Two new articles on genocide

November 22, 2026 • 10:00 am

There are two new posts on genocide and its meaning, one at the website of the journalist Gerald Posner, and the other by federal judge Roy K. Altman at the Free Press. I’ll highlight the former but give links and extracts from both.  The two articles are somewhat similar in arguing that Israel did not commit genocide in Gaza, but Altman’s makes the additional point that the new ruling by the UN’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Myanmar for genocide on the Rohingya may have deliberately tried to change the definition of “genocide” in a way that would make Israel guilty of it in a future ICJ ruling.  But both articles show why that, according to the UN’s own definition of genocide, what happened in Gaza is not an instance of it.

First, the “legal” definition of genocide as set out by the United Nations.  There are two documents, the first, UN Doc. E/447 from 1947, can be downloaded here.

The second is a shortened and refined version of the first document that was issued by the UN in 1948. You can click on the screenshot below to see it;  Article 2 is the relevant definition.

Article II:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Finally, note that on p. 23 of the 1947 document you find these words. Remember, this comes from the UN’s own document, and remember too that the ICJ is the UN’s organ, and is supposed to use the UN’s definition and its construal when making rulings.

Since the argument for Israeli “genocide” in Gaza often depends heavily on the “disproportionate” number of noncombatants killed by the IDF, it’s important to realize that the UN itself has emphasized that the criterion for genocide is not “heavy losses” but the acts in Article 2 that are “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” (But remember that the noncombatant Palestinians killed/combatants killed ratio is about 2:1 or 3:1—much lower that the ratio of modern warfare and, especially, modern urban warfare.)

In earlier posts I’ve lauded Maarten Boudry for his demolition of the Israeli “genocide” argument in a Substack post called “They don’t believe it either” (a longer version of his Quillette article), so perhaps you don’t need to read the dissections below.  But all three together make a good package for refuting the gazillions of people who proclaim, in their ignorance, that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza.  If you have the time, read all three, but since the Free Press piece is paywalled, I’ve given a long excerpt (please forgive me, FP), you might limit yourself to Posner and Boudry.

Click headline to read:

Some excerpts (indented). My comments are flush left. First, about the definition:

Article II is the whole ballgame — one sentence that has been parsed in courtrooms for seventy years. Genocide means any of five acts — killing members of a group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group, preventing births, forcibly transferring children — committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

Everything hinges on those last words. Lawyers call it dolus specialis — special intent. The bottom line is that it is not enough to kill a great many people from one group. It is not enough to kill them carelessly, disproportionately, or unlawfully. You must kill them because of what they are, with the object of erasing the group.

And there is a second requirement people skip past, which is where nearly every public argument about Gaza goes off the rails. When intent is inferred from a pattern of conduct rather than proven by an order or a plan, the International Court of Justice has held — in Bosnia v. Serbia in 2007 and Croatia v. Serbia in 2015 — that the inference of genocidal intent must be the only reasonable inference available.

Not the most emotionally satisfying one. There is no vote for what majority prefers. It must be the only one available. If another reasonable explanation for the pattern exists, the charge fails. That is not an Israeli talking point. It is black-letter international law, and it exists for a reason: to keep the gravest crime in the legal canon from collapsing into a synonym for “war I find abhorrent.”

Posner then lists a few genocides that did conform to the UN’s definition in Article 2. These include the Holocaust, the 1994 slaughter of the Tutsis in Rwanda by the Hutu, the slaughter of Bosnian Muslim men and boys (8,000 of them) by Bosnian Serbs, and the killing of Cham Muslims and ethnic Vietnamese by the Khmer Rouge in the “killing fields.” In the last case, the ICJ ruled that only the killing of those two groups was a genocide. Many, many additional Cambodians were killed by the Khmer Rouge, but the ICJ determined that those killings did not constitute a genocide because they were not singled out because of their nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion. (The UN deliberately omitted political parties or social classes from the definition of genocide.)

Posner moves on to the case of Gaza, and, giving examples that many of us know about, including the IDF’s warnings of attacks, provision of humanitarian corridors and polio vaccine, negotiations with Hamas, and its ability to wipe out all Palestinians but not having done so—all these things showed that the intent of Israel was not to destroy all Palestinians, but to destroy an enemy that embedded itself within Palestinian civil society: Hamas. As Posnber says,

Genocide requires intent to destroy a protected group as such — national, ethnic, racial, religious. Not a government or army or a political movement. That is why the Khmer Rouge, who killed a quarter of Cambodia, were convicted of genocide only as to the Cham and the Vietnamese. So, the threshold question in Gaza is whether the belligerent Israel is fighting is Hamas or the Palestinian people. Most of Israel’s own conduct supports the former inference.

. . .This is the distinction the chant of genocide obliterates. There is an enormous legal and moral difference between a state that fights a war brutally, and one that sets out to eliminate a people. The first describes a great many wars, including wars fought by countries whose citizens are now doing the chanting. The second describes a small handful of adjudicated cases in the modern era, and Gaza does not fit their pattern.

The Battle of Mosul in 2016 and 2017 produced devastation — a city largely destroyed, thousands of civilians killed, an enemy entrenched in residential blocks — and no serious legal analysis called it genocide. The difference was not the destruction. It was the enemy.

Fighting Hamas in Gaza kills Palestinians. That is a fact, and I am not going to soften it with a euphemism. But killing Palestinians while fighting Hamas and killing Palestinians in order to destroy Palestinians are different acts with different names, and the entire architecture of international criminal law rests on keeping them apart.

As Boudry did in his article, Posner points out that some angry statements made by Israeli politicians and generals do no establish that the IDF committed genocide, for proving that charge demands what the IDF actually did, and what they did NOT do was try to destroy all Palestinians. I am baffled by that charge as it is so arrantly false.

Further, when civilians are killed during attacks on the enemy, Posner notes that if there is a non-genocidal “reasonable alternative” explanation, like accidentally killing noncombatants while targeting combatants, that does not buttress a charge of genocide. At the end, Posner lays out what would convince him that Israel did commit genocide:

So here is my falsifiable standard, offered to my neighbor and to anyone else. Show me direct evidence of intent to destroy Palestinians as such — whether through explicit statements of policy, a pattern of conduct from which destruction is the only reasonable inference surviving contact with the alternative explanation, or both. Show me that the alternative explanation — a brutal war against an armed enemy embedded in a civilian population — has been considered and eliminated rather than simply wished away. Show me a competent tribunal that has weighed adversarial evidence, with a defense in the room, and returned that verdict.

Bring me those and I will write the correction myself, under my own name.

Until then, understand what you are doing when you repeat the word as though it were a talisman that turns Israelis into modern-day Nazis. You are not making an argument. You are casting a spell — and hoping that if enough people say the word, it will become true.

It doesn’t work that way. It never has.

When somebody tosses around the g-word with respect to Israel (and of course they never mention Hamas’s truly genocidal acts), unless they know all this stuff they are not worth listening to or arguing with.

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The second article is from the Free Press, “How the campaign against Israel rewrote the law against genocide.”  Click headline to read—if you subscribe. The description notes that author Roy K. Altman is:

. . . a federal judge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida [and] the author of the recently released New York Times bestseller Israel on Trial: Examining the History, the Evidence, and the Law. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and are offered only in his individual, not judicial, capacity.

The article is paywalled, so I give a long excerpt below that makes two major points. First, it echoes Posner by rebutting the claim that Israel committed genocide, and second, it goes on to argue that the ICJ’s ruling in the case of Myanmar appears to have tried to change the very definition of genocide so as to convict Israel when the ICJ gets around to that ruling in a decade or so. First, why Gaza wasn’t a genocide according to the UN’s definition:

As to intent, the UN’s Genocide Convention requires proof that the accused had the “specific intent” to “destroy” the victimized group “in whole or in part.” On burden, the ICJ has said that proof of genocidal intent can either be explicit—as, for instance, in the Holocaust, where the order to exterminate Europe’s Jews was issued expressly by high-ranking Nazis at the Wannsee Conference—or it can be inferred. But the circumstances in which the court will infer genocidal intent, the ICJ has made clear, are very narrow: Genocidal intent, the court has said, can be inferred if it’s the only reasonable inference one can draw from the accused’s conduct—and the quantum of proof in these circumstances, the court has added, must be “fully conclusive.” Turning again to the Holocaust, think of the gas vans and mass firing squads the Nazis deployed—nearly 34,000 Jews lined up and murdered in two days at Babi Yar alone—and the gas chambers that exterminated millions more in death camps serviced by trains that delivered Jews from across Europe to death factories that operated around the clock. On the other hand, Allied bombing raids on German cities, carried out to achieve military objectives in a war against a brutal enemy, wouldn’t qualify as genocide—though they certainly attest to the fact that “war is hell.”

Proving a genocide, in short, is very hard—especially in the unique context of an urban war. As John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at West Point, has written, the average combatant-to-civilian kill ratio in the context of modern warfare is one to nine (one combatant for every nine civilians). Although that’s a staggering (and tragic) figure, no one seriously believes that every conflict in recent history has been a genocide. On the contrary, Myanmar is the first country the ICJ has ever found guilty of genocide. According to Spencer, the United States and our allies set the “standard” in Iraq and Afghanistan with a kill ratio of about one to three (or four). And many urban-warfare experts believed that no army would meet that standard again—until now. In arguably more difficult circumstances—with Hamas embedding its military infrastructure within and underneath the civilian population of Gaza—Israel has a kill ratio of about one to one (or two), slashing by more than 50 percent the standard we set in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Israel is guilty of genocide, in other words, then virtually every war in modern history has been a genocide.

This did not prevent South Africa from accusing Israel at the ICJ of committing genocide in its war against Hamas—a terrorist organization whose founding charter explicitly called for genocide against the Jews—which was armed, trained, and funded by the Islamic Republic of Iran, a country that expressly calls for wiping Israel and America off the map. The problem for South Africa was finding the evidence that fit the court’s well-established definition of genocide. As hundreds of military and international-law experts have written, Israel went to tremendous lengths—even at the risk of sacrificing its own soldiers—to protect the civilian population of Gaza. After the October 7, 2023, invasion, in which Palestinian militants killed 1,200 people, raped dozens of women, and took 251 hostages, Israel declared its twin war aims: to destroy Hamas’s capacity to threaten Israel and to return the hostages. Throughout the war, Israel’s war cabinet reiterated these legitimate and lawful war aims and repeatedly instructed its officers to follow international law by distinguishing between combatants and civilians.

And that admonition was heeded. As the High Level Military Group, a collection of officers and leaders from across the Western world, has written, Israel deployed what may be the most sophisticated and pervasive civilian-warning system the world has ever seen. And when it became clear that Hamas was forcing fleeing civilians to reenter the battlefield in order to increase the number of civilian casualties, Israel created humanitarian corridors, often guarded by Israeli soldiers, to allow Palestinian civilians to flee safely. Israel thus put its own soldiers in harm’s way to protect Palestinian civilians from other Palestinians. That’s the very opposite of genocide.

On the Myanmar ICJ case:

Which brings us back to the outsize interest in the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar. The overwhelming evidence that Israel has not committed genocide in Gaza has led some voices in the anti-Israel camp to grumble that the genocide case against Israel may be dead on arrival. Some believe that South Africa begged the ICJ for an 18-month extension of its next filing deadline—a request the court granted—precisely so that it might find, over the next few years, the evidence of genocide it has been sorely missing. Those hopes have now also dimmed, as Israel has compiled footage of dozens of strikes against legitimate military targets its pilots and commanders canceled because of a concern for civilian safety. This, again, is the very opposite of genocide. Did the German army employ a sophisticated, army-wide program to warn Jewish civilians to get out of the gas chambers? Did German firing squads hold their fire out of concern for civilian casualties? To ask these absurd questions is to answer them.

But Amnesty had a plan: The ICJ, it proposed, should change the definition of genocide to make it easier to find Israel guilty. In recent months, the chorus of countries and NGOs demanding this change has grown almost exponentially. Never mind that this would violate the animating principle of the Western tradition—which is that everyone is equal under the law, a principle that finds notable expression in the commonsense notion that a word (like genocide) must mean the same thing for the Jewish state as for everyone else.

What the ICJ did in its ruling:

. . .First, it inferred that the evidence of genocidal intent against Myanmar was “fully conclusive”—and that it constitutes the “only reasonable inference”—even though a staggering six of its 15 members dissented, a rarity for a court that often seeks consensus.

Second, the court diluted the only-reasonable-inference standard almost to the point of obsolescence by considering a balance of new factors that, on the one hand, it had excluded from consideration in prior cases and that, on the other, will make it easier for judges to find genocidal intent whenever they want to. Take, for instance, this new factor: “acts that violate the foundations of the Rohingya group.” Whatever this phrase means—and I, for one, have no idea—it’s certainly, as the Myanmar dissenters put it, “of such a high degree of generality and vagueness that it permits sweeping inferences of genocidal intent to be drawn . . . without a sufficiently rigorous explanation.” And then there’s the court’s reliance on “the general context,” which—as the dissent correctly observed—“leads to a holistic assessment that is, in reality, so indeterminate that it borders on arbitrariness.”

Third, the court tossed aside decades of jurisprudence, in which it had narrowly interpreted the word destroy to mean only “physical” destruction (mass killing) or “biological” destruction (the widespread elimination of a group’s reproductive capacity such that its “survival is no longer ensured”). It will now allow genocidal intent to be inferred from the unfortunate realities all wars present—including “the dispersal of at least a part of [a] group,” evidence of discrimination and expulsion, and evidence of the destruction of the “foundations” of the group’s social life. “The result,” as the dissent explained, “is a blurring of the boundary”—a boundary the ICJ had carefully patrolled over many decades—“between genocide and other [non-genocide] crimes under international law.”

More fundamentally, this significant revision to the genocide definition violates three foundational precepts of our legal tradition.

One, it eviscerates the widely held view that, in the process of interpretation, courts should give words their common, everyday meaning. However one might feel about the new acts the Myanmar court stuffed into its definition of destroy, I haven’t found a dictionary that defines destroy to mean “expel,” “discriminate against,” or “disperse.” Changing the definitions of words to suit one’s ideological objectives is just not how courts are supposed to operate.

Two, for the vast majority of countries that signed the Genocide Convention on the justifiable understanding that the crime of genocide involved only the “destruction” of a people, to what extent can we really say that any of them “consented” to the court’s jurisdiction over lesser, different crimes (like discrimination and dispersal)?

Three, this fundamental alteration in the nature of the crime of genocide will make it possible for the court to find countries guilty of this worst of all crimes by pointing to conduct that was not illegal, at least not under the Genocide Convention, when they engaged in it. This danger of being punished after the fact for conduct that was legal when you engaged in it was so offensive to our American sense of ordered liberty that we even included clauses prohibiting it in our Constitution (the ex post facto clauses).

I haven’t read the ruling, so if you have and want to argue this second point, feel free to do so. Finally, though I think the case that Israel did not commit genocide under the UN’s own rule is airtight, it’s telling that people who nevertheless argue for such a genocide never seem to get around to saying that Hamas actually did commit genocide: targeting Jews because they were Jews.  That is what the intifadas were about. Now why, do you think, Amnesty International, and many others, want to find Israel guilty of genocide but are silent on the intentions and acts of Hamas?

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