The estimable Jason Rosenhouse doesn’t post terribly often, but when he does, it’s worth reading. Over at EvolutionBlog last February, Jason tackled Elliott Sober’s idea (floated in an interview in The Philosopher’s Magazine) that God-guided mutations are not philosophically incompatible with evolution, a topic I wrote about yesterday. I was chuffed that my post seemed to get a lot of attention (over 140 comments) for one that dealt largely with evolution.
Yesterday Jason put up another post on God-guided mutations—actually, a dual post that also dealt with both the recent backlash against philosophy instantiated by Larry Krauss’s ill-advised comments in The Atlantic. (Jason’s title is in fact “The reason for the ambivalence toward the philosophy of science”). He agrees with me that Krauss was uncharitable in his remarks:
Now, I can understand why Krauss was feeling a bit vexed on this subject, since his book had just received an unkind review from a philosopher in The New York Times. Still, his sentiments were so exaggerated and over the top that the criticism directed at him is largely deserved. For example, his charge that only philosophers of science read work in the philosophy of science could be leveled (appropriately revised) at virtually any academic discipline. Moreover, I would think the philosophers could argue that it reflects badly on other people that they don’t take a greater interest in philosophy, just as Krauss would no doubt lament the unwillingness of so many nonscientists to read more about science. Krauss ought to have calmed down a bit before taking such broad swipes at his fellow academics.
On the other hand, I also have moments when I understand the exasperation. These are the moments when I see the truth in the adage that a philosopher is someone who kicks up a lot of dust and then complains he cannot see. For example, when it comes to anti-creationist writing I have generally found the writings of scientists to be more lucid and convincing than the writings of philosophers. [JAC: one comment here: at least two philosophers have written excellent anti-creationist books: Philip Kitcher’s Abusing Science and Rob Pennock’s Tower of Babel.]
Jason’s example of philosophical writing that is unconvincing and less than lucid is Sober’s talk highlighted yesterday, as well as Sober’s remarks on God-guided mutations in The Philosopher’s Magazine.
Both in that interview and [in the video] he presents his argument as a corrective to some pervasive logical error he thinks has been committed by someone or other. But who are these scientists that actually need his philosophical services on this point? Who ever claimed that science has shown that it is flat-out logically impossible that God could be directing the mutations in a manner that is invisible to science?
Indeed. As I noted yesterday, it is logically possible that God has a hand in any natural process—just a hand that is so cryptic and infrequent that it’s undetectable. I still fail to see the novelty in this argument, which has been made, even for mutations, by theologians like Alvin Plantinga and religious scientists like Ken Miller. So what? It’s also logically possible that God influences the coin-toss at the beginning of football games, giving an advantage to the team who has prayed harder. Why is that not equally fertile ground for Sober’s lucubrations?
Jason is rightly peeved about the claim that there’s no difference between the logical possibility of God’s existence and the probability of God’s existence.
I’m more interested in the second goal, since it illustrates another annoying tendency of certain philosophers. I am referring to the endless turf protection. The relentless nattering not about the arguments themselves, but about classifying the argument within the proper academic discipline. Obviously to go from the facts of science to nontrivial conclusions about God you are going to have to add to your argument some assumptions about God’s nature and abilities. If that transforms the argument from scientific to philosophical then so be it. Can we please now move on to the more important question of determining whether the arguments are any good?
I argue again that if there should be evidence for God, but there isn’t, then we have more confidence that God doesn’t exist. And that existence is an empirical rather than a philosophical question. The existence of a supernatural being cannot be decided through philosophy or reason alone: it requires observation or experiment. (That’s why the ontological argument isn’t any good.) If there is indeed a beneficent and omnipotent God, there should be evidence for it (prayers should be answered, we should see miracles, innocent children shouldn’t die of leukemia). But there isn’t any—any more than there is evidence for Bigfoot. Presumably Sober would be willing to accept the provisional non-existence of Bigfoot. Why, then, does he try to keep God in the picture with just as little evidence (i.e., none)? Jason goes on:
Yes, there’s a gulf between scientific facts and theological conclusions. But it’s a very small gulf, readily bridged by assumptions about God that are very common. The millennia of suffering entailed by the evolutionary process does not by itself rule out God, but add the standard assumptions (among Christians at any rate) that God is all-loving, knowing and powerful, and suddenly the problem is obvious. Moreover, the conflict isn’t logical, but evidential. The numerous ways that evolution challenges Christianity (challenging the Bible on the age of the Earth and on Adam and Eve, refuting the argument form design, exacerbating the problem of evil, and diminishing human significance) amount to a strong cumulative case against the possibility of reconciling evolution and religion. They don’t logically disprove theism, but that is neither here not there.
Dealing with those evidential challenges is the tune that prompts the annoying tap-dance of modern theology.
Finally, Jason, like me, claims that Sober’s conclusions are completely trivial—and he adds that they’re likely to be ineffectual:
Truly, though, it is the height of ivory tower nonsense to think that Sober’s argument makes even the slightest contribution to allaying the concerns of religious folks with regard to evolution. They are not worried about logical possibilities. They are worried about plausibilities, and Sober is quite up front that he himself does not find it plausible to think that God is directing the mutations. He points out there is not a shred of evidence for believing any such thing. He could have added that there are grave theological problems with such a suggestion, some of which I discussed in my previous post.
As a final point I would note that there is nothing new in Sober’s argument. The suggestion that God is subtly directing the mutations is commonplace in the literature of theistic evolution. Late in the session, Michael Ruse points out that physicist Robert John Russell has long argued for this general view. Ken Miller has made similar arguments. I am not aware of anyone who has responded to these gentlemen by saying their arguments are logically impossible.
In short, Sober’s presentation reminds me of John Hodgman’s “You’re Welcome” segments on The Daily Show. Sober struts in claiming he’s going to correct a logical fallacy absolutely no one has made, takes forty-five minutes to establish an utterly trivial point, is keen to remind us that we need philosophers to explain these things to us, and then coolly dismisses the idea that there is any necessary tension between non-fundamentalist Christianity and evolution. A bravura performance.
I am baffled why Sober spends so much time trying to argue for logical compatibility of God and evolution when he himself apparently thinks that God hasn’t played a role in evolution. One could argue that he’s just trying to demonstrate the power of philosophy, but perhaps there are other reasons involving dislike of New Atheists, giving succor to worried theists, and so on. That, after all, is what Michael Ruse did in his book Can a Darwinian Be a Christian?
Sober replies in the comments section that Jason misunderstands his thesis, arguing that “evolutionary biology is silent on this question [of God-guided mutations].” It is not, for have looked for them and have not found them. We cannot, of course, rule out that God creates such mutations very rarely and undetectably, but they’re not so frequent as to make mutations seem “nonrandom” in the scientific sense.
Finally, in the first comment on Jason’s post, Nick Matzke pops up to level a completely irrelevant slap at my criticism of theistic evolution as a form of creationism. Nick wants to validate God-guided evolution so that he (and the National Center for Science Education) can count more Americans as being pro-evolution (remember that more than twice as many Americans accept God-guided evolution as accept purely naturalistic evolution):
Apart from the massive logical and definitional problems with the above, Coyne also managed to change evolution from a majority view in the U.S. population, into a minority view outnumbered 5 to 1. Some people just like being disliked I think…
At any rate, I’ve received several private emails from people defending Sober’s views. Their main points are similar, and I’ll summarize them briefly:
1. Sober was not justifying or accepting God’s hand in evolution; he’s only saying that it’s logically possible. I agree. Neither Jason nor I assert that Sober is arguing for theism; that’s very clear in my post. What I claim is that Sober is enabling theism, and I’m not sure why.
2. All the good arguments against God’s existence are not scientific, but philosophical. I don’t agree. You can’t argue against the existence of something that affects the world on philosophical grounds alone. There has to be some appeal to evidence. Even the argument from evil is not totally philosophical: it uses the empirical evidence of undeserved evil combined with the philosophical premise that such evil is incompatible with a loving and powerful God.
3. Sober agrees that empirical evidence is relevant to establishing God’s existence. This, of course, conflicts with point (2). Here is a quote from an email written by one of Sober’s defenders: “[Sober] thinks that mixed claims that involve both supernatural and natural elements—’God created the Earth 10,000 years ago’—can and have been falsified.” Indeed. But isn’t this an admission that some of the best arguments for God’s existence are empirically testable? One of them was Adam and Eve; another the creation of the world and its inhabitats ex nihilo; still another the failure of intercessory prayer. And we know that God doesn’t generally elevate the mutation rate to make species more adapted to their environments. Nor have we seen macromutations (which God could create) that would enable species to evolve around adaptive “valleys” and actually climb Mount Improbable.
When we see failure after failure of such claims for God’s existence, why continue to argue that God could act in the interstices of the DNA molecule? Why doesn’t Sober think that Bigfoot exists? Presumably because there’s no evidence, even though there could be Well, think of God as an ethereal Bigfoot that can intercede in the workings of the universe.
My final appeal to Sober and is this: Elliott, why do you limit your argument for the logical compatibility of God and science to the occurrence of mutations alone? Why not argue that God and genetic drift are logically compatible? Or that God and quantum mechanics are logically compatible? Or that God and plate tectonics are logically compatible? (After all, God could be the one causing the tectonic activity that pushes the continents around.) Or that God could be subtly influencing the outcome of coin tosses?
Indeed, as one of my commenters (Dan L.) noted (and this is quoted by Jason), Sober could argue that “certain elements phone system would cease to work if it weren’t for the daily intervention of some benevolent deity. We can’t look for God in every relay every second of every day, so we can’t prove He’s not at work there.”
Indeed, and if this is what philosophers are going to spend their time doing, then my opinion of that enterprise is greatly lessened.