Christian bodybuilders find Biblical justification for swinging

September 27, 2014 • 10:49 am

Well, this just goes to show that literally anything, including wife-swapping, can be justified by the Bible. We learn via reader Barry from an article in yesterday’s HuffPo that a new Christian swingers’ group, one aimed at bodybuilders (!) has arisen. And of course because they’re Christians, and having sex with a bunch of other people besides your spouse seems distinctly un-Christian, they’re forced to justify it by citing scripture.  The justification goes beyond, “Well, the Bible doesn’t say anything against it (of course the phenomenon of “swinging” didn’t really exist among the Israelites), and into the ground that it’s actually something that God wants. It’s God’s plan. After all, as Dean says in the video below, it’s a way of spreading God’s word among swingers. (That’s not the only thing it spreads!)

Frankly, I don’t care who does what to where, or when, so long as they’re all consenting adults and nobody gets hurt. But it’s funny to see how Christians have to rationalize it. Here’s an excerpt from HuffPo, but the video below it is a real gem.

If you like Jesus, pumping iron and pumping/getting pumped by acquaintances bound by holy matrimony, there’s a website just for you.

It’s called Fitness Swingers, and it’s the brainchild of Cristy Parave and her husband, Dean, who dreamed up the site after reportedly having a threesome with this wife and her female friend. Apparently, the sex was just heavenly.

The Florida couple, who met at a bodybuilding competition, are interested in sharing their beliefs and their spouses with others who feel similarly. They started their online network 7 years ago, and haven’t looked back. The pillars of their relationship: A commitment to their faith, to fitness, and to the ideals of the swinger lifestyle.

Dean Parave told Barcroft Media that he doesn’t think that his swinger lifestyle conflicts with his Christian beliefs. In fact, he considers it a kind of ministry.

“So far today, God hasn’t told me, ‘Dean stop that, it’s a sin. I don’t want you to do that.’ Until he does that, I’m going to keep trying to help as many people as I can,” he told Barcroft.

Christy said she needed a little convincing that it was moral at first, but now she’s totally convinced that god is on their side.

“God put people on the Earth to breed and enjoy each other,” she told Barcroft. “I feel God is always with me and he has put us here for a reason.”

Count how many times in this hilarious video you see “God’s will” used simply as an excuse for people to make the beast with two backs:

I wonder if—in the same manner Obama characterizes ISIS—other horrified Christians would say that these “aren’t real Christians.”

If you’re a randy and muscular Christian, you can sign up for Fitness Swingers by clicking on the screenshot below:

Screen Shot 2014-09-27 at 10.14.07 AM

I don’t think this is a joke!

Keeping the faith: an apologist argues that religion isn’t responsible for anything bad

September 21, 2014 • 1:55 pm

Guess who said this?

In the past, many of the most influential Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers understood that what we call “God” is merely a symbol that points beyond itself to an indescribable transcendence, whose existence cannot be proved but is only intuited by means of spiritual exercises and a compassionate lifestyle that enable us to cultivate new capacities of mind and heart.

Well, it could have been any number of Sophisticated Theologians™, but you’re right if you guessed Karen Armstrong, the ex-nun who has been lavishly honored for explaining that God isn’t “real” in the sense that most people think. Ironically, she has laid out her apophatic thesis—that one can’t say anything meaningful about God—in a string of books.  (By the way, she wrote the above bafflegab in a Wall Street Journal printed debate with Richard Dawkins, which is worth a read.)

If you know Armstrong, and you know that she’s about to come out with a new book that looks like this (click on screenshot to go to Amazon listing; book out Oct. 28), you can guess what it will say:

512t8vEdA8L

That’s right: her thesis is that religion has almost nothing to do with creating violence—it simply absorbs violence whose causes are social or cultural. Even the Spanish Inquisition wasn’t really about religion. Sound familiar?

Of course it will sell well, for Armstrong has done quite well for telling believers and faitheists what they want to hear, whether it be that it’s useless to look for evidence for God, that Islam is a religion of peace, and now that religion has never been a cause of violence.

And yet there’s already a negative review in the Telegraph by someone who is not at all a fan of atheism or a critic of religion, but still has enough integrity to see through shoddy arguments. The reviewer is Noel Malcolm—Sir Noel to you—scholar, journalist, and author. And Malcolm, who has no great love for Dawkins (why is Richard even mentioned in this piece?), at least has no truck with the idea that religion births no evils. A few snippets (more than usual because I savored this review):

First, the obligatory Dawkins-dissing, just to show that Sir Noel is on the side of the angels:

‘Many of us saw religion as harmless nonsense. We thought, if people needed a crutch for consolation, where’s the harm? September 11 changed all that.” So said Richard Dawkins, who until his retirement enjoyed the title of Professor for the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University.

Some of us began to wonder whether Dawkins had secretly renegotiated the terms of his job, becoming instead the Professor for the Public Misunderstanding of Religion. To argue that one act of terrorism, however extreme, committed by members of one radical movement proved the harmfulness of all religion was a strange piece of reasoning.

But then on to Armstrong, who gets the brunt of it:

. . . her new book runs from the one to the other, from Gilgamesh to bin Laden, covering almost five millennia of human experience in between. This is both an apologia and a history book, aimed always at supplying the context of what may look like religiously motivated episodes of violence, in order to show that religion as such was not the prime cause.

But what is, or was, religion “as such”? Armstrong argues from the outset that it is impossible to give a clear answer to that question. Writing about ancient Persia, she declares that “a religious tradition is never a single, unchanging essence; it is a template that can be modified and altered radically to serve a variety of ends”. That sounds reasonable enough, but then she makes a much bolder claim. Until about 1700, she says, people were simply unable to distinguish between religious issues and political, social or economic ones. There was no such separate thing as religion. Ergo, it is wrong to single out “religion” as something to blame. [JAC editorial comment: Oy vey!]

If that were true, it would also mean that you can’t single out religion as something to excuse, or at least partly exonerate. But when she discusses medieval Christian anti-Semitism, for example, Armstrong is quick to say that not only “religious conviction” but also “social, political and economic elements” were to blame. The violence of the Spanish Inquisition, likewise, “was caused less by theological than political considerations”. What was all that about it being impossible to distinguish religious issues from non-religious ones?

The whole idea that no such distinctions could be made in western Europe until the end of the 17th century is, in any case, highly dubious.

. . . When she comes to the present day, Armstrong’s defence of religion seems questionable on other grounds too. She is no doubt right to say that the aggression of a modern jihadist does not represent some timeless essence of religion, and that other political, economic and cultural factors loom large in the stories of how and why individuals become radicalised. Yet she goes beyond that, to suggest that such violence tends always to be a response to provocation or oppression.

The key term here is “structural violence”, which crops up repeatedly in her pages. When Anwar Sadat tried to introduce a free-market economy to Egypt, his policy involved “blatant structural violence”, as it increased inequality and inequity: radical Islamism swiftly followed. “Structural violence” is a bit of a weasel phrase, as it means something other than actual violence. What it seems to imply is a kind of equivalentism between the actions of the state and those of the genuinely violent radicals who seek to overthrow it.

The next paragraph ends with a zinger—the kind of puncturing of pretension I love to see directed at apologists:

Equivalentism is carried one step further in Armstrong’s comments on George W Bush and his response to 9/11. In launching the “War on Terror”, he was displaying the “quasi-religious fervour” of neoconservatism, with its “semi-mystical belief” in “America’s unique historical mission”. “Suicide bombing shocks us to the core,” she writes, “but should it be more shocking than collateral damage in a drone strike?” The answer, surely, is “yes”: the intentional slaughter of people is worse than the unintentional slaughter of them.

But then the obligatory dissing of Dawkins occurs again in the last sentence:

I am all in favour of mounting a sensible defence of religion against the Dawkinsite dogma. But I doubt this is the right way to go about it.

Others can read this book, though I doubt many here will. I’ll save my dosh for, say, Golfing for Cats:

cats.h/t: Pyers

 

 

William Lane Craig answers a distressed reader: “If ISIS’s god were mine, should I do what he says?”

September 19, 2014 • 10:49 am

Sometimes the mask slips just a little on Sophisticated Theologians™—or, in the case of William Lane Craig, Slick Theologians.  In this case it happened when Craig was forced to answer the question, one not often taken up by theologians, of how they know their god is the RIGHT God.

It came in the form of a letter posted by an anonymous reader from the UK on Craig’s website Reasonable Faith. The question formed half of a post called “If ISIS’s God were real, would I be obliged to follow him?” (The other half is Craig’s answer.) A distressed follower of Craig’s wrote in asking what would happen if  a) the follower conformed to Craig’s “Divine Command Theory” (DCT), which says that what is moral is what God dictates, and b) the real god turned out to be not the God of Christianity, but the Muslim god Allah whose dictates are followed by ISIS. The distressed acolyte had two concerns:

Well, recently, an atheist flipped this question around and asked me “If the Islamic State were true (by which he means, if the specific type of Allah that IS believe in, existed) then likewise, would you become an IS member?”

Now, my gut reaction is to say no. I would not follow a God whom I find so horrendous as to condone rape, mass murder and forced conversion such as we’re seeing happen right now in the Middle East.

Two problems arise, however:

Firstly, if I say this, the atheist can simply reply, “exactly! And now I’m sure you’re aware how I feel too. Even if your Christian God existed, I would not follow him, because I find certain things about his morality horrendous and objectionable”. This would seem a conversation stopper.

But, secondly, there seems an even greater problem:

From my understanding of Divine Command Theory (DCT), it seems the response I ought to give, is “yes, under such circumstances I should become an IS member”. After all, if moral ontology is ultimately based in the character of God, then if the real God who existed after all was the IS God, and not the Christian God, then I would have no intellectual alternative other than to bite the bullet and treat his character as the paradigm of Moral Goodness. Rape etc really would be good, if their God existed, and if the principle of DCT applies.

It goes on and on, but that’s the gist of it. The writer really did perceive a serious problem with the DCT.

Craig quickly stepped in, however, with two qualifications of the DCT. But first he says this, which is almost funny:

Anonymous, I can’t help but observe that you seem to be emotionally caught up in this objection. I think the first thing that needs to be done, then, is to try to disentangle your emotions from the philosophical issues at stake here. Then you will be able to think more clear-headedly about the arguments.

Actually, if you read the letter, it’s not very emotional; it’s just concerned.  And here’s the meat of Craig’s response.

1. You’ve got the wrong Divine Command Theory. Craig distinguishes between the “voluntarist” DCT, in which you have to do what God says because what is moral consists precisely and only of what God tells you to do, regardless of how you feel about it:

On voluntaristic theories God’s commands are based upon His free will alone. He arbitrarily chooses what values are good or bad and what our obligations and prohibitions are. It seems to me that the voluntarist has no choice but to bite the bullet, as you say, and affirm that had God so chosen, then we would be obligated to engage in rape, mass murder, and forced conversion.

But Craig says that very few DCT adherents actually buy into that form of DCT. No, they accept another form of Divine Command Theory, the non-voluntarist one. Here Craig pulls his bait-and-switch:

Most divine command theorists are non-voluntarists who hold that moral values are not grounded in God’s will but in His nature. Moral duties are grounded in His will or commands; but moral values are prior to His will, since God’s own nature is not something invented by God. Since His will is not independent of His nature but must express His nature, it is logically impossible for Him to issue certain sorts of commands. In order to do so, He would have to have a different nature, which is logically impossible.

What that means is that there is a set of moral goods that antedate God, though they’re said to inhere in his nature. So how do we know what God’s nature is? The only way is to see if he tells us to do what strikes us as moral. But how can you test that?

The only way I know is to see if God’s commands in Scripture comport with what we see as moral. And they very clearly don’t. We are all aware of the horrors that God commands in the Old Testament, including genocide, stoning of adulterers, killing of those who work on the Sabbath or curse their parents, and so on and so on. . .  And that doesn’t include the genocides that God regularly orders up—genocides in which innocent women and children are slaughtered along with everyone else.

And yet Craig himself seemed in at least one case to hold to the voluntarist view of the DCT: when he justified God’s order to slaughter the Canaanites, including women and children. Craig thought that was perfectly moral because God ordered it and God’s ways aren’t our ways. As Craig said in his monstrous justification:

But God has no such prohibition [the prohibition not to take an innocent life]. He can give and take life as He chooses.  We all recognize this when we accuse some authority who presumes to take life as “playing God.”  Human authorities  arrogate to themselves rights which belong only to God.  God is under no obligation whatsoever to extend my life for another second.  If He wanted to strike me dead right now, that’s His prerogative.

What that implies is that God has the right to take the lives of the Canaanites when He sees fit.  How long they live and when they die is up to Him.

So the problem isn’t that God ended the Canaanites’ lives.  The problem is that He commanded the Israeli soldiers to end them.  Isn’t that like commanding someone to commit murder?  No, it’s not.  Rather, since our moral duties are determined by God’s commands, it is commanding someone to do something which, in the absence of a divine command, would have been murder.  The act was morally obligatory for the Israeli soldiers in virtue of God’s command, even though, had they undertaken it on their on initiative, it would have been wrong.

On divine command theory, then, God has the right to command an act, which, in the absence of a divine command, would have been sin, but which is now morally obligatory in virtue of that command.

If that’s not voluntaristic DCT, I don’t know what is. It basically says that God’s commands ARE the arbiter of right and wrong. So Craig is either a hypocrite or a weasel, one who basically accepts the Euthyphro theory but imputes right and wrong to “God’s nature,” conveniently comporting with people’s innate views of right and wrong. I could go on, but there’s another interesting question for Craig: “How do you know that ISIS’s Allah is the wrong God?” Craig’s answer is funny.

2. Allah isn’t the right God because he’s not all-loving! Yes, that’s right. While Yahweh is clearly all-loving (right!), the Qur’an shows that Allah is not. And, according to the Ontological Argument, God must logically be all-loving. Oh, and there must be just one of those gods. No polytheism!  My emphasis in the following:

But then, Anonymous, you begin to muddy the waters by bringing in epistemic considerations, which are not relevant to the truth or coherence of divine command theory. You ask, “What if, epistemically, I’d been mistaken and had the wrong God, what would the implications be of the DCT principle?It is logically impossible that there be any other God. So if you were mistaken and believed in the wrong God, you would be a Muslim or a Hindu or a polytheist or what have you; but there wouldn’t be another God. Remember: on perfect being theology, God is a maximally great being, a being which is worthy of worship. Lesser beings are not “Gods” at all. In fact, in my debates with Muslim theologians, this is one of the arguments I use against the Islamic conception of God: that Allah cannot be the greatest conceivable being because he is not all-loving and therefore cannot be God.

And there you have it. Craig says that “Anonymous” is not even obliged to answer the question because there is no possibility that the right God is ISIS’s God, nor that the REAL God, i.e., Craig’s God, would order someone to engage in acts like beheading and stoning (right!).

Is only Craig’s god “all-loving”? And if He is so damn loving, why did he order the massacre of the Canaanites, man, woman, and child, as well as the massacres of many others? Why did he order she-bears to kill the group of kids who made fun of Elisha’s bald head? The questions go on forever. The fact is that Craig’s God, at least in the Old Testament (which Craig holds as correct), is a horrible bully and miscreant.

And things aren’t so cool in the New Testament, either. There’s that Hell thing, for instance. No all-loving being would fry someone forever for trivial “sins.” Further, why hasn’t Craig forsaken his wife and kids, as Jesus said he should?

This is Sophisticated Theology™ at its finest and funniest. It involves one positing not only a God, but a special kind of God, through logic alone, and in the face of empirical evidence. But there’s more! It also involves a tortuous logical twist so that that God (again, in the face of logic) just happens to have the exact kind of moral nature that corresponds to our own morality. The Right God could never order bears to kill kids for making fun of someone’s depilated pate. The thing is, though, He did!

craig-smiling
“And if you buy my Divine Command Theory, I have some real estate in Florida I’d like to sell you.”

 

 

 

Why is this thing not like the others?: Bill Maher schools Charlie Rose on the perfidies of Islam

September 18, 2014 • 10:33 am

Like Sam Harris, Bill Maher is one of those people who inspires a lot of rancor among atheists because their view aren’t perfectly consonant with the thoughtful, secular “line”. Harris favors gun ownership and profiling for terrorists, while Maher was an anti-vaxer. (I’m not sure whether he still adheres to that position.) My view has always been that even if you disagree with someone about something, you should still promote their arguments that you consider good.  Hitchens was in favor of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but how does that invalidate his arguments against religion? And do you know anyone who doesn’t have at least one opinion that seems bizarre?

Here’s a 6-minute video of Bill Maher’s September 11 (!) appearance on the Charlie Rose show in which he just steamrollers over Rose (who appears to be religious), over Rose’s claims that Islam is no worse than any other faith, and over Rose’s stupid assertion that ISIS isn’t really Islamic.

At 45 seconds in, you can see Rose tacitly admitting he’s a believer, saying that he “covers all the bases” (but hastens to add that he’s “a devotee of science, too”). Rose also agrees with Howard Dean’s claim that he (Dean) “is about as Islamic as ISIS”.

Here Maher shows that he can be absolutely serious and eloquent on the topic of religion. There’s none of the persiflage that people objected to in “Religulous.”

Rose, sadly, seems to be a pretty lame apologist for Islam. I have to say that I think less of him after his performance here. He, like other apologists, should look at the polls on Muslim beliefs throughout the world.

I’ll add here a cartoon from reader Pliny the in Between, taken from his/her website Pictoral Theology:

Toon Background.014

h/t: Aneris

A new proof of God: The argument from The Matrix

September 15, 2014 • 6:51 am

Well, there’s this website whose name (which includes “Science and Nonduality”) has some strange characters in it, so I’ll just give a screenshot that links to the site:

Screen Shot 2014-09-15 at 7.00.10 AMPart of the site’s aim is to “ignite the dialogue between science and spirituality,” which already erects my fur.

And on that site, someone named Bernardo Kastrup has decided to go after my view that studying theology is a useless endeavor. I agree with Dan Barker that it’s a “subject without an object,” a thesis I discussed a while back.

Kastrup, who was trained as a scientist (see below) but then jumped the rails and abandoned materialism, has decided that I’m dead wrong—that theology has an object after all, and that he can prove it. He tries to do so in a post called “In defense of theology: a reply to Jerry Coyne.” It’s one of the most convoluted arguments for God I’ve ever seen, right up there with the Ontological Argument, for it “proves” God without using real evidence. And, unless I am so unsophisticated that I can’t grasp the argument, I think it’s based on a faulty analogy. Fiinally, it involves that favorite point of theists: the “mystery” of consciousness.

But first, who is Kastrup? His website profile, includes this:

Bernardo Kastrup has a Ph.D. in Computer Engineering and has worked as a scientist in some of the world’s foremost research laboratories, including the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) and the Philips Research Laboratories (where the “Casimir Effect” of Quantum Field Theory was discovered). He has authored many scientific papers and four philosophy books: Rationalist Spirituality, Dreamed up Reality, Meaning in Absurdity, and Why Materialism Is Baloney. This latter book is a grand synthesis of his metaphysical views. Bernardo has also been an entrepreneur and founder of two high-tech businesses. Today, he holds a managerial position in the high-tech industry.

“Why Materialism is Baloney” sets off warning bells, but of course that must perforce be the view of someone who’s defending God’s existence.

So what is Kastrup’s argument? In short, it comes in three parts:

1.  We are conscious beings who construe reality through our senses and consciousness. This seems simple enough, but Kastrup can’t use ten words when 200 will do:

Consciousness is the only carrier of reality anyone can ever know for sure; it is the one undeniable, empirical fact of existence. As I elaborate extensively upon in my book Why Materialism Is Baloney, we do not need more than this one undeniable fact to explain reality: all things and phenomena can be explained as excitations of consciousness itself. As such, the ground of all reality is an impersonal flow of subjective experiences that I metaphorically describe  as a stream, while our personal awareness is simply a localization of this flow — a whirlpool in the stream. It is this localization that leads to the illusion of personal identity and separateness. Moreover, it is your body-brain system that is in consciousness, not consciousness in your body-brain system. Think of reality as a collective dream: in a dream, it is your dream character that is in your consciousness, not your consciousness in your dream character. This becomes obvious when you wake up, but isn’t at all obvious while you are dreaming. Furthermore, the body-brain system is the image of that process of localization in the stream of consciousness, like a whirlpool is the image of a process of localization in a stream of water. For exactly the same reason that a whirlpool doesn’t generate water, your brain doesn’t generate consciousness.

Whirlpools, schmirlpools! Throughout the article Kastrup implies that there is no reality independent of consciousness: a view shared by one Deepak Chopra. That, of course, is untenable, as there is plenty of evidence about what was going on in the Universe before consciousness evolved. But of course you can further argue that our notion of what happened before brains existed is a construction of those brains; but I don’t think that anybody who is science-friendly wants to go that route.

Kastrup has it backwards. In fact, for exactly the same reason that water generates a whirlpool under certain physical conditions, the brain generates consciousness. It’s the laws of physics, Jake!

2. Science and its methods can’t penetrate consciousness, and have no way of separating our perception of the world from the world itself.  Here we get the old trope: you can study neurons and hormones, and see what correlates with love, but that will never tell you what it actually feels like to be in love.

Perhaps that’s true, but what is not true is that the phenomenon of consciousness—of qualia—is forever beyond scientific understanding. That is the “hard problem” of consciousness.  As Kastrup says,

For example: a neuroscientist might put a volunteer in a functional brain scanner (fMRI) and measure the patterns of his brain activity while the volunteer watches pictures of his loved ones. The neuroscientist would have precise measurements showing a pattern of activity in the volunteer’s brain, which could be printed out on slides and shared with the volunteer himself. The patterns on those slides would represent what the volunteer’s first-person experience of love looks like from the outside. In other words, they would be the image of subjective processes in the volunteer’s personal consciousness; the footprints of love. But if the neuroscientist were to point at the slides and tell the volunteer: “this is what you felt when you looked at the pictures of your loves ones,” the volunteer would vehemently, and correctly, deny the assertion. The first-person experience of love doesn’t feel at all like watching neurons activate, or ‘fire.’ You see, the image correlates with the process and carries valid information about it — like footprints correlate with the gait and carry valid information about it — but it isn’t the process, for exactly the same reason that footprints aren’t the gait. Looking at patterns of brain activity certainly feels very different from feeling love.

Yes, it does, but if you can understand how consciousness arises from patterns of brain activity, you’ve gone a long way toward understanding it. But even if we can’t do that easily, what does this have to do with God?

And that leads to Kastrup’s conclusion:

3. Just like the brain scans we see empirically—the ones associated with consciousness—say nothing about what it’s like to be conscious, so the empirical universe we see around us is a reflection of a higher consciousness: God’s consciousness, which is equally unfathomable. Ergo God. Theology is an attempt to plumb God’s consciousness. 

If you think I’m kidding, here are Kastrup’s words. Bear with me, for he writes in theobabble:

As our personal psyches are like whirlpools in a broader stream, so the broader stream itself is an impersonal form of consciousness that underlies all reality. Aldous Huxley ably called it ‘mind-at-large,’ a term that I will adopt from this point on. Now, for the same reason that the experiences of another person appear to us as a seemingly objective image — namely, an active brain — the seemingly objective world around us is the image of conscious experiences in mind-at-large. Moreover, for exactly the same reason that feeling love is completely different than watching the brain activity of someone in love, the first-person experience of mind-at-large will feel completely different than your watching the world around you right now. The world is the image of conscious experiences in mind-at-large, but mind-at-large doesn’t experience the world the way we do, for the same reason that our volunteer inside the brain scanner doesn’t experience patterns of firing neurons! The volunteer experiences love, not firing neurons. When we look at the world around us, we do see the footprints of conscious experience, but not the gait. And this is why theology not only has a concrete and worthy subject of study and speculation, but perhaps the ultimate one.

. . .Thus, theology does have a very concrete subject: mind-at-large, or ‘God.’ And theology also has concrete data to make inferences about this subject: nature itself. After all, nature — from atoms to galaxy clusters — is an image of God’s mental activity, just like a brain scan is an image of a person’s subjective experiences.

. . . theology is an attempt to see past the mere images and make inferences about the subjective processes behind those images, which include emotions and intentionality; it is an attempt to see past the ‘brain scan’ and infer how it ‘feels to feel’ love in a direct way; it is an attempt to see past the footprints and understand where the hiker wants to go, as well as why he wants to go there. In this sense, theology and the natural sciences are entirely complementary.

and finally:

In conclusion, both nature itself and religious texts are expressions of a mysterious divine perspective and, as such, valid sources of concrete data for theological study. Theology has a clear, concrete subject, as well as a clear and concrete challenge: to decode the divine mystery behind the images (both ‘unconscious’ and empirical) that we can ordinarily access during life. Coyne is simply wrong. While the natural sciences attempt to model and predict the patterns and regularities of nature, theology attempts to interpret those patterns and regularities so to make some sense of their first-person perspective; that is, God’s perspective.

This is an Argument for God From The Matrix: the Universe is the reflection of God’s consciousness, which we see through a glass darkly.

But this seems to me to be an argument based on a false analogy, and the syllogism fails at point #3. The problems are twofold. (I’m not mentioning the problems that the universe preceded the evolution of consciousness of its creatures, and that we can make and test hypotheses about what it was like. The fact that some of those hypotheses are verified tells us that there was a universe before we knew of it, and it had properties that were independent of our consciousness.)

First, when there is a human being who says she is conscious, we know that that that human exists and is saying those words.  We don’t know the same about God, whirlpools or not. In other words, the existence of a Universe says nothing about either human or divine consciousness. While we can perceive other humans, there is no similar evidence for God. But at least we know that our view of reality is filtered through senses that have evolved (largely to represent reality!), and in real, demonstrable entities. Where is Kastrup’s evidence for the entity that is God?

Second, we can study consciousness in humans (and perhaps other creatures) through science. That is, we can show what is required for consciousness, how to remove it, where it resides in the brain, how to change its nature, and so on.  We can make hypotheses and test them.

In contrast, Kastrup is stuck not only with having to sneak in God via a false analogy, but then with his claim that theology has valid methods for understanding God’s “consciousness” though his creation.  That’s Natural Theology, a discipline that became obsolete with Darwin, though it has had a revival of sorts with arguments about “fine tuning” and “The Moral Law”.

But we all know that theology has no verifiable methods for inferring anything about God from his creation, except that He’s either malicious, indifferent, or a bungler. Kastrup, however, insists that certain properties of God can be discerned from the Universe:

The term, although admittedly old-fashioned and highly ambiguous, was and remains appropriate: if all reality consists of ripples (that is, inanimate objects and phenomena) and whirlpools (that is, living creatures) in the stream of mind-at-large, then the attributes ‘omnipresent,’ ‘omniscient,’ and ‘omnipotent’ apply to the stream for obvious reasons.

It’s not so obvious to me that these attributes—particularly “omnipotence”—would apply to even a Universal Consciousness. You can see here that Kastrup, desperate to prove his god, is simply making stuff up: throwing out words without considering whether they fit into a logical framework.

And he tries to anticipate the objection I’ll raise to his argument:

Coyne could counter this by saying that we already have the natural sciences for studying nature, and that the scientific method is much better suited for this purpose. This is as strictly correct as it misses the point: theology is an attempt to see past the mere images and make inferences about the subjective processes behind those images, which include emotions and intentionality. . .

He says it again, too, trying desperately to turn theology into a kind of science:

. . . theology attempts to interpret those patterns and regularities so to make some sense of their first-person perspective; that is, God’s perspective.

The key word here is “attempt.” Yes, theology tries to find out about God from nature. The problem is that it can’t find out squat, because its methods don’t allow the discernment of truth. That is why, of course, the gazillion different religions on this planet have come to different conclusions about “God’s perspective.” Does God like gays or hate them? Does He want women to be veiled or not? Is he affected by the world, as process theology claims, or is He completely unmoved by what happens on Earth? And how many Gods are there: how does Kastrup know that the Hindus are wrong and there’s only one God?

He doesn’t. He doesn’t know anything about God. And that’s because he has no good evidence that there is a God (the existence of “nature,” of course, is not evidence). Without a tangible object to study, you can’t say anything about it.

Kastrup’s argument fails miserably, I think, though it’s not for want of trying. It’s because, like all such arguments, it’s motivated less by logic than by wish-thinking. The man starts with his conclusion—God exists—and then retrofits the arguments to “demonstrate” that. Like all theology, it’s philosophical creationism.  As Voltaire said,

De plus, l’intérêt que j’ai à croire une chose n’est pas une preuve de l’existence de cette chose.

or, in English:

The interest I have in believing in something is not a proof that the something exists.

Kastrup has a deep interest in believing in God, and his “proof” is simply pulled out of thin air.

His readers’ comments are often funny, and Kastrup wades into the fray and argues with his commenters:

Screen Shot 2014-09-15 at 8.02.45 AM

and

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Sadly, I was unable to ignore this flea, as I had an attack of Maru’s Syndrome. But I won’t fight with Kastrup here; if he wants to reply, he has his own website.

The good news and the bad news

September 14, 2014 • 4:14 pm

While watching the evening newscast, I heard some good news and some bad news.

Bad news first: a quote from P.M. David Cameron on the brutal beheading by ISIS of British aid worker David Haines (quote verified in The Daily News):

“They [ISIS] boast of their brutality. They claim to do this in the name of Islam. That is nonsense. Islam is a religion of peace. They’re not Muslims; they’re monsters.”

Uh huh.  Maybe if these pusillanimous politicians say it often enough, it will become true.

On a happier note, tonight is the premiere of Ken Burns’s new television documentary “The Roosevelts: An Intimate History“:

THE ROOSEVELTS: AN INTIMATE HISTORY chronicles the lives of Theodore, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, three members of the most prominent and influential family in American politics. It is the first time in a major documentary television series that their individual stories have been interwoven into a single narrative  This seven-part, fourteen hour film follows the Roosevelts for more than a century, from Theodore’s birth in 1858 to Eleanor’s death in 1962.

I will definitely be watching this one as the exception to my usual regime of watching only the evening news and, on Sundays, “60 Minutes”. I’ve never seen a bad program by Burns, and I think that his first big venture, “The Civil War,” was the best television documentary ever made.

The Roosevelt show starts on Public Broadcasting Stations in the U.S. at 8 p.m., except for us lucky people in the central time zone, where it starts at 7. Check the link above to find the PBS station in your area.

Two debates on science vs. faith: Craig vs. Caroll and Craig vs. Krauss

August 24, 2014 • 12:58 pm

I’ve been meaning to put these up for a while, but finally got around to it. I haven’t yet watched either debate yet (one is actually supposed a “discussion”), but now I will. Be aware: each debate is about two hours long. They’re worth watching, I hear, because although Craig is an accomplished debater and rhetorically skillful, the scientist on the other side supposedly got the best of him. Watch and judge for yourself.

First, Sean Carroll vs. William Lane Craig on “God and Cosmology”, Greer-Heard Forum of the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, February 9, 2014:

I’m especially proud of Sean for this, as everyone said he mopped the floor with Craig and, after all, Carroll is the Official Website Physicist™. You can see his post-debate reflections, posted on his website, here.

Second, a “discussion” between Lawrence Krauss and William Lane Craig at Adelaide’s City Bible forum, which took place on August 20 of last year. The topic given on the website is “the big questions of Life, the Universe and Nothing.”

h/t: Susan