Category: science journalists acting badly

The Atlantic unfairly disses Dawkins

September 27, 2024 • 9:30 am

The Atlantic decided they needed a piece on Richard Dawkins’s “farewell tour”, but they either chose the wrong journalist or asked the author to write a semi hit-piece that made Dawkins look bad. Not completely bad, mind you, for the author does mention a few good things Dawkins has done. But, overall, the piece depicts an aging man who simply needs to fight battles, and now there are no battles to fight.  Once it was creationism, says senior editor Ross Andersen, but now it’s the lesser battle of “fighting wokeness”.

Since Andersen himself shows signs of “progressive” thought in his piece (he defends, for example, the teaching Māori legends as science in New Zealand), he may have an animus against Richard. I don’t know, but I know two things. First, Andersen shows no signs of having read Dawkins’s books or followed his career.  Second, Anderson ends his piece, which describes his opinion of Richard’s recent lecture in Washington D.C., by saying “I was bored.” His pronouncement is distinctly un-journalistic given that Andersen describes a very enthusiastic audience lining up to get books signed, and bespeaks a reviewer more concerned with his own personal reaction than with the effect of Dawkins, his writing, and his Washington discussion on the audience (and on society in general).

Click on the headline below to read it, or, if you can’t, you can find it archived here. Several readers sent me this piece—I suppose expecting to get my reaction. So here it is: the piece stinks.

The dissing starts off in a subtle way with the title (granted, Andersen may not have written it, but the Atlantic approved it). But in the second sentence, Andersen says this:

[Dawkins] has adapted his swaggering Oxbridge eloquence to a variety of media ecosystems.

Anybody who knows or has even heard Richard knows that his eloquence is not “swaggering,” but measured and reserved.  But I’ll leave that aside and pass on. Here, also, in the first paragraph, Andersen describes Dawkins’s first foray into atheism:

In 2006’s The God Delusion, another mega–best seller, Dawkins antagonized the world’s religions.

“Antagonized the world’s religions”?  Well, yes, some believers may have been offended, but what about adding that this book made an eloquent argument against religion, and, in fact (as Andersen says later!), changed people’s lives for the better. That sentence is like saying, “In Mein Kampf, Hitler antagonized the world’s Jews.”  It may be true, but both statements are certainly pejorative and woefully incomplete.

Throughout the piece, Anderson describes how energized, worshipful, and jazzed up the audience was. But of course Anderson was “bored”.  Here is part of his description:

Now, at age 83, Dawkins is saying goodbye to the lecture circuit with a five-country tour that he’s marketing as his “Final Bow.” Earlier this month, I went to see him at the Warner Theatre in Washington, D.C. Dawkins has said that when he visits the U.S., he has the most fun in the Bible Belt, but most of his farewell-tour appearances will take place in godless coastal cities. After all, Dawkins has a new book to sell—The Genetic Book of the Dead—and at the Warner, it was selling well. I saw several people holding two or three copies, and one man walking around awkwardly with nine, steadying the whole stack beneath his chin. The line to buy books snaked away from the theater entrance and ran all the way up the stairs. It was longer than the line for the bar.

As for the audience, which was surely diverse:

The packed theater looked like a subreddit come to life. Bald white heads poked above the seat backs, as did a few ponytails and fedoras. This being an assembly of freethinkers, there was no standard uniform, but I did spot lots of goatees and black T-shirts. The faded silk-screen graphics on the tees varied. One was covered in equations. Another featured a taxonomy of jellyfish extending onto its sleeves. These people had not come here merely to see a performer; Dawkins had changed many of their lives. A man in the row behind me said that he had attended Dawkins’s show in Newark, New Jersey, the previous night. As a Christian teen, he had sought out videos of Dawkins, hoping that they would prepare him to rebut arguments for evolution. He ultimately found himself defeated by the zoologist’s logic, and gave up his faith.

. . . Jake Klein, the director of the Virginia Chapter of Atheists for Liberty [JAC: the “warm-up” act], told a similar conversion story onstage, before introducing Dawkins. Klein said The God Delusion had radicalized him against the Orthodox Judaism of his youth. Millions of other creationists had similar experiences, Klein said. He credited Dawkins with catalyzing an important triumph of reason over blind superstition.

Indeed, Dawkins has changed many lives for the better; his books were an important impetus for people not only accepting the scientific truth of evolution, but also grasping the wonder and majesty of both natural selection and evolution—not to mention helping people throw off the constricting chains of religion. (I’m a small fish, but I myself have been told that that Why Evolution is True and Faith Versus Fact have also changed lives.) Given the dominance of creationism in America—37% of Americans still accept Biblical creationism, 34% accept a form of God-guided evolution, while a mere 24% accept naturalistic evolution, making a total of 71% of Americans who think the supernatural played a role in evolution—accepting naturalistic evolution as true is a powerful reason to jettison your faith. And that’s what several people have told me about my first trade book.

More on audience appreciation for what Dawkins has done (attacking wokeness), a description tinged with opprobrium (my bolding):

Now that mainstream culture has moved on from big debates about evolution and theism, he no longer has a prominent foe that so perfectly suits his singular talent for explaining the creative power of biology. And so he’s playing whack-a-mole, swinging full strength, and without much discernment, at anything that strikes him as even vaguely irrational. His fans at the Warner Theatre didn’t seem to mind. For all I know, some of them had come with the sole intent of hearing Dawkins weigh in on the latest campus disputes and cancellations.

For nearly an hour, Dawkins stuck largely to science, and it served him well. The latter half of the evening was heavier on culture-war material. To whoops and hollers, Dawkins expressed astonishment that anyone could believe that sex is a continuum, instead of a straightforward binary. He described safety-craving college students as “pathetic wimps.” It all seemed small, compared with the majesty of the ideas he’d been discussing just minutes before.

Is the discussion of wokeness (mainly how ideology affects science) a problem? And doesn’t the author realize that the interlocutor, economist Steven Levitt, confected the questions without Dawkins’s knowledge of what they’d be? If Levitt wanted to ask Dawkins about wokeness or campus ferment, is that Dawkins’s fault? Besides, the audience wanted to hear a thoughtful person’s take on wokeness, which includes science: not only the biology of sex, but the low value of indigenous “knowledge” (see below).

And that brings us to one of several major misconceptions about Dawkins. Andersen seems to think that, throughout Richard’s life, he was motivated by contentiousness: everything he did was motivated by his need to have an enemy. That enemy was, avers Andersen initially creationism, but now has morphed into wokeness (see “whack-a-mole” above):

The day before, on a video call, Dawkins told me that he was puzzled—and disquieted—by the support he has received from the political right. He tends to support the Labour Party. He loathes Donald Trump. The New Atheist movement arose partly in response to the ascent of George W. Bush and other evangelicals in Republican politics. Its leaders—Dawkins, along with Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Daniel Dennett—worried that public-school students would soon be learning creationism in biology class. But there has since been a realignment in America’s culture wars. Americans still fight over the separation of church and state, but arguments about evolution have almost completely vanished from electoral politics and the broader zeitgeist. With no great crusade against creationism to occupy him, Dawkins’s most visible moments over the past 15 years have been not as a scientist but as a crusader against “wokeness”—even before that was the preferred term.

First, creationism is still with us, and in a big way. I gave the figures above, but Andersen, who’s supposed to know science, doesn’t seem to realize that far more Americans are creationists than are materialistic evolutionists, and more than 7 out of 10 of us think that God played some role in evolution. We have a long way to go.  Further, arguments about evolution aren’t gone, for the Intelligent Design miscreants are still plaguing us. As for electoral politics, evolution never played a prominent role there except once (in 2008, three of the Republican Presidential candidates in a debate raised their hands to show they didn’t accept evolution.) Evolution simply isn’t on the electoral agenda compared to the economy and, right now, immigration. And doesn’t Andersen know that the Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, is a creationist?  Further, many of us worry, and justifiably so, that the Supreme Court, which hasn’t adjudicated the teaching of evolution since 1987, might now revisit the issue and allow creationism to be taught. Given the present composition of the court, that’s entirely possible.

I’ve known Richard for much longer than has Andersen, and I can’t agree with his conclusion that Richard needs an enemy to thrive.  Dawkins started off writing a book expounding how evolution worked (The Selfish Gene), and as far as I remember that book barely mentions creationism, if at all. It was designed not to fight creationists but to enlighten both scientists and readers about how natural selection worked. This was followed by more books explaining evolution (Climbing Mount Improbable. The Extended Phenotype—Richard’s favorite—and my favorite, the Blind Watchmaker) and of course there are several more books explaining evolution.

The fight against creationism, I think, only came later, when Richard saw to his dismay that his views weren’t immediately embraced by the American public (I had the same reaction when I wrote Wby Evolution is True). He saw, correctly, that that opposition came almost exclusively from religion. And so, only in 2009 (three decades after The Selfish Gene) did Richard write an explicitly anticreationist book: The Greatest Show on Earth: The Evidcence for Evolution. My own parallel is having the same realization about religious opposition to evolution, which led to my writing Faith Versus Fact after WEIT. Richard’s main motivation, as I see it, was not to fight creationism, but to share the wonder of evolution and natural selection that he himself felt. Since The Selfish Gene, he’s written 18 books, only two against religion and creationism; and his most recent books,  Flights of Fancy: Defying Gravity by Design and Evolution, and The Genetic Book of the Dead: A Darwinian Reverie, are pure science.

As for Richard’s new “opponent”, wokeness, Andersen has to reach back into Dawkins’s Precambrian Twitter feed, basing this criticdism on just three tweets. He even mentions Elevatorgate, without noting that Richard apologized for that tweet. And as for this one, well, I see nothing wrong with it: it raises a good question for debate first broached by philosopher Rebecca Tuvel in the journal Hypatia:

Dawkins is raising the question for discussion, though Andersen denigrates this important issue by saying it’s a “just-asking-questions” (JAQ) tweet.  He doesn’t seem to realize that Dawkins was a professor and teacher, and this is very similar to the kind of questions an Oxford don would ask his students to write about.

At any rate, Andersen really shows his own wokeness, and, importantly, his ignorance of what’s going on in New Zealand, when he criticizes Richard’s emphasis on not teaching Māori “ways of knowing” alongside and coequal to modern science in New Zealand. This is an ongoing problem that I’ve written about many times, and one Andersen wrongly dismisses as a non-problem:

The tale of Lysenko is almost fable-like in its moral purity, and Dawkins told it well, but only as a setup for a contemporary controversy that he wished to discuss—an ongoing dispute over school curricula in New Zealand. According to one proposal, students there would learn traditional creation stories and myths alongside standard science lessons, out of deference to the Māori, whose language and culture British settlers had tried earnestly to erase. Dawkins noted that some eminent New Zealand scientists had “stuck their heads above the parapet” to object to this idea with an open letter in 2021, and were “unpleasantly punished” for doing so. He called this mob rule, and expressed concern for the young students. They could end up confused, he said, forced as they would be to reconcile lessons about the “sky father” and “earth mother” with those that concern the Big Bang and evolution.

I suspect that kids can hold those two things in mind. I suspect also that the project of science—no innocent bystander in the treatment of Indigenous people—will be best served if its most prominent voices address themselves to the Māori, and other such groups, in an imaginative spirit of synthesis and reconciliation. But even if I am wrong about all that, the specter of Lysenko would seem to have little bearing on a case in which no scientist has been officially punished. Complaints about the open letter did produce an initial investigation by the Royal Society Te Apārangi, as a matter of process, but nothing more.

The errors in these two paragraphs are at least four:

1.) The endeavor to keep modern science free from indigenous superstition was not just in the Listener Letter, but is an ongoing battle between rationalism and superstition.

2.) The battle continues because kids CANNOT hold two different conceptions of science in their mind at once. It is confusing and simply bad pedagogy.

3.) Scientists were officially punished for denying the scientific worth of indigenous knowledge. See this report by the New Zealand Initiative. Not only were professors punished and investigated, but the ubiquity of Māori sacralization in New Zealand has chilled both university teaching and the speech of professors and students.

4.) Andersen’s ignorance is particularly strong when, Tom-Friedman-like, he proposes a melding of Māori “ways of knowing” and science in “an imaginative spirit of synthesis and reconciliation.”  That idea has led to the ludicrous notion, for example, that kauri blight (a tree disease) might be cured by rubbing the trees with whale bones and whale oil while saying Māori prayers. That is the imaginative synthesis that’s happening at this moment, and it’s in all the sciences.

The final paragraph is, frankly, offensive to journalists and readers alike:

After he took his last bow, the lights went out, and I tried to understand what I was feeling. I didn’t leave the show offended. I wasn’t upset. It was something milder than that. I was bored.

Who cares if Andersen was bored? The crowd wasn’t bored and many paid extra for VIP tickets to get their books custom-signed and say a few words to Richard, while others formed a bigger line to get pre-signed books.  All we learn here is that the author feels superior to both Dawkins and the crowd.  I went to Dawkins’s talk here in Chicago, and I wasn’t bored, even at times when I disagreed with what Richard said.  And I’m an evolutionary biologist who’s written a lot about the fracas in New Zealand.  It appears that Mr. Andersen is not just journalistically ham-handed, but also incurious.

Scientific American endorses Kamala Harris—their second endorsement in history

September 20, 2024 • 10:45 am

For the second time in its 179-year history, Scientific American, which has become increasingly lame in its science reporting but increasingly “progressive” in its politics (see all my posts about this rag here), has decided to endorse a political candidate. I consider this endorsement—or any ensorsement—an abrogation of institutional neutrality that should go with science journals and magazines. I am opposed to science magazines making political or ideological statements in general. Of course Sci Am endorsed Harris, but I’d be just as opposed if they had endorsed Trump.) My main objections to an endorsement per se are fourfold:

  1. It’s performative, designed to show the virtue of the magazine, and will accomplish nothing.
  2. It’s been shown that when science journals endorese political candidates, it reduces not only the credibility of the journal, but of science itself in the eyes of the public.
  3. The purpose of a science magazine is to present science, not endorse ideologies or politics. If ideological endorsements becomes normal—and they are becoming normal—then science magazines will morph into political magazines.  It’s as if the National Review published an editorial endorsing string theory.
  4. If you argue that the endorsement is simply because Trump would do more damage to the scientific enterprise than would Harris, then why does the endorsement include a lot of issues that have nothing to do with that mission: like approving of Harris’s stand on abortion? (Again, I’m firmly on her side in this, but science magazines shouldn’t be giving endorsements for debatable issues like abortion.)

Blame editor Laura Helmuth, who has taken the magazine to its present depths and must have approved this endorsement.

But let someone more articulate than I give his critique: writer Tom Nichols writing in The Atlantic. I’ve also put a link Scientific American’s long endorsement below. Click to read, or find the Atlantic piece archived here.

Like me, Nichols considers Trump a scientific ignoramus and someone whose actions, during the pandemic, almost certainly injured people:

I understand the frustration that probably led to this decision. Donald Trump is the most willfully ignorant man ever to hold the presidency. He does not understand even basic concepts of … well, almost anything. (Yesterday, he explained to a woman in Michigan that he would lower food prices by limiting food imports—in other words, by reducing the supply of food. Trump went to the Wharton School, where I assume “supply and demand” was part of the first-year curriculum.) He is insensate to anything that conflicts with his needs or beliefs, and briefing him on any topic is virtually impossible.

When a scientific crisis—a pandemic—struck, Trump was worse than useless. He approved the government program to work with private industry to create vaccines, but he also flogged nutty theories about an unproven drug therapy and later undermined public confidence in the vaccines he’d helped bring to fruition. His stubborn stupidity literally cost American lives.

It makes sense, then, that a magazine of science would feel the need to inform its readers about the dangers of such a man returning to public office. To be honest, almost any sensible magazine about anything probably wants to endorse his opponent, because of Trump’s baleful effects on just about every corner of American life. (Cat Fancy magazine-—now called Catster-—should be especially eager to write up a jeremiad about Trump and his running mate, J. D. Vance. But I digress.)

Catster??!  Was Cat Fancy considered politically incorrect, perhaps implying that people were having sex with cats? But I digress, too. For after noting the above, Nichols still disagrees with Helmuth’s decision to endorse Harris.

Strange as it seems to say it, a magazine devoted to science should not take sides in a political contest. For one thing, it doesn’t need to endorse anyone: The readers of a magazine such as Scientific American are likely people who have a pretty good grasp of a variety of concepts, including causation, the scientific method, peer review, and probability. It’s something of an insult to these readers to explain to them that Trump has no idea what any of those words mean. They likely know this already.

And here are the reasons Nichols opposes political endorsements in general. The bold headings are mine.

They won’t sway the readers. Nichols has already said that the readers are too savvy to be influenced by the magazine. Indeed, I felt patronized when I read the endorsement, even though I agree in the main with the article’s opinions about Trump. And, Nichols says, Trump voters have pretty much made up their minds and won’t be swayed by what this magazine says:

Now, I am aware that the science and engineering community has plenty of Trump voters in it. (I know some of them.) But one of the most distinctive qualities of Trump supporters is that they are not swayed by the appeals of intellectuals. They’re voting for reasons of their own, and they are not waiting for the editors of Scientific American to brainiac-splain why Trump is bad for knowledge.

Well, there are people on the fence, and perhaps they might be influenced, right? Perhaps. But one of the biggest arguments about science magazines taking ideological stands is that they reduce the public’s trust in both the magazine and science. This is pretty well known from the Nature study cited next:

Political stands of magazines reduce public trust in science.

In fact, we have at least some evidence that scientists taking sides in politics can backfire. In 2021, a researcher asked a group that included both Biden and Trump supporters to look at two versions of the prestigious journal Nature—one with merely an informative page about the magazine, the other carrying an endorsement of Biden. Here is the utterly unsurprising result:

The endorsement message caused large reductions in stated trust in Nature among Trump supporters. This distrust lowered the demand for COVID-related information provided by Nature, as evidenced by substantially reduced requests for Nature articles on vaccine efficacy when offered. The endorsement also reduced Trump supporters’ trust in scientists in general. The estimated effects on Biden supporters’ trust in Nature and scientists were positive, small and mostly statistically insignificant.

In other words, readers who supported Biden shrugged; Trump supporters decided that Nature was taking sides and was therefore an unreliable source of scientific information.

To me this is the most important issue, and is why I keep my political views out of lectures on science, like when I’m defending evolution. I could go on and on in such lectures about how Republicans oppose evolution far more than do Democrats, and thus the audience should vote Democratic, but that would accomplish nothing save reduce my credibility about evolution. “Coyne must be pushing this issue because he’s a Democrat,” they’d say.

The Scientific American editorial ventured into fields that had little or nothing to do with science, and also dealt with debatable issues that can’t be “scientifically” settled.

But even if Scientific American’s editors felt that the threat to science and knowledge was so dire that they had to endorse a candidate, they did it the worst way possible. They could have made a case for electing Harris as a matter of science acting in self-defense, because Trump, who chafes at any version of science that does not serve him, plans to destroy the relationship between expertise and government by obliterating the independence of the government’s scientific institutions. This is an obvious danger, especially when Trump is consorting with kooks such as Laura Loomer and has floated bringing Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s crackpot circus into the government.

Instead, the magazine gave a standard-issue left-liberal endorsement that focused on health care, reproductive rights, gun safety, climate policy, technology policy, and the economy. Although science and data play their role in debates around such issues, most of the policy choices they present are not specifically scientific questions: In the end, almost all political questions are about values—and how voters think about risks and rewards. Science cannot answer those questions; it can only tell us about the likely consequences of our choices.

. . . . Also unhelpful is that some of the endorsement seemed to be drawn from the Harris campaign’s talking points, such as this section:

Economically, the renewable-energy projects she supports will create new jobs in rural America. Her platform also increases tax deductions for new small businesses from $5,000 to $50,000, making it easier for them to turn a profit. Trump, a convicted felon who was also found liable of sexual abuse in a civil trial, offers a return to his dark fantasies and demagoguery …

An endorsement based on Harris’s tax proposals—which again, are policy choices—belongs in a newspaper or financial journal. It’s not a matter of science, any more than her views on abortions or guns or anything else are.

This implies that it might be okay if the magazine endorsed Harris because her election is better for science than the election of Trump. That might well be true, but we can’t be sure (after all, both candidates are making promises they can’t keep). More important, even if the endorsement were based on the proposed effect on science in the U.S., it’s still based on politics and ideology (Scientific American is hardly politically neutral!), and is outside the ambit of what the magazine should be about. Readers may disagree, of course, and feel free to do so in the comments. But I’d feel the same way not only if they endorsed Trump, but also if a journal like Nature of Evolution endorsed any presidential candidates.

Here’s Nichols’s conclusion:

I realize that my objections seem like I’m asking scientists to be morally neutral androids who have no feelings on important issues. Many decent people want to express their objections to Trump in the public square, regardless of their profession, and scientists are not required to be some cloistered monastic order. But policy choices are matters of judgment and belong in the realm of politics and democratic choice. If the point of a publication such as Scientific American is to increase respect for science and knowledge as part of creating a better society, then the magazine’s highly politicized endorsement of Harris does not serve that cause.

But have a look at Sci Am’s endorsement below (click on the headline or find it archived here):

The topics covered in the endorsement are healthcare (a debatable issues on what kind to provide), reproductive rights, gun safety, environment and climate, and technology.  Except for the undoubtable presence of anthropogenic climate change, which is a scientific reality that Trump has denied, all of these issues involve political differences.  Now I agree with Helmuth Scientific American and Harris on nearly all these issues, and, indeed, I go further than most in my permissive views on abortion (I favor unrestricted abortion up to term). But I know that many regard abortion as murder, and how up to what point in gestation we should permit abortion is simply not a scientific issue. Gun issues, too, are a debatable proposition, and, of course, if you’re going to bring up issues that bear on science, then Title IX and gender ideology, in which I think the Trump administrator has done better than Biden, should make an appearance (they don’t).

Further, the op-ed gives credit to Harris for things that the Biden administration actually did, referring to the accomplishments of the “Biden-Harris” administration, as if they were one person and as if Harris had a major role. As Harris has emphasized repeatedly, “I am not Joe Biden.”

But this is all pilpul.  The main point is that, in my view, science magazines should stay out of politics. If they want to publish articles about global warming, or the effect of gun laws on human lives, that’s fine, but let the readers absorb the scientific information and make their own judgments.  To tell them how to vote is both patronizing and a slippery slope that could lead to the politicization of all science journals and magazines. (In fact, that’s already happening; have a look at the Lancet or Nature.)

A critique of Scientific American

May 8, 2024 • 10:00 am

If you’ve read this site for a while, you’ll know that I’ve documented the decline and fall of the magazine Scientific American (see all my posts here). Under the editorship of Laura Helmuth, the magazine has become increasingly woke. And by “woke”, I mean “neglecting science in favor of pushing a progressive ideology.”  One of the classic examples of this decline is a hit job that the magazine published on E. O. Wilson, accusing him of racism—along with other scientists like Charles Darwin and yes—wait for it—Gregor Mendel. A quote:

Wilson was hardly alone in his problematic beliefs. His predecessors—mathematician Karl Pearson, anthropologist Francis Galton, Charles Darwin, Gregor Mendel and others—also published works and spoke of theories fraught with racist ideas about distributions of health and illness in populations without any attention to the context in which these distributions occur.

Darwin, of course was an abolitionist, though he did share the view of his time that white people were in general superior. But the article doesn’t mention that, for it violates the dprogressive tendency to indict people of the past for not conforming to today’s beliefs. And if Gregor Mendel ever wrote a racist word, I don’t know about it!

The author, Monica McLemore, also took it upon herself to “problematize” the normal distribution of statistics. Check out the first two sentences, which are totally bogus:

First, the so-called normal distribution of statistics assumes that there are default humans who serve as the standard that the rest of us can be accurately measured against. The fact that we don’t adequately take into account differences between experimental and reference group determinants of risk and resilience, particularly in the health sciences, has been a hallmark of inadequate scientific methods based on theoretical underpinnings of a superior subject and an inferior one.

Oy! Several of us, all scientists, sent a defense of Wilson to the magazine as a response to McLemore’s piece, but our defense was summarily rejected.  There’s no “search for truth” in this magazine if your views contravene progressive “presentism”.

And here’s a list of ten articles pushing progressive ideology published within the single year of 2021 (if the links to the stories aren’t visible in the posts, click on the icon anyway). The first one is a gem:

1.) Bizarre acronym pecksniffery in Scientific American.Title: “Why the term ‘JEDI’ is problematic for describing programs that promote justice, diversity, equity, and Inclusion.”

2.) More bias in Scientific American, this time in a “news” article. Title: “New math research group reflects a schism in the field.”

3.) Scientific American again posting non-scientific political editorials.Title: “The anti-critical race theory movement will profoundly effect public education.“

4.) Scientific American (and math) go full woke.  Title: “Modern mathematics confronts its white, patriarchal past.”

5.) Scientific American: Denying evolution is white supremacy. Title: “Denial of evolution is a form of white supremacy.”

6.) Scientific American publishes misleading and distorted op-ed lauding Palestine and demonizing Israel, accompanied by a pro-Palestinian petition. Title: “Health care workers call for support of Palestinians.” (The title is still up but see #7 below)

7.) Scientific American withdraws anti-Semitic op-ed. Title of original article is above, but now a withdrawal appears (they vanished the text): “Editor’s Note: This article fell outside the scope of Scientific American and has been removed.”   Now, apparently, nothing falls outside the scope of the magazine!

8.) Scientific American: Religious or “spiritual” treatment of mental illness produces better outcomes. Title: “Psychiatry needs to get right with God.”

9.)  Scientific American: Transgender girls belong on girl’s sports teams. Title:  “Trans girls belong on girls’ sports teams.”

and one more for an even ten, as I’m not going to spend another minute doing this:

10.) Former Scientific American editor, writing in the magazine, suggests that science may find evidence for God using telescopes and other instruments. Title: “Can science rule out God?“

But I digress. The topic here is a long article published in the City Journal by James Meigs, documenting the downfall of the magazine as one example of a general degeneration of science journalism. Click to read:

Meigs begins with how Michael Shermer wrote a monthly “Skeptic” column in Sci Am for seventeen years, but they gave him his pink slip after he started criticizing the claim that abused children tend to grow up to become abusers themselves. Shermer then argued, unforgivably, that there’s been progress in racial relations, and in eliminating pollution and poverty, reprising the theme of several recent books by Steven Pinker. Apparently progressives frown on the idea that there’s been progress in anything.

Shermer tells his story in a Skeptic column called “Scientific American goes woke.” As he said,

My revised December column, titled “Kids These Days,” focused on the growing concern over Gen Z kids having significantly higher rates of depression and anxiety, which Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt attribute to “coddling” by helicopter parenting and the larger culture of safetyism.

Shortly after the December 2018 column I was given my walking papers, but was allowed one more farewell column in January, 2019. In it I noted that in accordance with (Herb) Stein’s Law—“Things that can’t go on forever won’t”—closed out my streak at 214 consecutive essays, my dream deferred to another day, which has now come in accordance to Davies’ Corollary to Stein’s Law—“Things that can’t go on forever can go on much longer than you think.”

Back to Meigs, who notes the decline of science journalism and its infusion with au courant ideology:

American journalism has never been very good at covering science. In fact, the mainstream press is generally a cheap date when it comes to stories about alternative medicine, UFO sightings, pop psychology, or various forms of junk science. For many years, that was one factor that made Scientific American’s rigorous reporting so vital. The New York Times, National Geographic, Smithsonian, and a few other mainstream publications also produced top-notch science coverage. Peer-reviewed academic journals aimed at specialists met a higher standard still. But over the past decade or so, the quality of science journalism—even at the top publications—has declined in a new and alarming way. Today’s journalistic failings don’t owe simply to lazy reporting or a weakness for sensationalism but to a sweeping and increasingly pervasive worldview.

This dogma sees Western values, and the United States in particular, as uniquely pernicious forces in world history. And, as exemplified by the anticapitalist tirades of climate activist Greta Thunberg, the movement features a deep eco-pessimism buoyed only by the distant hope of a collectivist green utopia.

Meigs indicts intersectionality, Critical Race Theory, queer studies, and postmodern notions of truth as factors in this decline.  Here are a few areas where Meigs argues that Scientific American failed after Laura Helmuth, who had sterling credentials, became editor of Sci Am in April, 2020.

Covid

 . . .  those difficult times represented a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for an ambitious science editor. Rarely in the magazine’s history had so many Americans urgently needed timely, sensible science reporting: Where did Covid come from? How is it transmitted? Was shutting down schools and businesses scientifically justified? What do we know about vaccines?

Scientific American did examine Covid from various angles, including an informative July 2020 cover story diagramming how the SARS-CoV-2 virus “sneaks inside human cells.” But the publication didn’t break much new ground in covering the pandemic. When it came to assessing growing evidence that Covid might have escaped from a laboratory, for example, SciAm got scooped by New York and Vanity Fair, publications known more for their coverage of politics and entertainment than of science.

The magazine apparently had no patience with the “lab leak” theory for the origin of the virus:

During the first two years of the pandemic, most mainstream media outlets barely mentioned the lab-leak debate. And when they did, they generally savaged both the idea and anyone who took it seriously. In March 2021, long after credible evidence emerged hinting at a laboratory origin for the virus, Scientific American published an article, “Lab-Leak Hypothesis Made It Harder for Scientists to Seek the Truth.” The piece compared the theory to the KGB’s disinformation campaign about the origin of HIV/AIDS and blamed lab-leak advocates for creating a poisonous climate around the issue: “The proliferation of xenophobic rhetoric has been linked to a striking increase in anti-Asian hate crimes. It has also led to a vilification of the [Wuhan Institute of Virology] and some of its Western collaborators, as well as partisan attempts to defund certain types of research (such as ‘gain of function’ research).”

The author faults Fauci for repressing information supporting this theory, but my pay grade isn’t high enough to judge whether that’s true.

Social Justice (the “JEDI” article is a gem, and note my self-aggrandizement)

At the same time, SciAm dramatically ramped up its social-justice coverage. The magazine would soon publish a flurry of articles with titles such as “Modern Mathematics Confronts Its White, Patriarchal Past” and “The Racist Roots of Fighting Obesity.” The death of the twentieth century’s most acclaimed biologist was the hook for “The Complicated Legacy of E. O. Wilson,” an opinion piece arguing that Wilson’s work was “based on racist ideas,” without quoting a single line from his large published canon. At least those pieces had some connection to scientific topics, though. In 2021, SciAm published an opinion essay, “Why the Term ‘JEDI’ Is Problematic for Describing Programs That Promote Justice, Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion.” The article’s five authors took issue with the effort by some social-justice advocates to create a cute new label while expanding the DEI acronym to include “Justice.” The Jedi knights of the Star Wars movies are “inappropriate mascots for social justice,” the authors argued, because they are “prone to (white) saviorism and toxically masculine approaches to conflict resolution (violent duels with phallic light sabers, gaslighting by means of ‘Jedi mind tricks,’ etc.).” What all this had to do with science was anyone’s guess.

Several prominent scientists took note of SciAm’s shift. “Scientific American is changing from a popular-science magazine into a social-justice-in-science magazine,” Jerry Coyne, a University of Chicago emeritus professor of ecology and evolution, wrote on his popular blog, “Why Evolution Is True.” He asked why the magazine had “changed its mission from publishing decent science pieces to flawed bits of ideology.”

“The old Scientific American that I subscribed to in college was all about the science,” University of New Mexico evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller told me. “It was factual reporting on new ideas and findings from physics to psychology, with a clear writing style, excellent illustrations, and no obvious political agenda.” Miller says that he noticed a gradual change about 15 years ago, and then a “woke political bias that got more flagrant and irrational” over recent years. The leading U.S. science journals, Nature and Science, and the U.K.-based New Scientist made a similar pivot, he says. By the time Trump was elected in 2016, he says, “the Scientific American editors seem to have decided that fighting conservatives was more important than reporting on science.”

The magazine also broke with tradition and endorsed Joe Biden for President in 2020 (Nature, Science, and New Scientist did the same). Unless you can make a solid argument that one candidate will damage science more than another, this kind of advocacy violates the kind of “institutional neutrality” that should pervade science journals.

Gender issues  Meigs criticizes the magazine for being gung-ho for “affirmative therapy”:

In such an overheated environment, it would be helpful to have a journalistic outlet advocating a sober, evidence-based approach. In an earlier era, Scientific American might have been that voice. Unfortunately, SciAm today downplays messy debates about gender therapies, while offering sunny platitudes about the “safety and efficacy” of hormone treatments for prepubescent patients. For example, in a 2023 article, “What Are Puberty Blockers, and How Do They Work?,” the magazine repeats the unsubstantiated claim that such treatments are crucial to preventing suicide among gender-dysphoric children. “These medications are well studied and have been used safely since the late 1980s to pause puberty in adolescents with gender dysphoria,” SciAm states.

The independent journalist Jesse Singal, a longtime critic of slipshod science reporting, demolishes these misleading claims in a Substack post. In fact, the use of puberty blockers to treat gender dysphoria is a new and barely researched phenomenon, he notes: “[W]e have close to zero studies that have tracked gender dysphoric kids who went on blockers over significant lengths of time to see how they have fared.” Singal finds it especially alarming to see a leading science magazine obscure the uncertainty surrounding these treatments. “I believe that this will go down as a major journalistic blunder that will be looked back upon with embarrassment and regret,” he writes.

The truth will out, but not due to Scientific American!

It’s not just popular magazines about science that have been ideologically colonized, either. Technical cience and medical journals are going the same route; these include Science, Nature, Lancet, JAMA, New Scientist, and PNAS. The same is happening with scientific societies, which increasingly are becoming enclaves of progressive ideology, with keynote speeches, once devoted to science, now devoted to ideology.  This is what Luana Maroja and I meant when we concluded our Skeptical Inquirer paper on the ideological subversion of biology with these words:

Progressive ideology is growing stronger and intruding further into all areas of science. And because it’s “progressive,” and because most scientists are liberals, few of us dare oppose these restrictions on our freedom. Unless there is a change in the Zeitgeist, and unless scientists finally find the courage to speak up against the toxic effects of ideology on their field, in a few decades science will be very different from what it is now. Indeed, it’s doubtful that we’d recognize it as science at all.

When I wrote that last sentence, I thought it might be a wee bit hyperbolic, but now I’m not so sure. When scientists are forced to see nature through the lenses of progressive ideology, indicting Mendel for racism and renaming every animal whose popular name came from a person’s name, it doesn’t fool the public. They know that politics are warping science. The results are that the public loses trust in science—a trust based on the increasingly false assumption that scientists are objective researchers whose job is simply to figure out how nature works, not ideologues bent on twisting science to fit a progressive ideology. As Meigs notes:

 When scientists claim to represent a consensus about ideas that remain in dispute—or avoid certain topics entirely—those decisions filter down through the journalistic food chain. Findings that support the social-justice worldview get amplified in the media, while disapproved topics are excoriated as disinformation. Not only do scientists lose the opportunity to form a clearer picture of the world; the public does, too. At the same time, the public notices when claims made by health officials and other experts prove to be based more on politics than on science. A new Pew Research poll finds that the percentage of Americans who say that they have a “great deal” of trust in scientists has fallen from 39 percent in 2020 to 23 percent today.

That’s a drop in trust of over 40% in just four years.  The way to regain that trust, if it’s even possible now, is to stick to the truth, leaving out your politics.  Unfortunately, Scientific American and many other journals and magazines can’t refrain from injecting ideology into science.

h/t: Simon

In an abysmal article, Nautilus dismisses the importance of genes

March 26, 2024 • 11:30 am

This is one of the worst papers on genetics I’ve seen in the last 15 years, and although it’s from 2019, this same kind of palaver keeps coming around again and again, and in exactly the same form. And so when a reader sent me the link, I reacted instinctively. The laws of physics mandated that, like a starving leopard encountering an antelope, I must fall on it and rip it to pieces.  So here goes. (Yes, Carole Hooven is right: males tend to have the killer instinct more than do females!)

The piece is intended not for professionals but for laypeople, and appeared in Nautilus, a quarterly magazine on science and its relationship to and implications for society. Founded by a big grant from the John Templeton Foundation, it does publish solid science articles, but sometimes the Foundation’s purpose (to find evidence of God in science) shines through. This occurs through promoting bizarre science, like panpsychism, or touting dubious reconciliations between religion and science. This paper falls into a third class: doing down “modern” genetics to imply that there’s something terribly wrong with our modern paradigm. (Evolution is a related and favorite target.)

The author, Ken Richardson, seems to have derived most of his genetics from fringe figures like Denis Noble and James Shapiro, with the result that the casual, non-geneticist reader will buy what these people are selling: genes are of only minor significance in both development and evolution.

Richardson is listed in the article as “formerly Senior Lecturer in Human Development at the Open University (U.K.). He is the author of Genes, Brains and Human Potential: The Science and Ideology of Intelligence.”

Read it by clicking below, or find the article archived here.

I was torn between ignoring this paper—for the author deserves no attention—or taking it apart. I decided on a compromise: to show some of the statements it makes that are either flat wrong or deeply misguided. Richardson’s quotes are indented, and my take is flush left. Here’s how he starts:

The preferred dogma started to appear in different versions in the 1920s. It was aptly summarized by renowned physicist Erwin Schrödinger in a famous lecture in Dublin in 1943. He told his audience that chromosomes “contain, in some kind of code-script, the entire pattern of the individual’s future development and of its functioning in the mature state.”

Around that image of the code a whole world order of rank and privilege soon became reinforced. These genes, we were told, come in different “strengths,” different permutations forming ranks that determine the worth of different “races” and of different classes in a class-structured society. A whole intelligence testing movement was built around that preconception, with the tests constructed accordingly.

The image fostered the eugenics and Nazi movements of the 1930s, with tragic consequences. Governments followed a famous 1938 United Kingdom education commission in decreeing that, “The facts of genetic inequality are something that we cannot escape,” and that, “different children … require types of education varying in certain important respects.”

The “strengths” and “permutations of genes” was not widely viewed as the underpinnings of different races. Yes, racial hierarchies were constructed based on supposed genetic constitution, but not the image of the “code script”.  It was the claim that racial differences were inherited, regardless how inheritance worked—much less the unproved notion of “code script”—that buttressed the Nazis’ eugenics program.  But somehow Richardson manages to connect the Nazis with the genetic code at the very beginning of his paper. But this is a minor quibble compared to what follows.

Richardson then uses what he sees as the disappointing performance of the GWAS (Genome-wide Association Studies) method (used to locate, from population surveys, regions of the genome responsible for various traits, which helps narrow down the location of “candidate genes”):

Now, in low-cost, highly mechanized procedures, the search has become even easier. The DNA components—the letters in the words—that can vary from person to person are called single nucleotide polymorphisms, or SNPs. The genetic search for our human definition boiled down to looking for statistical associations between such variations and differences in IQ, education, disease, or whatever.

For years, disappointment followed: Only a few extremely weak associations between SNPs and observable human characteristics could be found. Then another stroke of imagination. Why not just add the strongest weak associations together until a statistically significant association with individual differences is obtained? It is such “polygenic scores,” combining hundreds or thousands of SNPs, varying from person to person, and correlating (albeit weakly) with trait scores such as IQ or educational scores, that form the grounds for the vaulting claims we now witness.

Today, 1930s-style policy implications are being drawn once again. Proposals include gene-testing at birth for educational intervention, embryo selection for desired traits, identifying which classes or “races” are fitter than others, and so on. And clever marketizing now sees millions of people scampering to learn their genetic horoscopes in DNA self-testing kits.

So the hype now pouring out of the mass media is popularizing what has been lurking in the science all along: a gene-god as an entity with almost supernatural powers. Today it’s the gene that, in the words of the Anglican hymn, “makes us high and lowly and orders our estate.”

Although GWAS studies are hard and require big samples, and give genomic regions rather than genes there have been some notable successes in both medical genetics and agriculture, as one would expect in the past five years (see this Twitter thread for some examples).  The implication throughout the paper is that the failure of GWAS to locate individual genes responsible for traits shows that the variation of genes themselves aren’t responsible for the variation in traits. There must be something else!

But that’s completely wrong. We already have a way to judge the influence of genetic variation on trait variation, and that is heritability analysis. Heritabilities (symbolized as h²) range between 0 and 1, and are a measure of the proportion of variation for a trait in a given population caused by the variation among the genes in that population (the rest is due to environmental variation, interactions between genes and environments, and other arcane factors). But the point is that heritabilities calculated from our earlier crude methods are nearly always higher than heritabilities estimated from GWAS analysis, simply because GWAS (but not h²) misses a lot of variable gene sites that have small effects, and isn’t good at detecting effects of rare alleles. But the more we use GWAS, the more variation we find, and, for well studied traits like height, heritabilities estimated from traditional methods are now converging with heritabilities estimated from GWAS.

And heritabilities of most traits, which are most extensively studied in humans, are often quite high. Have a look at this list, for example, which includes cognitive traits, behavioral traits, and physical traits. Most heritabilities range between 0.2 and 0.8, which means that for a typical trait, between 20% and 80% of the inter-individual variation in a population is due to variation of genes. When asked to guess the heritability of an unknown trait, I’d usually say, “well, probably about 50%”.  That seems, for example, to be close to the heritability of IQ in a population.

This shows that genes are highly important in explaining human variation, just as they are variation in animals and plants. This phenomenon was well known ages ago. If genes weren’t important in variation, selective breeding of dogs, plants, pigeons, and so on would be almost useless. Here’s a famous quote from Darwin’s in The Origin:

“Breeders habitually speak of an animal’s organization as something quite plastic, which they can model almost as they please.”

If genes weren’t important in variation, animals (and plants, which of course have been bred out the wazoo) wouldn’t be so plastic. Ergo genetic variation is important in explaining the variation of organisms.

Despite this, Richardson makes the following statement, which would astound most geneticists:

. . . . it is now well known that a group of genetically identical individuals, reared in identical environments—as in pure-bred laboratory animals—do not become identical adults. Rather, they develop to exhibit the full range of bodily and functional variations found in normal, genetically-variable, groups. In a report in Science in 2013, Julia Fruend and colleagues observed this effect in differences in developing brain structures.

Full range? Really? Yes, there is still variation among clonal individuals raised in identical environments, but not nearly as much as among genetically variable individuals raised in different environments! Clonal populations show a heritability of zero (they have no genetic variation among them), so there is less phenotypic variation among the individuals.  As for the Fruend paper, it shows plasticity of brain development, because of course learning is a form of adaptive plasticity that can change the brain. But that by no means says that genes aren’t an important source of variation.

I could go on and on about how Richardson claims that genes aren’t important, all the while showing that they are. Here’s a good example:

First, laboratory experiments have shown how living forms probably flourished as “molecular soups” long before genes existed. They self-organized, synthesized polymers (like RNA and DNA), adapted, and reproduced through interactions among hundreds of components. That means they followed “instructions” arising from relations between components, according to current conditions, with no overall controller: compositional information, as the geneticist Doron Lancet calls it.

In this perspective, the genes evolved later, as products of prior systems, not as the original designers and controllers of them. More likely as templates for components as and when needed: a kind of facility for “just in time” supply of parts needed on a recurring basis.

So what? There were primitive replicators first, which might as well be called genes, but the modern system of sophisticated gene action, often involving introns, splicing, transcription factors, and so on, is what we know about now, and what Richardson says about early organisms is irrelevant.  But wait! There’s more!

Then it was slowly appreciated that we inherit just such dynamical systems from our parents, not only our genes. Eggs and sperm contain a vast variety of factors: enzymes and other proteins; amino acids; vitamins, minerals; fats; RNAs (nucleic acids other than DNA); hundreds of cell signalling factors; and other products of the parents’ genes, other than genes themselves.

Where does Richardson think that those enzymes and proteins come from, which are often used to manufacture vitamins and amino acids? Where do the cell signalling factors come from? They all come from genes! The “dynamical systems” that he touts so highly come largely from genes, and without genes we would have no organisms and no evolution. Yes, environmental factors are important in controlling the timing and action of genes, but often those “environmental factors”, like signals in different organs that lead to differential development, are themselves derived from genes. And the sequestration and use of externally derived chemicals, like some amino acids and vitamins, are also controlled by genes.

I can barely go on, and if I continue this would last forever. Just one or two more pieces of stupidity:

Accordingly, even single cells change their metabolic pathways, and the way they use their genes to suit those patterns. That is, they “learn,” and create instructions on the hoof. Genes are used as templates for making vital resources, of course. But directions and outcomes of the system are not controlled by genes. Like colonies of ants or bees, there are deeper dynamical laws at work in the development of forms and variations.

Some have likened the process to an orchestra without a conductor. Physiologist Denis Noble has described it as Dancing to the Tune of Life (the title of his recent book). It is most stunningly displayed in early development. Within hours, the fertilized egg becomes a ball of identical cells—all with the same genome, of course. But the cells are already talking to each other with storms of chemical signals. Through the statistical patterns within the storms, instructions are, again, created de novo. The cells, all with the same genes, multiply into hundreds of starkly different types, moving in a glorious ballet to find just the right places at the right times. That could not have been specified in the fixed linear strings of DNA.

My answer is “yes it could have, and it is”. Those “chemical systems” that cause an organism to develop come from genes, which have changed over evolutionary time in a way that leads to adaptations, including proper development. By and large, genes control development, particularly early development.  Organisms with pretty much the same genes (members of the same species, for example) always turn out pretty much alike, with similar behaviors and appearances. Further, the more closely related species are, the more similar they tend to be. This reflects genetic similiarity, not some nebulous similarity in “dynamical systems,” whatever those are.

One more:

But it’s not so simple. Consider Mendel’s sweet peas. Some flowers were either purple or white, and patterns of inheritance seemed to reflect variation in a single “hereditary unit,” as mentioned above. It is not dependent on a single gene, however. The statistical relation obscures several streams of chemical synthesis of the dye (anthocyanin), controlled and regulated by the cell as a whole, including the products of many genes. A tiny alteration in one component (a “transcription factor”) disrupts this orchestration. In its absence the flower is white.

This is a good illustration of what Noble calls “passive causation.” A similar perspective applies to many “genetic diseases,” as well as what runs in families. But more evolved functions—and associated diseases—depend upon the vast regulatory networks mentioned above, and thousands of genes. Far from acting as single-minded executives, genes are typically flanked, on the DNA sequence, by a dozen or more “regulatory” sequences used by wider cell signals and their dynamics to control genetic transcription.

“Statistical relation”? What is described in peas is a direct causal relation: a mutation, acting through pathways, is responsible for changing flower color. If you flip a light switch, the light goes on. If you have the right mutation, the flower is white. What’s the big deal? Further, “transcription factors” are coded in the DNA; they are proteins that regulate the transcripotion of other genes: how those genes make messenger RNA.

And the ultimate dissing of genes:

We have reached peak gene, and passed it.

Finally, because GWAS studies aren’t yet developed to the point where they always can pick out important genes (remember, variation in most traits is due to variation in many genes, with the variants having small effects, and GWAS misses rare genes), Richardson says this:

The startling implication is that the gene as popularly conceived—a blueprint on a strand of DNA, determining development and its variations—does not really exist.

Well, as Dawkins has pointed out, genes are more like “recipes” than blueprints, but this isn’t what Richardson is saying here. What he is saying is that genes play at best only a small role in development.  He is both wrong and muddled.

It is this kind of popular science that I most despise, because it dissimulates, misleads, and even fibs about the state of modern science. By misleading the public about genetics, it affects not only their understanding of science, but, when shown up to be nonsense, as I and other have done, erodes public trust in science.

If you want to read this piece, be my guest, but if you know anything about genetics, keep a big glass of Pepto-Bismol at hand.

 

h/t: the always helpful Luana

Science-Based Medicine goes down the drain

January 5, 2024 • 11:45 am

Lordy, how many of us used to love the Science-Based Medicine (SBM) site? I did! It was the go-to place for enjoying the debunking of medical quackery and the scrutiny of dubious medical claims. Started in 2008 by Steve Novella and David Gorski (“Orac”), SBM is affiliated with the Society for Science-Based Medicine.

Sadly, it’s now going down the tubes, having bought heavily, like the ACLU and FFRF, into gender activism. It started with an incident I reported here, involving Abigail Shrier’s book Irreversible Damage and a positive review by SBM editor, skeptic, and physician Harriet Hall. Let’s let Wikipedia sum it up:

On June 15, 2021, Science-Based Medicine published a book review of Abigail Shrier’s Irreversible Damage written by founding editor Harriet Hall. In her review, Hall wrote that Shrier’s book had raised legitimate concerns about the science surrounding drug treatments for gender dysphoria in children and that there was a lack of quality scientific studies on the subject. Several days after the review was published, Novella and Gorski replaced the review with a retraction notice and responded with a review of their own, the first of six SBM posts rejecting Shrier’s claims and addressing the retraction.

Skeptic magazine republished Hall’s review, and she remained one of three editors at SBM along with Novella and Gorski after the retraction until her death in 2023.

That SIX articles were needed to defend the retraction of Hall’s review and criticize Shrier’s book was not only a sign of trouble at SBM, but an almost obsessive act. And this obsessiveness is very evident in the piece below, written by A. J. Eckert, a doctor of osteopathy. Here’s some information about the author from Anchor Health:

AJ Eckert, DO, is Connecticut’s first out nonbinary trans doctor and serves as the Medical Director of our Gender & Life-Affirming Medicine (GLAM) Program. Dr. Eckert has over 17 years’ experience in LGBTQ health care, with 9 years as a provider of primary care and gender-affirming services.

As a nonbinary trans doctor, he has written several articles for SBM on trans and gender issues, including two pieces defending SBM’s removal of Hall’s review of Shrier’s book, and has written on these issues elsewhere.

Click to read Eckert’s piece at SBM (h/t Jez)

What the sweating author is trying to do in this tremendously long piece is express dismay about a book by Helen Joyce, a book shortlisted for the John Maddox Prize in 2023. I wasn’t aware, and can’t find on the web, that Joyce had a book in 2023, but her own site notes that it must have been a 2023 edition of a book she’s already written (and one that I’ve read): Trans.

I’m also an author: my first book, ‘Trans: When Ideology Meets Reality’, was published by OneWorld in July 2021. It was reissued in 2023 under a new title: ‘Trans: Gender Identity and the New Battle for Women’s Rights’.

Although Joyce was shortlisted, she didn’t win; the winner was Nancy Olivieri. What really bothered Eckert was that the reissue of Joyce’s book was even considered for a prize given to “individuals who have shown courage and integrity in standing up for sound science and evidence.” That really rankled Eckert, who, as a gender activist, doesn’t think that Joyce has in any way stood up for sound science and evidence. I’ll give Eckert’s intro, as it gives Luana and me a shout-out for contributing to last year’s “hit” on science by “scaremongering”:

Science has taken many hits in 2023. Anti-environmentalism continues to spread; anti-vaxxers loudly deny COVID-19; some physicians have made themselves comfortable spreading medical misinformation and even urging others to resist public health mandates. An anti-trans paper promoting the many-times-over–discredited theory of “rapid onset gender dysphoria” (ROGD) was published without obtaining ethics approval in a peer-reviewed journal; an anti-vaxx paper was published in a fake journal made to appear legitimate, replete with an editorial board of antivaxxers. Both papers, when retracted, spun a narrative blaming an ideological suppression of science and lamenting about cancellation when the truth is simple: flawed and incorrect science should not be disseminated. Evolutionary biologists Jerry Coyne and Luana Maroja were heavily featured in the Skeptical Inquirer and CSI scaremongering about “the ideological subversion of biology.” At least one-third-33% or more-of trans youth now live in states with unscientific bans on gender-affirming care due to ignorance and the spread of false narratives. At the end of September, Dr. Gorski lamented the likely permanent pause in funding a program designed to counter scientific misinformation and warned of the ongoing war on science-based regulation and public health.

The latest example was announced in October, when Irish journalist Helen Joyce was shortlisted for The John Maddox Prize, an initiative of UK charity Sense About Science and the international scientific journal Nature. The eponymous prize is named for the editor of Nature from 1966-73 and 1980-95; according to his obituary, science writer and scientist Sir John Maddox argued for objectivity and rationality in science and once worked alongside my personal favorite James Randi to debunk Jacques Benveniste’s claims about homeopathy and water memory. Sir John Maddox was knighted and worked on the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, and Richard Dawkins called him “the last great scientific polymath.” Thus, the John Maddox Prize carries quite a legacy and considerable prestige.

Unfortunately, Helen Joyce was shortlisted for The John Maddox Prize for…

…her courage in highlighting the need for further research and evidence to be brought into discourse and policy discussion related to gender identity, and raising the importance of acknowledging biological sex differences.

A Closer Look at Nature and Sense about Science’s Decision

Let me put this statement by the board behind the Maddox prize into context:

  1. Joyce is a prominent member of the UK “gender critical” movement and author of a “deeply anti-transgender” book. “Courage” is not a word I would ever associate with her.
  2. Joyce did not “highlight the need for further research and evidence,” at least not in any sort of productive way. Physicians practicing gender-affirming care and scientists involved in transgender studies generally agree that there is a need for more research. However, we neither need nor want a gender-critical trans-exclusionist to highlight the areas of need and thus continue the pattern of stigma and research about us without us. We’re on it. What we need are resources and funding, regular and consistent data collection on gender identity, notably absent from prior research, and involvement of the trans community, along with overlooked intersectional minorities previously excluded or underrepresented due to issues such as systemic racism, not lectures from people who deny existing science.
  3. Trans health and research-all medicine and research-belongs in the realm of science. It is the ignorant meddling of policymakers that harms our work. Gender-affirming healthcare should be between the health professional and the patient (and the patient’s parents or medical guardians, as applicable). Though politics are inextricably linked to trans healthcare—as is the case for all healthcare, actually—that does not mean that politicians should be able to dictate the standard of care in medicine, any more than politicians should be able to force a woman to carry a nonviable fetus to term when there is no chance of the fetus surviving and continuing the pregnancy risks the mother’s health.
  4. Here, we have on display two scientific organizations espousing the “importance of acknowledging biological sex differences,” an essentialist trope that serves to criminalize, dehumanize, and pathologize trans and intersex people. Their reasoning is also scientifically unsound. The science of biological sex does not mesh with Sense About Science’s comments. Trans people are very aware of biology and how our bodies work, sometimes painfully so. This is not about human biology and its supposed denial; it is about advancing a hostile agenda toward trans people and bad science. Updating gender markers to match one’s identity—which, naturally, Joyce is vehemently opposed to—has nothing to do with denying biology and everything to do with personal dignity, respect, equality, autonomy, and safety. Having the wrong marker on documents means being constantly exposed as trans in a cruel and sometimes violent society and being regularly undermined and questioned about gender. Gender is determined by one’s gender identity, which in turn should determine one’s legal sex designation. As for Nature, it has published multiple articles about the spectrum of sex and the fallacy of biological sex differences. So what gives?

Sorry for the long excerpt, but it tells you what the review is about.

If you’ve read Joyce’s book, like I have, you’ll be baffled at Eckert’s claim that it’s “fiction”.  In fact, the piece is a 17-page (as I print it out in 9-point type) defense of affirmative therapy, and an attack on the idea that there are two biological sexes, which Eckert considers “transphobic”.  As #4 above notes, Eckert thinks that legal sex designations should be the same as gender identity (which of course can change). But there are obvious problems with that, the most obvious being the existence of “women’s spaces” like women’s sports, jails, or rape treatment. In such cases biological sex does matter, for trans women should not compete athletically against women or be put in women’s prisons; and rape victims should have the option to be treated or counseled by a biological woman.

I’ll give just a few quotes from Eckert as I don’t want to make this too long. Quotes from the article are indented, while, as always, my responses are flush left:

[Joyce] thinks men are infiltrating female spaces, both in restrooms and in sports, and that this is a vast and dangerous issue despite a lack of evidence and a predominance of evidence that sports participation on the correct team is vital to both mental and physical health, especially for trans youth.

The prohibition of trans women in female sports is to assure fair competition for women, not “mental and physical health”.

Joyce is no scientist. Joyce’s Twitter bio includes the line “show me the 3rd gamete & we can talk.” Joyce considers the term “TERF” a slur. It is evident throughout the painstaking reading of her online footprint and book that she labors under confusion, ignorance, and lack of scientific knowledge. And, of course, Joyce believes that trans activists are suppressing research.

I like the third gamete quote because it is indeed the presence of only two types of gametes that is the definition of sex: men have small mobile ones and women large immobile ones. And yes, “TERF” (trans-exclusionary radical feminist) is indeed a slur by gender activists against “gender-critical feminists” like Joyce.  Here’s the very first result I got when I googled TERF.  DEROGATORY!

Another quote:

 Joyce doesn’t understand why she’s seen as transphobic; in one interview, she claims,

“So according to them, I’m transphobic for just saying human beings come in two types, male and female…that’s transphobic.”

No, Helen. That’s not why you’re transphobic. Asserting two sexes is just incorrect. You’re transphobic because you claim that individuals cannot ever change biological sex, and anyone who disagrees with that statement is just frightened of activists. Your analogy is:

Again, Eckert is wrong here.  There are two sexes and no, you cannot change your biological sex—not unless you can change your developmental system so that it can make gametes different from those produced by your natal sex.

There’s a lot of guilt by association; here’s one case, combined with a false statement:

Natasha Loder was a judge [of the Maddox prize] both this year and in 2018 and, like Joyce, works for The Economist. According to her Twitter, Loder believes that campaigning for women’s rights means restricting trans rights, that the European consensus on treating trans youth is shifting due to weak evidence, and that gender-affirming care is experimental (false on all counts).

In fact, in nearly all European countries at present, the use of puberty blockers in children or adolescents—part of “gender-affirming care”—is indeed considered an experimental treatment, used in only very rare situations.

Two more bits of juvenilia. Eckert loves to give pejorative middle names to the people Eckert doesn’t like. To wit:

Joyce’s anti-trans origin story is not original (unoriginality is her ongoing theme). Like Abigail “I made the term ‘irreversible’ popular to use in trans medicine even though it’s nonsense” Shrier—Joyce wrote her book a favorable blurb, prominent on the back cover—and Lisa “I created a new Satanic panic with rapid-onset gender dysphoria, which despite all efforts, still doesn’t exist” Littman, Joyce became randomly aware of transgender issues with no prior knowledge of our community and became concerned about it/this/that, whatever that means.

Finally, here’s a labeled photo to show Eckert’s guilty-by-association trope:

  1. Professor Kathleen Stock, philosophy don who quit Sussex University amid gender row. Author of Material Girls: Why Reality Matters For Feminism
  2. Maya Forstater, co-founder of the Sex Matters campaign group
  3. Alison Bailey, co-founder of the LGB Alliance
  4. Helen Joyce, journalist, author of Trans: When Ideology Meets Reality and activist with Sex Matters
  5. Liane Timmermann, activist with Get The L Out– Lesbian Not Queer campaign group
  6. Angela C Wild, businesswoman and creator of Wild Womyn
  7. JK Rowling
  8. Suzanne Moore
  9. Julie Bindel,  journalist and women’s rights campaigner, author of Feminism for Women

This is Helen Joyce, the person short-listed for a prestigious science award.

What a bunch of TERFs!  Joyce is right behind J. K. Rowling, so clearly some of the TERFiness has rubbed off.

I won’t go on further; you can look at Eckert’s piece (but beware of their references, which are cherry-picked), and judge for yourself.  Eckert’s article is an unholy gemisch of false accusations, misrepresentations, and almost unhinged fulmination—all because Joyce’s book was short-listed for a science prize, and didn’t even win! This is not an evenhanded or even-tempered review, but a way-too-long rant against those people who are simply calling for caution in “gender affirming care”. What a shame that Science-Based Medicine has sunk so low!

ADDENDUM FROM READER JOOLZ (given with permission):

Eckert: “[Joyce] thinks men are infiltrating female spaces, […] despite a lack of evidence”.
Joolz:
There IS evidence. Plenty. I attach an image with some names. They can all be googled, eg: Shawn Hallet or Jacob Guerro. 
This information has been shared with activists many, many times. But they ignore it and continue with the same false assertions.
It’s frustrating. It’s like fighting fog. They insist TW [trans women] are safe, and that ‘you are trans if you say you are’, but when I mention the 436 TW prosecuted for rape over a 7-year period in England and Wales, they say ‘those men weren’t trans’. How convenient 🤦‍♀️

Once again, Scientific American screws up an article claiming that the binary definition of sex is harmful and limiting

October 26, 2023 • 9:30 am

Scientific American just can’t help itself; it has to keep pounding away at the biological definition of sex, which is based on differential gamete size. Just the other day they published a full article in the “evolution” category, arguing that women hunted just as much as men in ancient times (and in hunter/gatherer societies today), but part of that article claimed that sex and gender were both “spectrums”. To quote from my post on this execrable and tendentious piece (my bold):

For the purpose of describing anatomical and physiological evidence, most of the literature uses “female” and “male,” so we use those words here when discussing the results of such studies. For ethnographic and archaeological evidence, we are attempting to reconstruct social roles, for which the terms “woman” and “man” are usually used. Unfortunately, both these word sets assume a binary, which does not exist biologically, psychologically or socially. Sex and gender both exist as a spectrum, but when citing the work of others, it is difficult to add that nuance.

Now the magazine has a new op-ed arguing the same thing: a binary view of sex is not only wrong, but constricts us; is also harmful to people who don’t see themselves as “male” or “females”, like transsexuals (who do in fact see themselves as members of their non-natal sex); and doesn’t work for people who don’t produce gametes (note: postmenopausal women aren’t female under this criterion). But I digress. This piece is short, but is full of distortions and mistakes. Also, one of the authors (Cara Ocobock) also coauthored the article on hunting mentioned above. She gets a lot of space to propound her views, while the magazine prohibits me from writing an op-ed.that contradicts some claims of other op-eds. It is in effect a journalistic dictatorship that prohibits dissent.

 

I’ll put the authors’ claims in bold, and have indented their quotes:

The authors claim that sex is defined by gamete type, but we don’t check people’s gametes when judging their sex.  And people who don’t have gametes are problematic.

When we ask, “How many sexes are there in humans?” we can confidently answer “two,” right? Many people think sex should be defined by a strict gamete binary in which a person’s sex is determined by whether their body produces or could produce eggs or sperm. But when you are out and about in the human social world, are you checking everyone’s gametes? And what of the substantial number of people who do not produce or carry gametes?

Well, yes, in public we judge people’s sex by characters correlated with sex: appearance, including size, shape, presence of breasts, vocal timbre, and so on. So what? When doctors diagnose jaundice, they first look at the patient’s color, and then examine the underlying condition: liver function. There is no problem here; the idea of secondary sex characters, imperfectly but highly correlated with biological sex, is well ensconced in the literature. That doesn’t affect the definition, which is there because it clearly shows the binary and leads to many interesting lines of research.

And the claim that people who don’t produce gametes—sterile males, postmenopausal females, castrati, and so on—these pose no problem. They are male or female. Postmenopausal women should be furious at the implication that they are not biological women.

The authors raise the old, tired, and refuted “clownfish fallacy”. Clownfish switch sexes: when the sole alpha female in a group dies, a male fish changes sex to take over as the boss female. But there are still only two sexes. The article confuses the reader by bringing up other aspects of sex that involve how it’s determined.

The vast majority of life-forms—including bacteria and archaea—do not reproduce sexually. But if the question concerned the number of animal sexes present in a given tide pool or backyard garden, the answer would need to account for organisms that switch sexes, sometimes mate with themselves or switch back and forth between sexual and asexual reproduction.

. . . We have to appeal to a multiplicity of binaries, however, because sexual reproduction has evolved many times and in many different ways across the living world. Reproductive capacities in birds and mammals largely involve inheritance of different combinations of sex chromosomes, whereas in many reptiles, sex is determined based on environmental cues such as temperature.

Yes, but again, all animals have two sexes. They can arrive at that binary using temperature, chromosomes, environment, and other cues, but in all cases they wind up with two sexes. (And that binary hasn’t blinded us to working out how it’s attained in organisms like reptiles!).  The ubiquitous binary is scientifically useful because it raises the question, first raised by evolutionists Ronald Fisher, of “why are the sexes only two?”.  And we think we know the answer now. As I’ve said, there are many paths to sex but only two destinations: males and females.

The authors claim that defining sex is a bottom-up project and we should arrive at our definition from the “top down”: by asking questions.

We think the ongoing discussion about sex might benefit from a fundamental change in approach by turning the question around such that we ask, “If ‘sex’ is the answer, what was the question?”

They have a point here, and have used, as have I and others, a comparison with the definition of biological species. The species definition is fundamental because it explains an observation of and question about nature: “Why, in one area, do animals and plants come in neat packages, like the birds in my backyard. Why isn’t nature a spectrum rather than comprising discrete groups?”

The value of this [“questions first”] approach becomes clear when you consider the long-running debate in biology over how to define species. One definition, the biological species concept, posits that species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding organisms capable of producing fertile offspring. It is not universally applicable because, as noted earlier, most organisms do not reproduce sexually. It does, however, provide a framework for asking questions about how sexually reproducing organisms can evolve ways to avoid mating with organisms distinct enough that their offspring’s survivability or fertility would be compromised. This framework has led to a bounty of work demonstrating that speciation in organisms living in the same area is rare and that physical separation among groups appears to be a key component of evolving reproductive barriers.

We can extend this “ask questions first” framework to concepts about sex.

What the authors don’t seem to realize here is that the Biological Species Concept, based on reproductive barriers between groups, itself started with a question: “Why is nature discontinuous?” And that question led to the definition of species.  The discreteness of species in sexually reproducing creatures living in the same area is based on reproductive barriers.

Likewise, the definition of sex, based on equipment to produce one of two types of gametes, is also based on a question derived from observation: “Why do there seem to be two classes of organisms in animals, classes that have different reproductive roles and (usually) different appearances?”  Once we arrive at a gamete-based species definition, that helps us answer all sorts of questions, most notably ones involving sexual dimorphism and sexual selection.

So the top-down, question-asking method succeeded for both sex and species. The authors are kvetching about nothing.

Other aspects of organisms don’t adhere to a strict binary.

Binaries start to fail us once we move into questions about how organisms live out their lives. This can be seen in the example of transgender athletes. Arguments revolving around including or excluding trans athletes often rest on notions of strict binary differences in hormone type and concentration that associate female individuals with estrogen and male ones with testosterone. This assumes testosterone is at the root of athletic performance. These hormones do not hew to a strict binary, however. Female and male people need both estrogen and testosterone to function, and they overlap in their hormone concentrations. If we are interested in how estrogen and testosterone affect athletic performance, then we need to examine these respective hormone levels and how they correlate with athletic outcomes. We cannot rely on gross average differences between the sexes as evidence for differential athletic success. Adherence to a sex binary can lead us astray in this domain of inquiry.

My response is basically “This is irrelevant to whether sex itself is a binary.”  It also shows the ideological motivation of the paper, which is the usual motivation for denying the sex binary: “If sex is binary, then that erases people, like people of dual gender or trans people, who don’t feel that they belong to one of the two sexes.”  Well, that’s not true, as many trans people do feel they belong to one of the two sexes; they just feel they were born in the wrong one. But the biological definition of sex is irrelevant to the moral and legal rights of people of nonstandard gender, and, as I’ve always said, these folks should be treated with the respect and dignity their beliefs afford.

As for hormones not being in a strict binary, testosterone, for example, forms nearly a completely disjunct distribution in males and females, so the overlap is virtually nil.Below is a graph of hormone titers given by Carole Hooven in her book T: The Story of Testosterone, the Hormone that Dominates and Divides Us. The distributions are bimodal and almost nonoverlapping (a tiny bit of overlap, from people with sex disorders, isn’t shown because of the scale), with men at the higher mode and females at the other (h/t Robert):

But this is irrelevant, for, many sex-related characters, like height and strength, also show more overlap. The question is whether sex itself is bimodal, not sex-related traits.  And we know plenty about overlap in those traits, so the sex binary has not impeded us from studying things that overlap!

Further, people are already examining how hormone levels affect athletics-related traits.

Importantly, the fact that the Olympics and other groups used to use a hormone cutoff between athletes allowed to compete in “male” versus “female” categories has nothing to do with the sex binary. This is an artificial classification binary imposed on people for allowing them to compete in the two classes. (And it didn’t work.)  The authors are deliberately conflating two distinct issues here: the binary of sex and an artificial binary subjectively imposed by athletic organizations.

Other species, say the authors, don’t hew to a sex binary. 

Further problems arise when we compare humans to other species. Some organisms are incapable of reproducing. Some that are capable may end up not reproducing. Others may alternate between reproducing asexually and sexually, and still others may switch sexes. Such organisms provide fascinating insights into the diversity of life. But when we refer to clown fish changing sex to emphasize the diversity of ways in which sexual beings move through the world, we risk losing sight of the issues of consent, autonomy, well-being and self-determination that form the bedrock of all dimensions of human health, sexual or otherwise.

Every animal we know of has two, and only two, sexes, though sometimes they reproduce asexually. Alternation of sexes still leaves two sexes; like clownfish, organisms can change from one to the other —but there are no cases involving three or more sexes.

And what on earth do “consent, autonomy, well-being, and self determination” have to do with the sex binary? These are social issues that have nothing to do with how many sexes we have.  The authors are committing a form of the appeal to nature here, saying that because human sexuality is complicated by our social system, there must not be two sexes in nature!

This paper is deeply misguided, and its aim is to cast doubt on the utility of the sex binary because it distracts us from other stuff.  But the other stuff they mention has already been investigated and discussed extensively. In the end, I can conclude only that this is part of Scientific American‘s continuing “progressive” effort to convince us that there are more than two sexes in humans.  (For articles other than the two mentioned here, see here, here, and here). They won’t succeed, for Nature can’t be fooled. It’s infuriating that a science magazine repeatedly tries to deny empirical fact to serve a political agenda.

Yes, there may be good article in Scientific American, but there are also abysmal articles and op-eds, and I lay these at the door of the editor.

_________

For more kvetching about the magazine, see “The Fall of Scientific American” in Spiked, published two days ago.

My letter to the Washington Post on race

October 22, 2023 • 9:15 am

About a week ago, the Washington Post published, starting on its front page, a long article arguing that race is a purely social construct without reality or utility, and thus should be eliminated. The author Sydney Trent, is a science journalist who covers social issues, and that may explain why the article was replete with scientific problems, among them the neglect of existing research on ethnic groups (my preferred term for “race”). You can see the article by clicking on the headline below. Since it’ll probably be paywalled if you subscribe, I found the whole article archived here.

Leaving aside the misleading “science says” (science doesn’t say anything, scientists do; and not all scientists agree that race isn’t real), I’ll show you three small excerpts of Trent’s piece:

Yet unlike in decades past, more ordinary Americans are coming to see “race” for what it is, [Carlos] Hoyt maintains. In interviews he conducted for his doctoral thesis and book, these people describe gradually awakening to the idea — through traumatic personal experiences with discrimination, through foreign travel or something they read — that they had been sold a bill of goods. “Race,” they decided, does not exist.

. . . The truth, [Adrian] Lyles, 37, said, is that “race has no quantifiable metric,” like socioeconomic status, for example, he said. “Where you have unreliable input, your data is trash.”

. . . In 2003, the completion of the Human Genome Project — which found that humans globally share 99.9 percent of their DNA — gave waste to the notion of “race” among the vast majority of scientists. But the public appears barely to have noticed. The idea still lives everywhere — in discrimination and criminal profiling, in the rise in hate speech and acts, in the recent Supreme Court decision ending affirmative action in college admissions, in the rhetoric of social justice advocates and the new capitalization of Black and White in the media. Racial categorization persists on job applications, medical forms, and most critically to Hoyt due to its high visibility, the Census.

Implicit in Trent’s effort to dethrone the term is the misguided idea that if you think “races” have any biological reality, then that buttresses racism.  That need not be true, but, historically, belief in races has been associated with the idea of a racial hierarchy in various traits (most often intelligence), and so I prefer to use “populations” or “ethnicity”, which doesn’t carry that historical taint.

Trent concludes that racial categories should be eliminated everywhere, especially on the census. The problem is that from the DNA figures above, she concludes that “racial categories”—the half-dozen or so “races” recognized in the past (white, black, Asian, and so on)—have no biological significance.  But she conflates “racial categories”, the named “boxes” above, with “race”, which I take to mean “a population that is genetically distinguishable from other populations of our species”.

Classical “races” were assumed to be absolutely demarcated geographically and morphologically, and to be separated by substantial genetic differences.  We know now that this conception of “race” isn’t true. There are no absolutely clear-cut categories into which everyone fits, genetic differences between even the “classical” races are not large, and there are “races within races”: populations that can be distinguished genetically from other populations often put into the same classical race. Again, that’s why I use “ethnicity”  or “population” to refer to such groups.

But there is no doubt that ethnicity, and even the “old fashioned” races, carry meaningful biological information and are genetically differentiable. If they weren’t, then you wouldn’t be able to pay companies like 23andMe to suss out your ancestry, or to trace the history of human migration by using genetic differences between populations. (23andMe told me from my DNA that I am 97.2% Ashkenazi Jew and 2.8% Eastern European, which matches perfectly with what I know from my family history.)

Ethnicity reflects evolutionary history, and if you use thousands of DNA sites (as you see in my letter below, even 99.6% identity between people—not 99.9% as Trent wrote—still leaves, in a genome of 3 billion base pairs, at least 12 million variable nucleotides. That variation is largely correlated with ancestry and geography, so that, for example, the DNA of most Europeans allows you to identify their birthplace to within 500 miles. Luana Maroja and I described the real situation in our recent paper (“The ideological subversion of biology“) in Skeptical Inquirer, a magazine published by the Center for Inquiry. (The race material is under point #5 of the paper.)

And, as I say in my published letter, one study showed that if you ask people to self-identify their “old fashioned” race (they used 3,636 Americans who self identified as either African American, white, East Asian, or Hispanic), and then independently look at their DNA in a blind study, you find that when you compare the DNA with the self-identification, you find a 99.84 percent match! That means that even the widely-reviled “classical” races are genetically differentiable using cluster analysis.  This is not surprising because these groups evolved in different parts of the world, and for much of their history they evolved in semi-isolation, leading to the accumulation of differences in the DNA by either genetic drift or natural selection.

At any rate, the Post‘s article was scientifically misleading, and so I set out to correct it by writing a letter to the paper. Mirabile dictu, they published it, and you can find it by either clicking on the screenshot or by simply reading my letter reproduced below the headline.

They edited it fairly heavily for length, so I had to leave out stuff like locating someone’s birthplace from their genes. Still, I think I did make the point that there is substantial genetic variation among people and diagnostic genetic variation among ethnic groups, and that this variation is useful in several ways.  If I could make one change, it would be to re-insert something that was cut and that I missed when I reviewed the edits: I would have inserted “large differences in” at the point where I put an asterisk in the letter below.

If you get the paper version of the Post, the letter is on page A27; if you have an online subscription, it’s here (or see my letter and another one by clicking the headline below). They changed the title of Trent’s article after the online version was published to what you see above.

The letter:

The Oct. 19 front-page article “A categorical no to the concept of race” argued that human “race” is a social construct without biological meaning. But there is important scientific data showing that race is indeed associated with diagnostic and useful biological differences.

Scientists have long rejected the simplistic view of races as groups distinguishable by appearance, geographic origin and * genes. But rejecting this view of “racial categories” and arguing that humans “share 99.9 percent of their DNA,” misses important genetic differences between populations. In fact, while humans share 99.6 percent of their genome, our genome has more than 3 billion base pairs, leaving more than 12 million DNA sites that vary among people.

This variation is correlated with ancestry and geography. It is used, for example, by genealogy services to tell people about their ancestry. In forensics, it’s used to identify criminals and bodies. And DNA variation is used to map the location of genes causing disease, an effort with great medical promise because the frequency of genetic diseases such as schizophrenia varies among populations.

Jerry A. Coyne, Chicago
The writer is emeritus professor of ecology and evolution at the University of Chicago.

There was also another letter making a different point about racial designations, and I’ll add that, too:

The front-page article “A categorical no to the concept of race” explained how treating race as objective rather than socially constructed has led to demographic confusion while shoehorning people into categories at variance with how they view themselves. As an example, the article mentioned the recent custom of uppercasing “Black” and “White” in American news media. The Post ought to champion a more nuanced standard, perhaps by using lowercase for how people (whose self-identification might be unknown) are viewed by others and uppercase for how they view themselves. The majuscule would then carry the same connotation of intentional membership as it does in the distinction between “Republican” and “republican” or between “Deaf” and “deaf.”

Charles H. Bennett, Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.

Thanks to a reader who encouraged me to write my letter.