People who are determinists but are also compatibilists—that is, they believe that our actions are dictated by the laws of physics, and we can’t “will” them beyond that, but that we can still conceive of some form of free will—often justify their re-framing of “free will” on utilitarian grounds. That is, although we may not have “contracausal” free will (the kind that says that, at any given moment, we could have decided to do two or more different things), it’s still important for society to believe in some form of free will, for such a belief acts as an important social glue. Without a belief in agency, these folks say (Dan Dennett is one of them), society will fall apart, as everyone will just lie in bed and do nothing because determinism makes them nihilists. That argument resembles the old Argument from Utility for God; even if there’s no god, it’s good for society to believe in one, for it helps people behave morally. It’s also been called the “Little People” argument: although I know the truth, we need to let the Little People have their belief in contracausal free will.
Both arguments are wrong. Even though we feel and act as if we have contracausal free will, we can still accept rationally that we don’t, and make the social reforms mandated by that realization—especially reform of the judicial system. We don’t need Little People arguments to have a good society.
One of the famous papers used to justify compatibilism was published by Kathleen Vohs and Jonathan Schooler in Psychological Science, “The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating.” But that paper is problematic. Besides its design flaws (i.e., “cheating” was tested shortly after students read passages either promoting or denigrating free will, with no long-term monitoring of behavior), it’s also failed to be replicated at least twice (see here, here and here). And there’s at least one paper showing that accepting determinism makes you more empathic and less vindictive, which isn’t that surprising if you don’t think people are able to “decide’ whether to do good or bad things.
My own view is that while these studies are interesting, we need to concentrate less on testing the effects of free will on people’s views or on confecting new semantic arguments for free will, and more on working out the consequences and implications of determinism for society, for we know that determinism, (or, if you include quantum effects, “naturalism”) happens to be true, and we should accept it and work from there.
But the papers keep coming out. There’s a new one in PNAS by Nathan D. Martin, Davide Rigoni, and Kathleen Vohs (the same Vohs) that examines the effects of believing in free will on attitudes towards unethical acts and the need for “strong punishment”. (Reference and free link below, be sure you have the legal “Unpaywall” extension.)
I’ll try to be brief. Martin et al. used existing data from the World Values Survey, which asks questions not only about free will (the effect of “fate”), but whether certain actions are considered unethical and whether “criminals should be severely punished” (how severely is not specified). They also correlated the results with the nature of the country surveyed (65,111 people were surveyed from 46 countries): was the country one with a high “corruption index”, and was it a democracy? They then did a massive correlational analysis to see what effects various demographic variables, as well as belief in contracausal free will, had on attitudes towards ethics and criminal punishment.
Here are the data, with the left and right sides showing the regression of either intolerance for unethicality (left side) or support for strong criminal punishment (right side) on some variables; the bottom part of the graph (“B”) is better as it takes care of other variables correlated with the two items of interest:

Considering the regression coefficients (β) and the probabilities of getting them by chance alone (those with asterisks are considered statistically significant), you find these main results:
a.) Belief in free will is positively and significantly correlated with both intolerance for unethicality and support for criminal punishment; the association is stronger for the latter. This isn’t surprising: if you think people can choose to behave good or badly, then you would be more prone to pass moral judgment of them (be intolerant of their acts) and support punishment for them. (The authors note from other studies that the punishment is often seen as “retributive”: not to deter others or sequester criminals for “curing” and removal from society, but simply because criminals deserve to be punished because they made the wrong choice.
The regression for disapprobation of unethical acts, is pretty small, and of borderline significance. In fact, factors like gender, age, education, and religion are at least as strong. (As you’d expect, religious belief is positively associated with both disapprobation of unethical acts and calls for severe punishment; that’s likely because the Abrahamic religions are explicitly dualistic, favoring contracausal free will.)
b.) The relationship between belief in free will and support for criminal punishment holds across all societies, but the relationship for “intolerance of unethicality” holds only in countries that have “institutional integrity”—those where corruption is uncommon. Examples of high-integrity societies (determined in other analyses) include Chile, Japan, and Spain; medium-integrity societies are Poland, South Korea, and Trinidad and Tobago; and low-integrity societies are Iran, Moldova, and Rwanda.
Again, this is unsurprising; in all societies, people who accept contracausal free will should call for retributive punishment; but you can understand why those who live in corrupt societies might go a bit easier on those who commit unethical acts, for that’s how you get along there. As the authors note:
Institutional integrity reflects the extent to which countries’ public sectors are free of corruption and maintain strong, transparent governance. Among residents of countries with average to high institutional integrity, stronger free will beliefs predicted stronger intolerance of unethical behavior. However, in countries with widespread corruption and lax governance, whether people slightly or strongly endorsed free will beliefs was decoupled from their attitudes toward unethical action. In these countries, unethical behavior could be attributed to external circumstances or viewed as a rational strategy rather than a reflection of moral character.
c.) The authors construe this as strong support for the Vohs and Schooler paper and its conclusion that belief in free will makes you less likely to cheat. While the present paper doesn’t really say anything about people’s beliefs and tendency to act unethically, it does show a connection between free will and how you judge the behavior of other people. And since it’s based on a huge sample of people from many countries, it shows that a connection between free will and punishment or disapprobation holds pretty widely, especially in societies of “integrity.” I don’t doubt their conclusion, as it would seem to follow naturally from realizing that contracausal free will makes you see other people’s actions as a result of free choice, and thinking that they could have done otherwise.
What’s the upshot? The authors, mercifully, don’t even come close to saying that we should believe in free will because it’s good for society. All they do is point this out:
Belief in free will might seem esoteric, unworthy of scientific study, or academic (in the pejorative sense). It is not. Attesting to its widespread impact, our global analysis found that the more that people endorsed notions supporting free will beliefs, the harsher their attitudes toward wrong-doing and wrong-doers, with one notable exception. For residents of countries with corrupt and ineffectual public sectors, free will beliefs did not bear on judgments of unethical actions but nevertheless predicted preferences that criminals receive harsh punishments. The influence of free will beliefs in people around the world, along with the moderating influence of countries’ institutional integrity, provides evidence that seeing one’s own and others’ actions as reflecting personal choice, accountability, and self-determination can broadly affect moral attitudes and judgments.
Well, I have no problem with that; it’s a statement of fact. But what you do with that fact is disputable. Seeing that the “free will” associated with moral judgment is true contracausal free will, we already know that that belief is simply wrong. And I feel that basing social policy on something that’s known to be wrong is, in the long run, bad.
Naturalism and physical causation of behavior are true, and we must accept that. When we do, then we can deal with its supposed inimical effects. I for one think that a view of determinism (or naturalism) behind people’s behavior will be good for societies in the long run. I’m a naturalist and determinist, and I don’t lie in bed every day wondering what is the point of getting up. And yes, I feel as if I make free choices. But in my heart (or brain) I know that I don’t. This realization, to me, is one that can have immense and salubrious effects on the criminal justice system, and Robert Sapolsky, who’s way smarter than I, agrees. But I’ve already discussed that, and won’t go into it here.
h/t: Karl
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Martin, N. D., D. Rigoni, and K. D. Vohs. 2017. Free will beliefs predict attitudes toward unethical behavior and criminal punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114:7325-7330.