In the new issue of the Los Angeles Review of Books (link below), Peter Harrison, in a piece called “From conflict to dialogue and all the way back“, purports to review Yves Gingras’s recent book on science and religion, a book whose thesis is that no useful dialogue is possible between science and religion.
Harrison is described by Wikipedia as “an Australian Laureate Fellow and Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Queensland.”
Rather than taking for granted a dialogue between science and religion, Yves Gingras argues that such a dialogue is impossible, and that conflict is inevitable. @uqpharri writes: https://t.co/jsUu7jSKS2 pic.twitter.com/cJlZf9zhg5
— LA Review of Books (LARB) (@LAReviewofBooks) December 27, 2017
Harrison doesn’t like the book (though he damns it with faint praise at the end of his piece) for three reasons.
First, he appears to hold the Gouldian view that science and religion cannot be in conflict because they deal with different areas of inquiry (Gould saw religion as the bailiwick of morality, science as the study of the natural universe). He quotes for instance the arrogant and obscurantist Terry Eagleton, a prime specimen of the Sophisticated Theologian™:
TERRY EAGLETON once remarked that regarding religion as an attempt to offer a scientific explanation of the world is rather like seeing ballet as a botched attempt to run for a bus. Eagleton gestures toward a confusion that often afflicts those who advocate for an essential conflict between science and religion — the assumption that the two enterprises are competing for the same explanatory territory. Were this to be true, conflict between them would indeed be pretty much inevitable. An alternative view holds science and religion to be essentially independent operations, concerned with quite different questions. On this model, conflict is unlikely. Equally, dialogue would be unnecessary, perhaps even impossible? [JAC: Harrison never tells us, given his view that science and religion aren’t in conflict, what such a dialogue would consist of, or even if he approves of one!]
As I show at great length in Faith Versus Fact, religion does indeed make truth claims, some of which (efficacy of prayer, existence of Jesus, existence of a soul, etc.) are either directly or in principle testable empirically. Moreover, many religious scientists and science-friendly theologians, including Francis Collins, Karl Giberson, and Ian Barbour, have at least had the intellectual honesty to admit that many religions, including the Abrahamic ones, are at bottom founded on truth claims. I quote:
A religious tradition is indeed a way of life and not a set of abstract ideas. But a way of life presupposes beliefs about the nature of reality and cannot be sustained if those beliefs are no longer credible. —Ian Barbour
Likewise, religion in almost all of its manifestations is morethan just a collection of value judgments and moral directives. Religion often makes claims about ‘the way things are.’
—Karl Giberson and Francis Collins
If you don’t like those, how about the Bible?
If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your Faith is also vain. —1 Corinthians 15:14
You can hardly call yourself a Christian if you don’t think Jesus was the son of God, part man and part divine, and died and was resurrected to expiate our sins. If you don’t think an angel dictated God’s words to Muhammad to create the Qur’an, you’re hardly a Muslim.
I won’t go on here, but see Faith Versus Fact for the list of empirical claims made by religion. As I note there, the biggest opponents of the “separate magisteria” argument aren’t scientists but theologians, who dislike Gould’s claim that religion makes no factual claims about the world.
On this issue, both Eagleton and Harrison are wrong. If you disagree with me, look at the continuing and long-standing battle in America and other places (including Muslim countries) between scientists and creationists. This battle deals entirely with empirical claims about biology and origins, is motivated solely by religious dislike of evolution, and is a prime example of the “conflict hypothesis” in action: a battle lost by creationists on empirical grounds. I’ll add here the insistence of the Catholic Church that Adam and Eve were literally the ancestors of all of us, a claim that, says the Church, cannot be contradicted. Yet science has disproven that claim. And we’ve seen no evidence for a soul that enters us at conception, whatever that soul may be.
It is this duel of empirical claims that has indeed created a conflict between science and religion. That conflict is exacerbated because only science, and not religion, has ways of proving its own claims wrong. Most Abrahamic believers, I think, can envision no evidence that would make them change their minds about their factual claims. One well known person, whose name I can’t recall (see FvF), argued that even if a camera in Jesus’s tomb showed his body rotting, he’d still believe in the Resurrection.
The conflict in methodology between the way science and religion establish their truth claims creates a telling asymmetry. Science has the ability to tell believers that their factual beliefs are wrong, while religionists have no way to tell scientists that scientific facts are wrong. And so, over the years, science has repeatedly knocked down the truth claims of believers. Science has showed that prayer doesn’t work, we weren’t created 10,000 years ago at the same time as all other living things, there was no Exodus of the Jews from Egypt, there was no Adam and Eve, and so on. Religion can’t do anything similar to claims about biology, physics, or chemistry. This, I think, is one reason why believers often resent science, even while giving it lip service, and decry “scientism”, the pejorative and erroneous claim that scientists often overstep their expertise.
This asymmetry is in fact why a “constructive dialogue” is useless between scientists and religionists. What can believers tell scientists that’s of any use to science? (Yes, they can tell us what they believe, or things about the history of religion, but that’s not what’s meant by such an exchange.) In contrast, scientists can tell believers things that can fundamentally alter what they believe. That was one byproduct of the great work of Charles Darwin.
So while we can’t have a constructive dialogue, we can have a “destructive monologue”: science can tell religionists that what they believe is wrong, but the other side has no such ability.
This brings us to Harrison’s second claim: that Gingras’s criticism of the Templeton Foundation in spending millions of dollars fostering such dialogue is misguided and “unnuanced”, and, worse, has “played a major role in foisting the theme of a ‘dialogue’ between science and religion onto the history of science [emphasis added].” Harrison says that Gingras doesn’t convincingly document the claim that Templeton is trying to rewrite the history of science, and perhaps Gingras doesn’t, as I haven’t read his book. But given how Templeton is constantly funding people (like Harrison!) who maintain that the “conflict hypothesis” of religion versus science is misguided, there is more than a grain of truth in Gingras’s claim. For that is rewriting the history of science.
What’s odious about all this is that Harrison himself has received Templeton money, and yet spends a lot of his review defending Templeton against Gingras’s claims. Here’s what Harrison says:
(Full disclosure: I have been the recipient of Templeton funding, although none of my books on the historical relations between science and religion have been supported by them.)
This is a gross conflict of interest, and had I been Harrison trying to review Gingras’s book for, say, The Washington Post, the first question my editor would have asked me was whether I had any personal conflict of interest involving the author’s thesis. If I said I had taken Templeton money and Gingras criticizes the Templeton Foundation, I would absolutely have been prohibited from reviewing Science and Religion: An Impossible Dialogue. Shame on the L.A. Review of Books for even allowing Harrison to review the Gingras volume!
For, of course, if you’re in the Templeton stable, you better defend them if you want more Templeton money, and that is the prime conflict of interest at play here. Harrison, had he acted ethically, should have recused himself from reviewing this book.
If you want to see Harrison’s involvement with Templeton, check this Google search. He has given Templeton-sponsored lectures, attended Templeton-sponsored conferences, and accepted grants from the Templeton Foundation. In fact, in Templeton’s Stable of Prize Thoroughbreds, there’s a special stall labeled “Peter Harrison”. He knows which side his oats are buttered on.
Third, and I’m growing weary, Harrison goes through the usual machinations to show that what seems like a conflict between science and religion is really about something else, a thesis most prominently advanced by Ronald Numbers of the University of Wisconsin. Thus we learn from Harrison that Galileo was suppressed not because of religion, but because of other stuff, to wit:
This brings us to the Galileo affair, which makes a predictable appearance as a set piece. The basic details of the story are well known, and again Gingras does a creditable job of reconstructing them. Galileo was warned by the Inquisition in 1616 not to teach or defend the heliocentric hypothesis first propounded by Copernicus over 70 years before. Following the publication, in 1632, of an insufficiently ambiguous defense of Copernicanism, Galileo was placed on trial, and in the following year he was found guilty of vehement suspicion of heresy and ordered to recant. He did so and remained under house arrest until his death almost 10 years later.
This looks like an open and shut case of science versus religion. But there are complications. For a start, Galileo’s theory lacked proof, and his argument for the Earth’s motion based on a theory about the tides was simply wrong. Not only that, but the absence of observable stellar parallax provided apparently unassailable evidence against the motion of the Earth. The planetary model of Tycho Brahe, which had the planets orbiting the sun, and the sun orbiting a stationary Earth, offered a good compromise solution, and accounted for at least some of Galileo’s telescopic observations without the physical difficulties of putting the Earth into motion. In short, at this time there was no consensus in the scientific community about whether Galileo was right, and good reasons for thinking he was wrong. For its part, the Church was well informed on the relative merits of the various systems, and its support for the Tychonic model in the later 17th century was scientifically defensible.
Yes, complications!!! First of all, “proof” is not required for a theory to have credibility; the concept of “proof” is alien to science. And whether or not the scientific community agreed with Galileo or not, he wasn’t suppressed and put under house arrest because other scientists didn’t accept him. No, that happened because his own evidence contradicted Church teachings. This defense of the Church is boilerplate accommodationism. Yeah, maybe there were “complications”, but to say that religious dogma played no role in the Galileo affair is to show yourself as willfully blinkered. Even Harrison admits that Galileo was found guilty of heresy, and, well, heresy involves religion, not scientific debate.
Sadly, but understandably, Harrison says little about evolution except this (my emphasis):
Historians of science tend to cling to the old-fashioned idea that effects come after their causes. The canonical works that first began to dismantle the idea of a perennial conflict between science and religion — God and Nature (1986) edited by David Lindberg and Ronald Numbers, and John Hedley Brooke’s classic Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (1991) — were written before the Templeton Foundation’s funding activities had begun to have an impact in the 1990s (the Foundation itself was not constituted until 1987). Earlier still was James R. Moore’s The Post-Darwinian Controversies (1979). This book was instrumental in identifying the 19th-century progenitors of the conflict thesis, conclusively laying bare its deficiencies, and showing how religious opposition to Darwinism had been greatly exaggerated.
Anybody who claims that, beginning with the Scopes trial up to today, “religious opposition to Darwinism is greatly exaggerated”, is either ignorant or lying. 76% of Americans think that God either created life directly as Genesis states (38%) or thinks that God had a hand in directing or tweaking evolution (the other 38%). Muslim opposition to evolution continues throughout the world, but we don’t hear much about it. One example: the teaching of evolution in Turkish secondary schools was just banned by the pro-Islamic regime of President Erdogan. Woe to that once-secular country!
Harrison is wrong on all counts, I think, and it’s shameful that he, a consumer of Templeton dosh, accepted a commission to review a book that criticizes the Templeton Foundation. But that’s only one flaw in a deeply flawed and fulsomely accommodationist book review.
h/t: Matthew Cobb








