was violated by a big earthquake.

Oh, and they also suggest that neutron capture, presumably by the body, would have produced the image, though there’s no reason, scientifically, to think that an image could be produced by that.

Although there is evidence that some earthquakes can transitorily release substantial amounts of neutrons into the atomosphere, there are three scientific problems with this hypothesis.

1. The evidence for an earthquake is thin. The authors cite four sources. The first is Thallos, a historian in Rome who wrote about 50 A.D., and whose works mention Jesus as well as an earthquake and a solar eclipse that happened during the Crucifixion. This evidence is not credible (there was no solar eclipse then), and Biblical scholars no longer accept Thallos’s quoted words as evidence for the historicity of Jesus.

The second is the Gospel of Matthew, which also mentions an earthquake when Jesus died. Needless to say, this is not independent evidence, and the other Gospels don’t mention an earthquake.  Why not? If it had happened, wouldn’t all the Gospels have mentioned it?

The third source is Joseph of Arimathea, who, according to the Gospels, donated his own future tomb to Jesus. His “narrative,” a non-canonical Gospel that mentions an earthquake, is not accepted by scholars as independent evidence for the historicity of Jesus; indeed, I can find no credible evidence that this Joseph even lived.

Finally, Carpinteri et al. cite, of all people, Dante’s Inferno (XXI, Canto: 106-114) as mentioning a big earthquake, but who would possibly think that that is independent evidence for an earthquake, since Dante wrote this 13 centuries after Jesus supposedly lived and was, of course, basing much of his poem on the Bible. The authors fail to cast any doubt on the credibility of these sources.

2. There is no evidence that neutron emission during an earthquake could alter the C-14 content of a shroud. This, of course, could be tested in laboratory experiments, but the authors didn’t do it.

3. The alteration of the amount of C14 in the shroud would have to be sufficient to make it look sufficiently pre-modern, but not too young. In fact, the first accepted mention of the Shroud happens to be 1390, pretty close to the time when it was radiocarbon dated. If there was more C-14 generated by the earthquake, it would make it look like it dated from, say, 1600 or later, which wouldn’t comport with the historical records.  So the earthquake managed to give it a false data that happens to correspond to its first mention. That’s too much of a coincidence, and the authors don’t mention this.

4. There is no known way that an earthquake could, by neutron emission, produce an image of a body on a shroud. The authors don’t deal with this, either.

The Carpinteri paper is thus a confection of unlikely and untested hypotheses, all assembled to try to save the authenticity of the Shroud of Turin as the true burial cloth of Jesus. It is not a piece of science, but a piece of apologetics.

Nevertheless, it’s been uncritically accepted in some venues. Take a look at the February 11 article in the Telegraph, “Turin Shroud may have been created by earthquake from time of Jesus.” It presents the theory, and offers not a single piece of counterevidence, nor a single dissenting scientist (and there are some), casting doubt on the thesis. This can be attributed to shoddy journalism, to a credulous or lazy journalist (Sarah Knapton), to a desire to placate a public hungry for evidence that Jesus really lived, or all of these factors. What is certain is that the Carpinteri et al. paper is deeply flawed, is not objective science but advocacy, and has been reported uncritically by the press. I’m just a lowly website writer who spent an hour reading the paper and an hour writing this piece and looking stuff up. Why couldn’t Knapton do the same thing?

Indeed, even Wikipedia does a better job than the popular press, and points out something that Ms. Knapton should have known: Carpinteri is the editor of the journal that published this flawed paper. What does that say about the review process? As Wikipedia notes:

A team of researchers from the Politecnico di Torino, led by Professor Alberto Carpinteri (and published in the journal Meccanica, where same Alberto Carpinteri is currently the acting Editor-in-Chief, believe that if a magnitude 8.2 earthquake occurred in Jerusalem in 33 AD, it may have released sufficient radiation to have increased the level of carbon-14 isotopes in the shroud, which could skew carbon dating results, making the shroud appear younger.This hypothesis has been questioned by other scientists, including a radiocarbon-dating expert. The underlying science is widely disputed, and funding for the underlying research has been withdrawn by the Italian government after protests and pressure from more than 1000 Italian and international scientists. Dr REM Hedges, of the Radiocarbon Accelerator Unit of the University of Oxford, states that “the likelihood that [neutron irradiation] influenced the date in the way proposed is in my view so exceedingly remote that it beggars scientific credulity.” Raymond N. Rogers conducted various tests on linen fibers, and concluded that “the current evidence suggests that all radiation-based hypotheses for image formation will ultimately be rejected.”

Of course none of this counterevidence will shake the faithful, who will still see the Shroud as authentic, and will come in droves to pay homage when the Shroud has one of its rare showings. Like believers in homeopathy or ESP (or, now, Adam and Eve), they continue to hold their faith despite all scientific counterevidence.

____________

Carpinteri, A., G. Lacidogna, and O. Borla. 2014. Is the Shroud of Turin in relation to the Old Jerusalem historical earthquake? Meccanica DOI 10.1007/s11012-013-9865-x

The Finns must love their reindeer

February 20, 2014 • 5:36 am

. . . for they coat their antlers with reflective paint to make them visible to oncoming motorists:

Finnish reindeer

 

 

From Time’s newsfeed:

In an attempt to prevent road deaths, reindeer herders in Finland have begun painting the animals’ antlers with fluorescent dye to make them more visible to drivers, the Associated Press reports. The Finnish Reindeer Herder’s Association is currently testing this method to see how the creatures react — and to determine if the dye can withstand Finland’s harsh Arctic climate.

 

Every year, there are between 3,000 and 5,000 accidents involving reindeer in Finland, The Guardian reports. So if this strategy proves successful for the 20 animals who’ve received the makeover so far, herders will apply it as a more widespread solution across the Lapland region, home to around 200,000 reindeer.

 

Previous attempted solutions like reflectors and reflective tape have failed because the reindeer rip them off and then probably eat them or something. And tourists apparently steal reindeer warning signs as souvenirs.

Don’t-miss video: Squirrel pwns hawk

February 19, 2014 • 2:32 pm

I don’t know how the cinematographers got this footage (much of it must be a montage), nor do I know how to embed it in a way that will show you the video as you’re about to see it, but it’s pretty amazing footage.  A hawk goes after a wily squirrel, but (to my relief), the squirrel escapes. This video gets The Professor Ceiling Cat Seal of Approval.

Click here.

No squirrels were harmed in the making of this film!

p.s. Don’t bother telling me that the hawk goes hungry, or that you want to kill squirrels, or that you find squirrels delicious.

h/t: Moto via Hempenstein

Kas Thomas melts down

February 19, 2014 • 12:16 pm

I’m pretty much done with Kas Thomas and his dissing of modern evolutionary theory. All that’s left is to document the final stage in his loss of credibility: his siding with sympathetic creationists and his accusations that his critics are “bullies.”

As Hitchens pointed out, playing the “tone” card is the last refuge of those who have no good arguments. Thomas has yet to address the substantive scientific arguments of his critics. He is recalcitrant, unwilling to admit error and distortion, and therefore no longer worth spending time on. In many respects his behavior resembles that of Deepak Chopra.

Ergo, the final stage of Thomas’s meltdown, from the Big Think comments section. Andre, in whose words Thomas finds solace, is an ignorant creationist, whose argument against me includes the accusation that I like cats!

Andre and Kas Andre_hates_abiogensis

Curiously, after nearly all of the 500-odd comments at the Big Think site take Thomas to task for his ignorance and distortion of evolutionary biology, he’s tw**ted as if he were victorious:

Screen shot 2014-02-19 at 5.47.19 AMh/t: JJE

The Big Jump

February 19, 2014 • 10:14 am

This video of Felix’s Baumgartner’s famous 24-mile jump to Earth was posted on January 31 of this year and has already garnered over twelve million views. The new aspect of this video is that it’s filmed largely by GoPro cameras affixed to the jumper.

Reader Jon, who sent me the link to the video, adds this:

It’s been about a year and a half since Felix Baumgartner jumped from a balloon at the edge of space, but GoPro just recently released a video inviting everyone along for the ride. Baumgartner was wearing five GoPro HD HERO2 cameras to record his decent. Several other cameras were mounted to his capsule. The video starts with some historical footage of Joe Kittinger’s historic jump in 1960 from 19 ∏ miles. Kittinger served as capsule coordinator directing Baumgartner on his jump.

Does the average person believe in determinism, free will, and moral responsibility?

February 19, 2014 • 7:58 am


One of the recurrent arguments made by free-will “compatibilists” (i.e., those who see free will as being compatible with physical determinism), is that those of us who are incompatibilists—in my case, I think people conceive of free will as reflecting a dualistic “ghost in the brain,” and find that incompatible with the determinism that governs our behavior—is this: “Nobody really believes in dualistic free will—the sense that one could have done otherwise. Thus, invoking your kind of incompatibilism is accepting a form of free will that nobody espouses.  So why bother to beat a dead horse?”

Well, of course, they’re wrong insofar as there are many religionists who firmly believe and espouse dualistic free will. Except for Calvinists, for instance, many Christians think that God gave us libertarian (“I could have chosen otherwise”) free will so we can choose not only whether to accept Jesus as our savior, but also to do good or evil. That, these believers say, is why there is evil in the world: human-caused evil is simply a byproduct of the dualistic free will that God gave us. If we have the ability to choose God and Jesus, then an unavoidable byproduct is to choose to do good and evil. That’s explicitly dualistic. (I must add that this religious “free will” argument cannot explain the existence of physical evils, like earthquakes and childhood cancers.)

But many philosophers cite a seven-year-old paper of Eddy Nahmias et al. (reference below) that seems to show, using specific moral situations, that many people (by “people,” they mean honors students at Florida State University) feel that even in a deterministic universe, people still say that they choose actions of their own free will and are morally responsible for those actions.  That seems to show that Florida State honors students are compatibilists. The Nahmias paper is ubiquitously cited as evidence that the average person is a compatibilist.

I am in the process of reading the Nahmias et al. paper for the second time, but have discovered that there is a spate of literature since 2006 that points to opposite conclusions: a majority of people think that a.) the universe is not deterministic and b.) that if the world were truly deterministic, then we have no moral responsibility for our actions.

I finished one of the latter papers yesterday (I read it first because it was shorter!), and will report on the Nahmias et al. paper tomorrow. But for the nonce let us not accept Nahmias’s results as the final word on what the “average person” believes about free will. I would also hope that those many readers who are compatibilists will not try to pick many criticisms with today’s paper but then go easy on the Nahmias paper simply because it comports with their beliefs. In truth, a scan of the Nahmias paper (I read it some time ago) shows that it’s somewhat problematic.

But more on that tomorrow. Let’s look at the paper by Hagop Sarkissian et al. (reference below).

The authors first recount the historical controversy, citing several papers showing that “folk intuition,” contra Nahmias et al, is indeed incompatibilist, and they find a correlation between the kind of study conducted and whether people are shown to be compatibilist or incompatibilist:

These studies that elicited compatibilist responses have an interesting feature: they ask participants to consider concrete cases, often of a type guaranteed to provoke affective responses (such as killing a person or robbing a bank). There is now a wealth of studies in social psychology exploring links between affect and theoretical cognition suggesting that such concrete, affect-laden cases may introduce biases in folk judgments (e.g. Lerner, Goldberg and Tetlock, 1998; Smart and Loewenstein, 2005). It is therefore important to see whether the compatibilist intuitions hold up when participants are presented not with a case likely to trigger affect, but instead asked more directly whether moral responsibility can be possible in a deterministic universe.

In other words, if you give students general scenarios of how the world works, rather than special case studies (even if both limn a deterministic world), subjects show themselves as incompatibilists.

One of these studies, cited by Sarkissian et al., was done by Nichols and Knobe (2007, reference below). In the first part of their studies they presented the students with two different kinds of universes: Universe A is fully deterministic and Universe B is indeterministic insofar as decision-making occurs. That is, in Universe B, but not A, people could have chosen otherwise at any point when they must make a decision:

Picture 3

Picture 1 14-52-28

Nichols and Knobe then asked, “Which of these universes do you think is most like ours? (circle one)

Universe A
Universe B

Nearly all participants in that study (I haven’t read it, but presume they were American college students), chose “B”: the indeterminstic universe. In other words, the vast majority of people believed in dualistic free will and were indeterminists about decisions.

Then Nichols and Knobe gave the students a concrete situation:

Picture 2 Picture 3

In this case, in the deterministic universe (the one students almost all rejected), most (72%) still held Bill morally responsible. That is a compatibilist response! Clearly, outlining a concrete situation rather than an abstract one changed the students’ judgements.

Another set of students were asked a more abstract question:

Picture 6In this case 86% of the students said “no,” an incompatibilist response!

Clearly, whether you see respondents as compatibilist or incompatibilist depends on how you ask the question. It is possible, for instance, that sudents interpret the world according to abstract theories (the second question) and so are largely incompatibilist. Or they could judge specific situations, evincing compatibilism. What is manifestly clear, and something people haven’t emphasized, is that the subjects almost all believe in an indeterministic universe in which people can, in a given situation, make more than one decision. To me, that’s clearly incompatibilism if, like most of us, you accept a determinstic universe. Or at least it shows that most people aren’t determinists.

The present paper by Sarkissian et al. extends Nichols and Knobe’s  (“abstract situation”) results to four groups of students from four places: a total of 231 undergraduates from a.) two US universities, b.) an Indian university, c.) Hong Kong university, and d.) a university in Bogotá, Colombia. Their aim was to see how notions of determinism and moral responsibility varied across the world.

They presented all the students with the same two universes described by Nichols and Knobe: Universe A, deterministic, and Universe B, indeterministic for decision making (that, of course, means indeterministic for other stuff, since once a libertarian decision is made, the course of history is forever changed). They asked two questions again. Here’s the first one:

Picture 2

And here are the results: the large majority of students in all four areas believed in an indeterministic universe, one in which people could have decided otherwise:

Picture 1 14-45-01They then asked the second question:

Picture 2 Picture 2 14-45-01

In all four areas, 60-75% were moral incompatibilists: they thought that in a deterministic universe, people are not fully morally responsible for their decisions. So, on the whole, students are both indeterminists and incompatibilists.

The impressionistic notion that people don’t accept determinism is seen in these two studies, and perhaps as well their belief in moral responsibility depends on kind of universe we really don’t have. At any rate, the lesson is that we need to teach people that Universe A is the right one (excepting, of course, some quantum indeterminacy), and that Universe B, in which people have libertarian free will, is the wrong one.

This study, using an abstract situation, gives no evidence that the average person is a compatibilist. (Remember, though, that these are all students who were surveyed. What the study shows is that students from four diverse places show similar moral and physical intuitions.)

One curious result of this study, however, was that the minority of students who responded to the first question as determinists also tended to respond to question B as compatibilists. That is, a significantly higher fraction of those who believe in a clocklike world thought people were more morally responsible than did the larger fraction of people who believe in a world in which people could make free, libertarian decisions! It’s possible that this means that those people hold to moral responsibility even more tenaciously because they think that accepting a deterministic world tends to lead people to behave immorally. It also suggests that the more we convince people that the world is deterministic, the more people will accept moral responsibility—that is, compatibilism will grow.  Now I don’t believe in the notion of “moral responsibility” in a world where nobody can freely choose their actions, but to each their own.

To me, the data show that the most important task for scientists and philosophers is to teach people that we live in Universe A. If most people think they don’t, then any philosophical version of compatibilism is logically (but not emotionally) incoherent. And I still feel that accepting a deterministic world has enormous beneficial consequences for how we punish and reward people, especially when it concerns the judicial system.  In a deterministic universe, there’s no room for punishment based on retribution, or differential punishment based on the notion that people could vs. could not choose how to behave.  But philosophers seem to prefer arguing about semantics (“compatibilism” vs. “incompatibilism” when nearly all admit a deterministic universe)  than discussing the very real implications of accepting determinism. I’m beginning to think that such philosophers are deliberately removing themselves from the real world.

Sarkissian et al. go on to speculate whether these views are innate or are learned through experience (of course, both factors may act). They reach no decision, and I find their results much more interesting than the speculations.

These results are at odds with the findings of Nahmias et al., and, at least insofar as the Universe A vs. Universe B question is concerned, convince me that most people don’t believe in physical determinism of decisions. I’ll argue tomorrow that the question posted to the Florida students by Nahmias et al. don’t fully lay out the consequences of determinism, but I need to first finish their paper. (I’ve read it before but want to refresh myself.)

One difference between the two sets of studies (Nahmias et al. vs. Sarkissian et al. and Nichols and Knobe) is that Nahmias et al. did not ask students to judge whether the universe was determinstic or indeterministic; rather, students were presented with a deterministic universe. Their study thus gives no information on the prevalence of “average people’s” views on determinism.

________

Nahmias, E., S. Morris, T. Nadelhoffer, and J. turner. 2006. Surveying freedom: Folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosohical Psychology 18:561-584.

Nichols, S. and J. Knobe. 2007.  Moral responsibility and determinism: the cognitive science of folk intuitions. Nouse 41:663-685.

Sarkissian, H., A. Chatterjee, F. De Brigard, J. Knobe, N. S., and S. Sirker. 2010. Is belief in free will a cultural universal? Mind & Language 25:346-358.

The Holy Grail of katydids

February 19, 2014 • 5:53 am

Piotr Naskrecki’s website, The Smaller Majority, is a treasure trove of natural history and photography, especially when they concern insects.  Naskrecki has lately been in Mozambique, and recently describes finding what is perhaps the world’s most beautiful katydid—and one of the rarest. It’s Pardolata reimeri, and information about it is thin. (Katydids, you might recall, are in the order Orthoptera along with crickets and grasshoppers, but are in their own family, the Tettigoniidae.)

Naskrecki recounts his delight and dismay when seeing one of these things, which looks like a piece of modern art with graffiti on it (his “dismay” was due to his lack of collecting equipment). His narrative, below, is indented. (Note: all photos copyrighted by Naskrecki and reproduced with permission.)

pardalota2
Pardalota reimeri, probably the most colorful and one of the rarest katydids in the world. The individuals I observed in Quirimbas are the first record of this species in 103 years.

The katydids were calling from high in the trees and I was afraid that I would not be able to catch, or even see them. But then one flew down from the canopy and landed right in front of me. When I saw what it was, my heart skipped a beat – it was Pardalota reimeri, the Holy Grail for katydid aficionados (there are a few of us out there). This species had been known only from the original type series, described in 1911 and preserved in a museum in Berlin. What is special about this species is that even those old, dried husks retained vivid, crazy colors, unlike those of any other known katydid species. And colors as awesome as this indicate an equally awesome biology.

Here’s one of those “old, dried husks” from a museum in Stockholm, taken from OSF online:

GetThumb-1

I caught the katydid and he immediately went into a defensive mode: he opened his bright purple, black and white wings, and exposed his neon-orange abdomen and cervical membrane; he lifted his hind legs that had yellow and black markings, remarkably similar to those of toxic chrysomelid beetles. This was either a daring bluff, or this thing was seriously poisonous. All around me other males continued to sing.

The site has a video showing the defensive posture, but here’s what it looks like:

pardalota3
A defensive display of Pardalota reimeri – these katydids feed on highly toxic plants and is likely that their bodies are loaded with poisonous alkaloids.

Naskrecki theorizes that the coloration is aposematic—that is, “warning coloration” that lets predators know to stay away, for the insect is toxic or dangerous.

What to do? Here I was, surrounded by a remarkable entomological discovery, but with no way to collect, preserve, or record it. I decided to exploit Harith’s students and we fanned out looking for the insects. Soon we discovered where they sang – they were only calling from, and feeding on, two species of trees, both known to produce potent chemical defenses, including some powerful psychoactive alkaloids. This almost certainly explained their aposematic coloration. We also found nymphs of this species, which turned out to be incredibly hairy. In fact, when I first saw one I thought I was looking at a fuzzy caterpillar feeding on a toxic plant – its movements were an uncanny imitation of the front end of a caterpillar chewing on a leaf, even though I was looking at at the katydid’s butt. It wasn’t shocking then when a minute later I noticed very similar looking caterpillars feeding on the same plant and, also on the same plant, tiger moths (well known to be toxic) wearing colors very similar to those of the katydids’. Having nothing else at my disposal I pointed my Canon 6D at the canopy and used its video recording feature to record the sound of the singing males. I collected as many individuals as I could, stuffing them into Ziplock bags, hoping to be able to get decent photos and proper sound recordings later on.

What a lovely beast!:

pardalotaf
A female P. reimeri cleaning her foot.

h/t: Piotr, Matthew Cobb