The latest Scentific American has a short column by Michael Shermer on why he thinks consciousness, free will, and God are “insoluble mysteries”. Click on the screenshot to read the piece.
When I read it, I jotted down some thoughts that took issue with Shermer’s notion that all three are “insoluble”, and sent a few questions to Michael, whose answers I’ve put below the fold. I think he’s gone amiss with free will and God, but does have a point about consciousness. Excerpts from Michael’s article are indented, and he’s given me permission to quote his emails to me.
Here’s Shermer’s thesis from the Sci Am piece:
Are these “hard” problems, as philosopher David Chalmers characterized consciousness, or are they truly insoluble “mysterian” problems, as philosopher Owen Flanagan designated them (inspired by the 1960s rock group Question Mark and the Mysterians)? The “old mysterians” were dualists who believed in nonmaterial properties, such as the soul, that cannot be explained by natural processes. The “new mysterians,” Flanagan says, contend that consciousness can never be explained because of the limitations of human cognition. I contend that not only consciousness but also free will and God are mysterian problems—not because we are not yet smart enough to solve them but because they can never be solved, not even in principle, relating to how the concepts are conceived in language. Call those of us in this camp the “final mysterians.”
Well, to paraphrase Bill Clinton, this depends on what the meaning of “solved” is. I would contend that consciousness can in principle be “solved”, but not perhaps in the sense of how Shermer conceives of a “solution.” On the other hand, I think free will and God can indeed be “solved” scientifically: that is, we can get provisional answers about their existence or non-existence. And I think those answers are in. Let’s take the three areas in order:
Consciousness. Michael conceives of a solution as solving the “hard problem” of consciousness: what is it really like to be in someone else’s shoes, or the shoes of another species (most famously Thomas Nagel’s bat? And I agree with Shermer when he says this:
It is not possible to know what it is like to be a bat (in philosopher Thomas Nagel’s famous thought experiment), because if you altered your brain and body from humanoid to batoid, you would just be a bat, not a human knowing what it feels like to be a bat.
. . . By definition, only I can know my first-person experience of being me, and the same is true for you, bats and bugs.
That much is true, but if you conceive of the problem of consciousness, as I initially did, as “what are the neurological correlates that make somebody or something conscious?”, then that is in principle soluble. I asked Michael if he thought I, Jerry Coyne, was conscious, and if he did, didn’t that make the neurological solution possible in principle? (That is, just see what neurology goes with thinking that something else is conscious, or produce it using AI and using the same criteria we use when deciding that other people are conscious.) Michael responded by email:
I misunderstood your question: how do I know anyone else, much less a bat, is conscious. I don’t, and I can’t, through introspection or any other subjective form of experience. It is an inference to the best explanation that since I know I’m conscious, it is much more likely that the people around me with whom I interact are also conscious than that they’re not, and ergo by extension that everyone alive is conscious (with, of course exceptions for the truly brain dead), and by further extension across the phylogenetic tree other mammals are conscious, etc. I would even extend this to AI robots, when that day comes, if they exhibit similar characteristics to humans and other sentient animals: self-awareness, emotion, perceptive sensitive, responsive, thinking, and able to feel and suffer.
He then sent an excerpt about this from his book “The Moral Arc” which I’ve put below the fold. I agree with him that I see no scientific way to experience the consciousness of another being, but disagree that the question he didn’t ask is also insoluble: whether we can find out what it takes to be conscious.
Free Will. I think the answer is already in here. We do not have free will in the sense that most people conceive of it: as a libertarian, dualistic form of “I-could-have-done-otherwise” agency. Physics and determinism have solved this already, and neuroscience is buttressing the negation of this form of free will. One can, of course, define free will in a form that makes it compatible with determinism, but that’s a semantic solution, not a scientific one. Michael’s contention in his article, below, is a bit confusing, and I’ve put the confusing points in bold:
Few scientists dispute that we live in a deterministic universe in which all effects have causes (except in quantum mechanics, although this just adds an element of randomness to the system, not freedom). And yet we all act as if we have free will—that we make choices among options and retain certain degrees of freedom within constraining systems. Either we are all delusional, or else the problem is framed to be conceptually impenetrable. We are not inert blobs of matter bandied about the pinball machine of life by the paddles of nature’s laws; we are active agents within the causal net of the universe, both determined by it and helping to determine it through our choices. That is the compatibilist position from whence volition and culpability emerge.
Yes, we act as if we have free will, but so what? The solvable question, which is an empirical and not a semantic one, has been solved. We may think we could have done otherwise, but we couldn’t have. Michael’s claims that we are not inert blobs of matter but are “active agents” and “help to determine [the causal net of the universe] through our own choices” are claims that verge on dualism.
I know that Shermer is not a dualist, but this kind of language is deeply confusing. And what, pray tell, are the “certain degrees of freedom within constraining systems”? If that is not a nod to dualism—to I-could-have-done-otherwise-ism—I don’t know what is! “Degrees of freedom” certainly implies freedom of agency, which implies that we could have done other than what we did.
God. Michael makes a mistake, I think, when he thinks that the Sophisticated Theologians’™ idea of God has removed god from the realm of testability. His article says this:
If the creator of the universe is supernatural—outside of space and time and nature’s laws—then by definition, no natural science can discover God through any measurements made by natural instruments. By definition, this God is an unsolvable mystery. If God is part of the natural world or somehow reaches into our universe from outside of it to stir the particles (to, say, perform miracles like healing the sick), we should be able to quantify such providential acts. This God is scientifically soluble, but so far all claims of such measurements have yet to exceed statistical chance. In any case, God as a natural being who is just a whole lot smarter and more powerful than us is not what most people conceive of as deific.
I think that while Shermer is right that a theistic god is a testable god, he mistakenly conflates “supernatural” with “outside of space and time and nature’s laws”. To most people, God may be outside of space and time, and supernatural, and even be outside of nature’s laws, but still can interact with people and the universe. And if that’s the case, then one can make inferences about God’s existence. For example, God could be outside of space and time, and beyond our known laws of nature, but supernaturally answer prayers. He could, for example, answer the prayers of Catholics but not Baptists or Jews, which would give us evidence for God—evidence that Shermer says cannot exist. In Faith versus Fact I give more such evidence that could testify to the nature of even a removed and rarefied God so long as he interacts with the universe. Carl Sagan gave more possible evidence in his great book The Varieties of Scientific Experience: A Personal View of the Search for God (read it!).
We have no such evidence, despite the fact that we could in principle. This all suggests that if a god really does exist, it does not interact with the cosmos, regardless of whether it’s outside space or time, supernatural, violates physical law, and so on. The only kind of god that’s truly a mystery and must remain so is a god that does not manifest itself in any empirically verifiable way. Michael’s email response to me (below the fold) does not clarify the issue.
Have at it!
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