Sam Harris is widely demonized by the know-nothings, and I’m not quite sure why. Yes, he discussed the possibility of torture in certain circumstance, but this was a philosophical rumination which is perfectly justifiable if you have a utilitarian or consequentialist view of ethics, and in fact a similar discussion appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. His view are speculative and nuanced, and he thinks the torture by the American government should remain illegal. Nevertheless, over and over again I’ve seen him damned for advocating willy-nilly torture, as if he were some kind of latter-day Josef-Mengele.  And that is what I’ve seen people emphasize, though Sam has also discussed the possibility of American preemptive nuclear strikes, the nature of Islam (he’s been deemed an “Islamophobe”), and for profiling groups of people for airline security. That has been more fodder for going after him, though people always neglect the nuance.

I myself have criticized his position on “objective morality,” but that would never make me dismiss Sam, as his writings are always measured and thoughtful—and largely philosophical. They promote thought, and that is, after all, the goal of philosophy. But I guess when an avowed atheist dips into philosophy, he’s almost automatically damned.  So be it; I will continue to read him.

Yesterday Sam posted his views about our war with Iran, and his overall take is summarized in the title of this post. You can read his discussion by clicking on the link below, or reading the the piece archived here.

I think the moral confusion about the war, which I see as the conflict between feeling it’s a just war and the despair at the rationalizations for the war by our administration and Trump’s repeated lies about what’s going on and what he intends to do—all of this is the cause for the increasing anomie many of us feel about our engagement, as well as for the widespread opposition to the war by Americans. As Sam says, “To think clearly about this war, we need to hold two sets of ideas in our minds at the same moment: the Iranian regime is evil, and the Trump administration is dangerously amoral, corrupt, and incompetent.”

I’ll give a few quotes from Sam (indented). Text that is flush left is mine, as are the bold headings:

Why it’s a morally just war

The Islamic Republic has tormented its own people for forty-seven years. It has hanged dissidents from cranes, crushed peaceful protests with live ammunition, tortured political prisoners, and funded jihadist proxies throughout the Middle East and beyond. When Salman Rushdie was nearly killed by a knife-wielding fanatic, after living for thirty-three years under the shadow of the Ayatollah’s imbecilic curse, this was a direct export from the theocracy in Tehran—which has grown increasingly unpopular with the Iranian people. The protests of 2025 and 2026 reminded the world, yet again, of the Iranian majority’s desperation to be free. The assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei on the first day of this war was greeted with celebrations in Tehran, Isfahan, and among the Iranian diaspora in Los Angeles and New York. Whatever else one thinks about the decision to strike Iran, it is obscene to pretend that there was no moral or pragmatic argument for doing so.

Note that a credible figure for civilians killed by the Iranian regime for protesting is 30,000+.  The regime apprehends political prisoners for protesting the war, including the families of protestors, and tries to assassinate critics of the regime even when they are overseas (e.g., Masih Alinejad).  There’s no doubt that the Iranian people, overall, want to acquire the freedoms they had before the Revolution. All this, and the determination of Iran to export terrorism throughout the Middle East, makes this a just war.

The lame criticism of this war. (Sam sees this as a failure to recognize moral evil (or recognizing it and ignoring it), as he did when he wrote about the Gaza War)

And yet, most critics of the war speak as though Iran was a peaceful nation attacked by foreign aggressors. Notions of “sovereignty” and “international law” are invoked as though the Islamic Republic were Sweden. Almost no prominent critic of this war has anything cogent to say about the decades of misery the mullahs have inflicted on their own citizens, the threat that Iran’s network of proxy militias poses to the entire region, or the inconceivability of establishing deterrence once a jihadist death cult acquires nuclear weapons. If your opposition to this war cannot acknowledge the evil we are facing, your opposition is not morally sane.

I’ll add to this something that Sam takes up later: some of the motivation for criticizing this war comes from the fact that we’re allies with Israel, seen as a settler-colonialist and evil apartheid regime,and of course a Jewish state.

The justified criticism of this war.

But there is a serious case to be made against this war. One might believe, along with Damon Linker, that the risk of Iran becoming a failed state—a larger, more dangerous version of post-invasion Iraq—far outweighs the benefits of toppling the regime today. One could point to the apparent absence of a credible plan for what comes next, or to the fact that three weeks of bombardment haven’t produced anything resembling the “unconditional surrender” that Trump once demanded. Iranian state media has reported that the conflict has already killed more than 1,500 people, including over 200 children. Whatever the actual numbers, there can be no doubt that the humanitarian toll is real and mounting. These are intelligible concerns, and they deserve to be taken seriously.

But this is not the argument that most opponents of this war are making. They are making a much lazier set of claims—and often treating any American use of force as inherently unjust. Most critics are simply ignoring the question of what the world should do about a jihadist regime that has spent decades aspiring to commit genocide, views any peace as a temporary interval in which to gain the upper hand, and happens to be on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons.

Admittedly, it is difficult to separate the ethics of destroying the Iranian regime, and seeking to liberate the Iranian people, from the staggering incompetence and callousness of the reality-television stars who are now sit atop our vast machinery of war and wield it for no clearly stated purpose.

Sam then recounts a lot of Trump’s lies (or confusions), including his back-and-forth on whether we’ve destroyed the regime and its nuclear program, whether or not he’ll demand “unconditional surrender”, his failure to include Congress in his deliberations, and his failure to prepare the American people for the conflict.  This leads to feelings of both anomie and impotence:

Congressional Democrats now face the agonizing reality that they cannot stop a war that is already underway—the question is whether they can impose constitutional oversight on an administration that started it without asking anyone’s permission.

How the war increased antisemitism

I think we all know that antisemitism is now a tenacious termite in Western democracies. Though not ubiquitous, we see it growing in America, in Canada, in Europe, and in Australia.  I’m not sure whether the conflict with Iran has actually increased it, or simply given antisemites an excuse to parade their views more openly. Sam blames Trump for his incompetence that has created an explanatory vacuum that’s fbeen filled with Jew-hating.

Finally, all of this bluster, confusion, dishonesty, and strategic incoherence has been a gift to the world’s antisemites. In the three weeks since the war began, antisemitic incidents worldwide have spiked by 34 percent. The resignation of Joe Kent, former director of the National Counterterrorism Center—who blamed “high-ranking Israeli officials and influential members of the American media” for encouraging the conflict—gave mainstream respectability to the conspiracy theory that most of our wars are fought at the behest of perfidious Jews. Far-right figures have seized on the joint U.S.-Israeli operation to push the narrative that American soldiers are dying for a foreign power. And the antiwar Left, rather than reject this framing, has amplified it. While the similarities between the far Right and the far Left may be overstated, for the Jews, “horseshoe theory” is now a daily reality.

And Trump’s chaotic messaging bears much of the blame. When a president cannot clearly articulate why his country has gone to war, he leaves a vacuum that conspiracy theories will fill. A competent leader would have made the case for this war on its merits—the destruction of a terroristic theocracy’s military infrastructure, the elimination of its nuclear program, the liberation of 88 million people from a regime that jails and tortures women for the crime of uncovering their hair. Instead, Trump has offered a jumble of contradictions: Iran’s military is destroyed, but we need more troops; the war is almost over, but we may yet put boots on the ground; Iran wants to talk, but there is no one to talk to. This moral and logical void has become a vessel for antisemitic paranoia on both the Right and the Left. Needless to say, it doesn’t help that Trump and his family have been accepting personal gifts and payments from the Gulf states—a plane from Qatar, secretive investments from the UAE—while American forces protect those same regimes. The man is simultaneously waging a war of choice and running what appears to be an extortion racket.

The resultant ambivalence.

I think the first paragraph below, which involves us believing things that seem at odds with each other, explains at least for my ambivalence about the war.  A nutjob is in charge, someone who continually contradicts himself and acts on impulse, and yet he’s in charge of a just war.

It is possible, even necessary, to believe all of the following at once: the Iranian regime is a monstrosity that should be destroyed; the Iranian people deserve to be free; the risk that this war will end in catastrophe is real, largely because of the character of those who are waging it; and the rising tide of antisemitism that this conflict has unleashed is yet another moral emergency that people on both sides of the debate have a responsibility to confront.

The tragedy of this moment is that the right war is being waged by the wrong people, for the wrong reasons. And the opponents of the war, rather than making this case, have mostly opted for blinkered pacifism and conspiracy theories, while refusing to grapple with the manifest evil of the Iranian regime. Of course, the Iranian people, caught between their own tyrants, a reckless American president, and his feckless critics, will pay the heaviest price.

Several readers astutely mentioned in comments on today’s Hili Dialogue that a primary goal of the American attack on Iran wasn’t to democratize the country, but to remove Iran as a Chinese proxy.  As Haviv Rettig Gur, a journalist who writes for the Times of Israel, argues in the piece given below, a mutualistic relationship between Iran and China has developed, with Iran providing China with cheap oil that allows the People’s Republic to build a strategic petroleum reserve (nobody else will buy that oil), and China providing Iran with missiles and sophisticated weapons to go after Israel and the West. As Gur says:

Iran is to America what Hezbollah is to Israel—the smaller second-front proxy you have to take out to have a clean shot at the main foe later on.

This is also why President Trump seems to be pursuing a strange sort of regime change—something very different from what George W. Bush or the neocons meant by the term. Trump doesn’t care one whit about democratization, or, as Venezuela showed us, about changing any element of a regime that doesn’t stand in America’s way. He’s interested in regime change in Iran only because it is fundamentally, in its founding theology, unswervingly anti-American. It is thus not swayable from the Chinese orbit by any other means.

He doesn’t need a democratic Iran, he just needs a not-anti-American Iran.

Why are we so worried about China? Because, says Gur, a potential conflict with China is in the offing—over Taiwan:

The picture that emerges from all of this is of a Chinese forward base, a linchpin of the country’s naval architecture; cyber efforts; an economic Belt and Road influence program—every element of Chinese power projection and empire-building—positioned at the throat of the global oil supply, armed with weapons designed to penetrate advanced American defenses and kill American sailors, and embedded in a strategic architecture whose explicit purpose is to constrain American military freedom in any future conflict over Taiwan.

When Iran began to look like that, it stopped being Israel’s problem and became America’s.

Click below to read, but only if you have a subscription to TFP.  They don’t allow their articles to be archived.

Gur begins by noting that this is not one war but two: America’s on the one hand and Israel on the other, with Israel having existential worries as opposed to America’s concern with China:

. . . across the world, from Brazil to Beijing, London to Karachi, the argument is the same: America is fighting Israel’s war.

But this isn’t true. And the confusion matters, because if you misread what this war is actually about, you will misread everything that follows.

This is not a war about Israel. This is not a war for Israel’s sake. Israel is a beneficiary, a capable and willing local partner, but it is not the reason America is in this fight. America is playing a much bigger game, about more than what happens in the Middle East. The subtext, that Israel exercises outsize influence or “drags Americans into wars they don’t want,” borders on the conspiratorial.

This isn’t one war, but two. There is a regional chessboard, on which Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the other Gulf states all play. Iran’s proxies, its drones and ballistic missiles, its nuclear ambitions, its funding of Hezbollah and the Houthis: All of that belongs primarily to this smaller game. Israel has always understood this board. So have the Saudis. So has everyone in the neighborhood.

But there is a second chessboard, vastly larger, on which the United States and China are the primary players. On this board, the central question of the next 30 years is being worked out: whether the American-led global order survives, or whether China displaces it. Every significant American foreign policy decision, from the pivot to Asia to the tariff wars to the posture in the Pacific, is ultimately a move on this board.

Of course dodos like me (I never claimed to be a pundit) have missed all this, but Gur gives reasons why the U.S. decided to attack now (remember that China has said it will go after Taiwan within seven years):

. . . Reports emerged in late February of a near-finalized deal to supply Iran with supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles capable of speeds exceeding Mach 3 and engineered to evade the Aegis defense systems deployed on American carrier strike groups. China was replacing Iranian government and military software with closed Chinese systems, hardening Iran against CIA and Mossad cyber operations. Joint naval exercises between China, Russia, and Iran in the Straits of Hormuz were becoming regular events, building real-time operational familiarity between the three navies. Iran had switched from the GPS system to the Chinese BeiDou system. And Iran was providing China with the port at Jask, as part of China’s “string of pearls” base system in the Indian Ocean.

The picture that emerges from all of this is of a Chinese forward base, a linchpin of the country’s naval architecture; cyber efforts; an economic Belt and Road influence program—every element of Chinese power projection and empire-building—positioned at the throat of the global oil supply, armed with weapons designed to penetrate advanced American defenses and kill American sailors, and embedded in a strategic architecture whose explicit purpose is to constrain American military freedom in any future conflict over Taiwan.

Gur adds that the U.S. has had a hard time articulating this, but I can understand why they would not want to, even if that articulation would lessen America’s opposition to the war (more than 50%).  But it wouldn’t, since the American public doesn’t think much about China.

Now the first thing I asked myself why I saw Gur’s thesis was this: What is the evidence that this is the real American strategy?  Here is what counts as evidence:

The Americans went to war together with the Israelis because that’s the best way to fight a war like this. Having a capable and loyal local ally willing to deal damage and absorb blowback lowers the costs to America and increases the chances of success. If America ever finds itself in a kinetic fight with China, it presumably expects Japan and Taiwan and South Korea to play a similar role in the fighting. It’s one hell of an operational advantage.

To Gur, the targets give away Trump’s intentions:

. . .In the first 24 hours of the war, American strikes, as confirmed by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), focused on Iranian naval vessels, submarines, ports, and anti-ship missile positions along the southern coast. The port of Bandar Abbas, headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, was hit. So was Jask, which China had hoped would become a permanent naval foothold on the Indian Ocean. Isfahan and Tabriz, hubs of ballistic missile production and drone assembly, were struck. The goal, explicitly stated by American officials, was not merely to degrade existing stockpiles but to destroy the industrial base from which those weapons are produced, so that China cannot spend the next few years quietly rebuilding it.

President Trump announced the operation in terms that could not have been more direct, explicitly mentioning all those elements of Iranian power—the navy, the missile production sites—that would serve as that second front in a war with China.

Many of these targets so central to CENTCOM’s efforts are no threat whatsoever to Israel.

So far from China: crickets. It’s been silent and has left Iran hanging. In truth, there’s little that China can do save join the war itself—and it’s clearly not keen to do that. As for Trump’s notable omission of words about freeing the Iranian people, or creating a democracy in Iran, Gur says “He doesn’t need a democratic Iran, he just needs a not-anti-American Iran.” Finally, as to why the U.S. has remained mum about what are supposedly its real goals, Gur says this:

So why can’t Secretary Rubio say it? Why hem and haw and offer half-hearted non-explanations to a question that has set the conservative movement aflame?

One obvious answer: They don’t want to push the Chinese to more overt responses. One should always give one’s enemy an excuse not to respond in kind, on the off chance that they don’t want to. It’s a sensible ambiguity on the world stage, but it’s causing damage at home. It may be time for the administration to speak clearly on its grand strategy—not in policy papers, but in clearly articulated statements that actually answer the good-faith questions of a great many Americans.

America went to war in Iran because Iran made itself a Chinese weapon. It didn’t need to do this, to invest so much of the administration’s political capital and of the military’s firepower, just to shore up a second-run Israeli operation. This isn’t about Israel. Iran has been a growing threat to Israel for decades, and yet Trump has always resisted intervening.

As I said, I’m no pundit, and although this all sounds plausible, it hasn’t convinced me completely. Gur makes a good argument, and one that several readers agree with. Perhaps they’re right, and if so kudos to them. But I’m depressed at the thought that if Gur is right, Trump doesn’t give a fig for freeing the beleaguered Iranian people, or about creating a democratic regime. The Iranian people are hoping for that, and perhaps we’re deceiving them.

And if we ever go to war with China, Ceiling Cat help us all!

This is just a short update on the news, as I presume everyone with an interest in this conflict is following what is happening today. Below is the headline in the NYT; click on the screenshot to read or find the article archived here:

Of coure you wonder how Trump knew that. An excerpt:

President Trump announced on Saturday that the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran had killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the nation’s supreme leader for almost 37 years and an implacable enemy of Israel and the United States, in a potentially seismic political shift in Tehran and the broader region.

“Khamenei, one of the most evil people in History, is dead,” Mr. Trump wrote on Truth Social.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel had said earlier that there were “many indications” that Ayatollah Khamenei was dead, but stopped short of making a definitive statement.

There was no immediate confirmation from the Iranian government. Earlier in the day Iranian officials had dismissed such claims as bravado or psychological warfare. Later the ayatollah’s official account on X later posted an image rich with Shia religious symbolism, of a faceless clerical figure holding a flaming sword.

It was not immediately clear which country’s forces had killed Ayatollah Khamenei, but either way, the action exhibited a high degree of coordination between the United States and Israel. Israel’s military said it had targeted a gathering of senior Iranian officials in the opening strikes. Satellite imagery showed a plume of smoke and extensive damage at the supreme leader’s high-security compound.

Mr. Trump and Mr. Netanyahu both made clear that regime change was a goal of the massive waves of strikes on Iran that began around 1 a.m. local time Saturday.

But it is uncertain whether removing Ayatollah Khamenei, who was 86, would result in significant changes to the system he led, as many people in authority owed their positions to him.

The power to choose a new supreme leader rests with the Assembly of Experts, a conservative body of clerics who, given Ayatollah Khamenei’s age and infirmities, have likely given ample thought to potential successors.

In retaliation for the Israeli-U. S. attack, Iran fired waves of ballistic missiles at Israel, while the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait — all of which host U.S. military bases — said they had come under attack, as did Jordan.

So it is not definitive, but surely Israel has spies in Iran that could provide some confirmation. Eventually Iran will have to announce it.

So far there ha been little damage to the countries Iran attacked, and not one death in Israel.

Will there be regime change? I have no idea; it is foolish to predict such a thing so early in the conflict.  Perhaps the U.S. could find an amenable leader in the current regime to do its bidding, as it has in Venezuela, but that seems unlikely: all the rulers are, as it says, conservative theocrats. And the government has all the soldiers and weapons while the people have none.

Every day will tell a new story, but the critics of the attacks are predictable: most Democrats (save the rogue Fetterman) and the mainstream media (save Bret Stephens at the NYT).  We will know if the attack was a good thing only in retrospect.