Reading time: Whatever. . .
You’ll probably guess from the title of this short (150-page) book by Agustín Fuentes (Princeton University Press) that I am not keen on its thesis, and you’d be right. In fact, the thesis is nothing new, even if you have read Fuentes’s article about it in Natural History and Scientific American or the many attacks on the sex binary coming from woke but misguided people. These attacks, which assert that sex is really a “spectrum”, have also been launched by Steve Novella at Science-Based Medicine, the editors of Natural History, the Lancet, and other places that Luana and I discussed in our piece in Skeptical Inquirer (see our point #1).
In fact, it seems more common to see pieces attacking the sex binary than defending it, even though, in terms of biological sex—the binary of male and female, based on gamete type (big and immobile versus small and mobile)—happens to be true. As Dawkins and I (and others) have mentioned, it’s as close to a binary as you can get, with exceptions (“intersex” individuals) having a frequency of about 1 in 5600 or 1 in 6700, depending on how you define intersex. That is lower than the frequency of individuals born with extra or missing digits, but we don’t say that “humans lie on a digit spectrum”.
I won’t go into the numerous reasons why biologists in general see a sex binary in vascular plants and all animals; read Richard Dawkins’s eloquent exposition of the reasons here. Nor will I give a long review of Fuentes’s book, as a good critical one has already appeared, and Fuentes’s recycled arguments have been attacked by many of us. Let me just add that why this has suddenly become a big kerfuffle is not because any new biological facts have surfaced showing that animals actually have three or more types of gametes (they don’t), but because of the rise of gender ideology.
Fuentes wrote his book for the same reason that most others criticize the sex binary: because of the recent increase in the number of people who see themselves as not belonging to either sex, but lying outside the male/female dichotomy –or in between. This is gender, though, and while people do have these feelings, some of which may even have a biological basis, it does not dispel the reality of the gamete binary, which biologists seized on as the “concept” of biological sex for two reasons. First, the two-gametes reality is sole binary true of all animals and vascular plants; and second, because the binary concept is also deeply explanatory, giving insight into things like sexual selection. But because some people feel they’re not male or female, “progressive” scientists feel a duty to twist our view of nature so that sex becomes a spectrum. They may mean well, but they damage biology by misleading people about biological sex. They also damage biology by leading people to distrust it because the distorters demand that folks deny things that are palpably real.
And so Fuentes, though he feels the binary is “damaging” (his arguments are not convincing), actually does the damage himself. You can see his ideological motivation in the last two sections of the book, which deal respectively with why trans-identified males should be allowed to compete in women’s sports, and why we should not have bathrooms based on natal sex. (I happen to agree with the latter point but not the former.) But these are questions of politics and ideology, not biology.
So what is Fuentes’s argument? Again, it’s familiar. Sex as “enacted” in the real world of humans (note the concentration on humans) involve the 3 “Gs” (genitals, gonads, and genes), as well as physiology, hormones, reproductive leanings, and psychology (how one “feels”). These don’t always align perfectly, and because they don’t, sex is not binary. But this is a straw-man argument, since he’s arguing against the biological binary based on gametes, and none of us have asserted that there is always a perfect match between chromosomes, genital morphology, self-concept, physiology, and gamete type (the concordance, however, is often very high).
Fuentes raises familiar and already-rebutted arguments: fish like wrasses and clownfish change sex as sequential hermaphrodites. Bees have three types of castes, workers, queens, and drones. And so on and so on. But none of this refutes the sex binary. Fish, at a given time in their lives, produce either large or small gametes, and worker bees, as everyone with a brain knows, are females. Although their reproductive organs are underdeveloped, these organs are clearly female, and in fact some colonies of honeybees in South Africa have no queens: the normally “sterile” workers have fully developed female organs and lay parthenogenetic eggs without a need to be inseminated. Those colonies are 100% female.
Every example Fuentes gives falls into the gametic binary, and, as Bogardus’s review notes, Fuentes tacitly ACCEPTS a sex binary. Fuentes shies away from the words “male” or “female” (unless they’re in parentheses after “3G”), but instead constantly refers to “large gamete producers” and “small gamete producers”. Never does he refer to “intermediate gamete producers” or any other type of gamete producers. This is a tacit admission that sex, conceptualized through gamete type, is indeed binary.
As Bogardus said in his review (his bolding)
But there are strong reasons to deny that sex “comprises” multiple traits and processes. There is really only one trait that seems to be necessary and sufficient for being a male, namely having the function of producing a component with the function of producing sperm. And similarly for females, with regard to ova. To be “hormonally female” is to have hormone levels typical of the females of the species, but a male who has e.g. hormone levels typical of females of that species does not literally become a female in any sense of the word. Nor does he have multiple sexes, being both male and female.
Instead, what’s true is that there are many traits and processes that are linked to sex—there are a variety of sex-linked traits. But in order for these traits to be linked to sex, they must be distinct from sex. Fuentes is mistaken, then, to think that sex “comprises” multiple traits and processes: he’s confusing a multiplicity of sex-linked traits with sex itself.
Fuentes spends much of the book in a misguided quest to show that there aren’t really any biological differences between human males and females (or such differences are inconsequential), and so sex becomes a slippery concept. He never actually tells us how he defines “male” and “female”, perhaps because he thinks they don’t exist. Even differences in musculature and bones that mandate the creation of men’s vs. women’s sports, Fuentes suggests, have a social origin, perhaps based on differential training (“gendered training dynamics,” p. 143).
I can see that this is going to get long unless I bring it to a halt, and so I will. I’ll make one more point, involving how Fuentes contradicts himself—not for the first time in this book. Although he argues that any differences between men and women are “biocultural”, based on an interaction between nature and culture (he’s right for some traits), he also argues that it is imperative to take self-identified sex into account when doing medical or scientific investigations. And that is right, too: some drugs have differential effects on the sexes because of their biological differences (whatever the source of those differences). But if biology is only part of the reason for those differences, and sometimes a small one, shouldn’t we be dividing up research subjects not by biological sex, but by gender, culture, or even “lived experience”. Imagine designing a medical study based on experience!
At any rate, I’m done. I did my due diligence in reading the book, even though I already knew everything Fuentes was going to say—because he’d said it before. I’ll add that it’s not only a tendentious book, but a tedious book. The writing is poor, droning on in a hybrid popular + academic style that is hard going. Fuentes, for example, never cites one area without citing three. (Example on p. 135: “”These conditions represent complex interlacing of physiological, neurological, social, experiential, and individual processes.”) Over and over again you must slog through such sentences. The man needs to learn how to write popular scientific prose.
I’ll finish with the final paragraph of the review by Bogardus, who did much more due diligence than I (plus he’s a biologically-informed philosopher, good at pointing out and refuting muddled arguments):
Though Fuentes offers much sound and fury against “the binary view,” in the end it amounts to nothing: his thesis is either uncontroversially true or obviously false. Even worse, in tragic Shakespearean fashion, Fuentes sows the seeds of his own undoing, unwittingly supplying himself with premises sufficient to prove that the title of his book is exactly false: Sex itself is not a spectrum at all, but rather is binary.
The only thing I’ll add is that you don’t need to read this book if you already know about the “binary” controversy. Fuentes sheds no more light on it.










