The sorry state of the God of the Gaps

April 27, 2014 • 12:59 pm

This swell cartoon, published at “Ape, Not Monkey” (the strip’s subtitle is “The science vs religion comic strip”; how did I miss that?), was drawn by Jeffrey Weston and forwarded by reader Ant. It’s a sign of the times that stuff like this is readily published and consumed these days:

2009-07-08-Narrowing-god-of-the-gaps

It’s not just creationists who need him, though, it’s theologians like Plantinga and Hart.


57 thoughts on “The sorry state of the God of the Gaps

  1. I like the cartoon — the artist is talented and clever — but I’ll quibble with the example anyway. The God-of-the-Gaps only goes down very small (“It’s a miracle! I looked for my car keys TWICE in that very spot and now here they are!”) when it’s very personal. Generally speaking, if they’re making a God of the Gap apologetic then they’re not seeing the amazing evidence of God all around them. They’re going back further, sticking God into Big Unknowns like Fine Tuning, Consciousness, and Why-Is-There-Something-Rather-Than-Nothing. Some theists even want to stick God into the gap between the “subjective” and the “objective” — which is a very thin edge to dance between.

  2. “very thin edge to dance between”

    Reminds me of the phrase “falls between the cracks” 😉

  3. I agree that the “god-of-the-gaps” is a very weak creature as shown in the cartoon, and is so even when used by educated apologists like Hart.

    Scientific methodologies are great at HOW.

    The question I have for you is why do such scientists such as the evolutionary biologist Theodsius Dobzhansky (author of Nothing Makes Sense Except in the light of Evolution) maintain
    that WHY
    is a valid question for humans to ask. He is a theist, not a materialist.

      1. Coel,

        So you disagree I presume with Hume’s famous statement about how one can’t get ought from is?

        Why does the Cosmos exist? (Not how)

        And related, Why do some scientists think we should create bombs and support their being dropped upon civilians while others disagree?

        1. First you ask about empiricism and if science can answer “why” questions. And then you change to philosophy and, I assume, moral questions (“ought”).

          Philosophy is irrelevant for empiricism. And while science can study morality and its sources, it can’t do other on the outcome than registering what people chose.

          If we stick to science, the answer is simple: science can answer “why”, as it is the same as “how” here. For example: “why” did the Hot Big Bang happen is because of inflation, and “how” it happened is because of inflation and [insert details here].

          If you try to insert irrelevancies such as philosophy and morality, it works tantamount to deepities. Which no doubt is the idea.

          1. I forgot, it is the Hot Big Bang that results in the universe (“Cosmos”) as we know it.

            [We can go further back now due to BICEP2 (if it is confirmed), but that is still work in progress.

            BICEP2 makes Linde’s chaotic inflation looks good, and it may have started as a quantum fluctuation if we ask the man himself. Last I heard, people have now managed to show that such quantum fluctuations can occur in so called minisuperspace vacuums. [ http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.1207.pdf ]

            Meaning that all we need to get space and time is to post-select for observers in a volume with physic laws, i.e. “calm” enough in the minisuperspace sense to have quantum mechanics symmetries and conservation of them. The remainder of putative systems will never arise.

            Here “why” = “how” = spontaneously.]

          2. Torbjorn Larsson,

            ? I wasn’t asking a scientific-oriented why question, but WHY in the philosophical/theological sense that theistic evolutionary biologists like T.D. mean.

            I guess I wasn’t clear enough in my original post. I was responding to the original article by Jerry Coyne, whose last sentence was “It’s not just creationists who need him, though, it’s theologians like Plantinga and Hart.

            And I then asked, basically, why do some evolutionary biologists such as Theodsius Dobzhansky (author of Nothing Makes Sense Except in the light of Evolution) hold to a theistic worldview instead?

          3. Oh, okay.

            Scientific methodologies are great at HOW.

            The question I have for you is why do such scientists such as the evolutionary biologist Theodsius Dobzhansky (author of Nothing Makes Sense Except in the light of Evolution) maintain
            that WHY
            is a valid question for humans to ask.”

            I assumed that the first sentence provided context, especially since science answers “why” questions. It does so as readily as “how”, since there is no dualism, no agents, that provides moral et cetera “why” questions, which is what I wanted to point out.

            If you ask why scientists do things outside of science, it is another question indeed. Humans are versatile. =D

            Specifically here, people can hold to conflicting opinions or methods. That is interesting, but it doesn’t make the conflict or the erroneous ideas any lesser.

          4. I’m not sure what a “philosophical/theological sense” of the question “why?” actually is. (Perhaps it’s one where “the only answer that I’ll accept is “God did it””?)

            However, science can quite straightforwardly answer “why” questions. For example: Why did the Vervet monkey give an alarm call? Because it saw a snake. Why does a squirrel store nuts? To eat in winter. Etc.

            It is theology that cannot answer “why?” questions, though it pretends to.

          5. As for why some scientists hold to a theistic world view, Jerry has already answered this. In short, it’s wishful thinking. Wanting to believe it because it feels good.

          6. Yes and no.

            It’s true that the popular science writer and skeptic Martin Gardner said he was a theist because it appealed to him emotionally.

            But are you sure this is true of scientists such as Theodosius Dobzhansky?

            I’m skeptical of blanket statements (against both atheists and theists).

            How do you and Jerry know the motivations of theistic scientists, unless they have declared their motivations like Gardner did?

          7. Well I’m (admittedly) guessing at the motivations based on the fact that there is no actual evidence for theism.

        2. So you disagree I presume with Hume’s famous statement about how one can’t get ought from is?

          No, I agree entirely. But we were discussing “Why?” questions not “ought” statements, weren’t we?

          Why does the Cosmos exist? (Not how)

          I don’t know why the cosmos exists. I consider, though, that science is a better tool that is more likely to answer that question than theology.

          1. I already apologized yesterday for writing hurriedly and without enough clarity in the original post.

            My original question was meant to be a “why- ought” one, a philosophical question.

            I don’t think science can answer questions of “why in the philosophical sense.”

            Sorry for the confusion I started.

        3. Your distinction between a “how” and a “why” is a false distinction.

          A simplified example: When someone asks “Why are there mountains?” the simple answer is “Plate tectonics results in land masses colliding and driving mountains upwards.” Plat tectonics is WHY we have mountains.

          Your world-view, however, forces to you respond with “No…that’s HOW mountains are made…not why!”

          This a false distinction. here, the questioner is actually saying “I am personally dissatisfied with a mechanistic explanation, so I am going to ask a question that assumes as one of it’s premises that there must be purpose to things.”

          In reality, the question the person is actually asking is not “why are there mountains” but “what purpose do mountains serve?” This, obviously, presumes that matter has a purpose without first establishing a mechanism for such purposes to be dictated.

          Quit the doublespeak of “how v. why” and speak to the true issue: Your personal discomfort with the mechanical explanation of WHY things are the way they are.

          1. ?

            I have no “personal discomfort with the mechanical explanation.” On the contrary, I love science, especially geology. It was one of my favorite courses at university.

            But explaining why there are mountains at the level of methodology wasn’t what my question was about.

            My original post was asking why some scientists think there is no philosophical WHY, while other scientists–I mentioned Theodosius Dobzhansky as an example, do think that “beyond” the physical level, there is an ultimate why.

            Maybe an analogy would help. Why are squiggles showing up in this box? Because I am typing on my computer, etc.

            But that physical “why” explanation isn’t an explanation of the “why” I am talking about.

            I am very aware that scientists who are atheists, such as Richard Dawkins, think there is no why in a purposeful sense. (By the way his book on evolution, The Ancestor’s Tale which deals with the why at the physical level is one of my favorite books.)

            But evolutionary biologists such Theodosius Dobzhansky, Ken Miller, etc.
            disagree.

            That was my original point (though I know I expressed it unclearly).

            Being a former avid backpacker and artist, I would say one purpose mountains serve at a philosophical level–is beauty.

          2. When scientists make religious statements they don’t do so as scientists, but as people. They’re not applying their scientific habits of reasoning to their religious beliefs — but they should.

          3. I am very aware that scientists who are atheists, such as Richard Dawkins, think there is no why in a purposeful sense.

            It’s not just that they “think there is no why in a purposeful sense,” it’s that they *can’t find any evidence for it*, even though they (or others) have looked for it for a long time. Instead, they/we keep finding evidence for natural, impersonal processes that people used to think were supernatural actions.

        4. So you disagree I presume with Hume’s famous statement about how one can’t get ought from is?

          Absolutely. How else would you arrive at “ought?”

          Example: pain hurts–testable. Other people feel bad to see people in pain–testable. Conclusion–to alleviate both conditions, don’t cause pain. Do the experiment.

          Show me a philosopher’s ought that isn’t supported by a bunch of is premises.

    1. Sadly, not even scientists are immune from religious superstition, and Dobzhansky was one who wasn’t immune. Neither is Francis Collins. So my answer is yes, some scientists can be deluded by believing what comforts them.

      1. whyevolutionistrue,

        To ask philosophical questions (why) or to affirm philosophical views (theism),
        not based in materialism is “superstition”?

        1. Unless there is some evidence supporting them, then, yes, superstition would be as good a descriptor as any.

    2. “Why” is a reasonable question to ask as long as it’s perfectly fine to answer with “the question doesn’t apply in the way you mean under the circumstances you set.”

      “Why was there a comet in the sky last night?” is a legitimate question — as long as the question isn’t translated as “what was that comet supposed to tell us?” If THAT interpretation is going to be made legit, there has to be a heck of a lot more background work.

    3. Asking why something happened does not have a unique answer.

      To consider a trivial example, why did the player hit the game winning home run in the bottom of the ninth inning?

      The physicist could give you numbers for bat velocity and distance to the left field fence and solve equations of motion. That is a perfectly valid explanation of why.

      The general manager of the team says it is because the player is a superb athlete.

      The coach says it is because he is cool under pressure and good in the clutch.

      The losing pitcher says it is because he made a mistake and hung a curve ball.

      His team mate says it is because he has been practicing really hard.

      The point is that a why question only makes sense within a certain framework. So if you say that you are not satisfied with the explanation that the cosmologist gives you for why the universe exists, that you want to know the “purpose for the universe”, then you have already assumed the nature of the answer. You require the answer to be stated in terms of the intention of an intelligent agent.

      In previous posts Jerry has referred to this as the “Argument from hot beverages”, since it was raised by the theologian John Haught.

      Why is a very valid question for humans to ask. But there is no unique, final answer to the question. Anyone who has spent any time with a three year old knows that every answer to the question “why?” can be challenged with another “why?”

      1. That’s true. Good points.

        For instance, I could ask, Why do humans play baseball?

        Why are such ritual actions created which seem to serve no evolutionary advantage?

        Why do humans love games?

        Why are games more important to some humans than most of life?

        Etc.:-)

        1. That’s your example of a ritual action that serves no evolutionary advantage – an athletic contest that requires and displays both physical and strategic acumen?

          1. Good point.

            However, a game such as baseball doesn’t need to exist to provide “physical and strategic acumen.”

            The latter seems to be a side benefit, not the central or primary basis of game.

            For instance, it’s been shown that computer gaming increases various abilities in humans, but that isn’t the central basis for why teens (and adults) love to play computer games.

          2. Daniel,
            Your original question was, ‘why do some scientists maintain that why questions are legitimate to ask,’ however, I have yet to hear a ‘why’ question example from you that theology has successfully put to rest (i.e., one for which the answer is commonly accepted to be true and accurate). Most of your examples are tackled by social scientists.

            Trying to work through the polysemy problem here, I think the questions you seem to have in mind are big purpose ones. What is our purpose in being here? What is the universe’s purpose? Such questions are built on an unproven assumption that these things have purpose. Very often (agnostic and atheist) scientists will point out that the very first thing a believer should focus on is empirically testing whether that assumption is warranted. Until that happens, further questions about ‘what the purpose is’ are just idle speculation. That’s the scientific answer. Believers don’ find that answer satisfactory; they don’t want to discuss the validity or evidence for the assumption of purpose, they just want to assume its true and go from there. Scientists often don’t want to do that. That is why (IMO), science is often considered “bad” at such big purpose questions – we don’t give an answer the believer wants to hear. Sort of like interrupting a ‘batman vs. superman’ debate by saying ‘you know they’re both fictional characters, right?’ That’s a perfectly good answer, though probably not the answer either arguer is looking for.

          3. I have yet to hear a ‘why’ question example from you that theology has successfully put to rest (i.e., one for which the answer is commonly accepted to be true and accurate).

            Exactly right. Furthermore, how would one finally establish the truth and accuracy of an answer to a question without evidence. There’s that materialism again.

          4. You say,”What is our purpose in being here? What is the universe’s purpose? Such questions are built on an unproven assumption that these things have purpose.”

            Exactly! My original post was about “why” do some good scientists such as Theodosius Dobzhansky think there is “purpose” to the cosmos (a philosophical ‘why’), when other good scientists (atheists) don’t.

            As for myself, I think it makes more sense to think there is some kind of cosmic purpose than to think the human primate brain is the only self-conscious, sometimes rational, purposeful ‘thing’ in all of existence.

            But, of course, maybe that’s so. I suppose that if one grants the speculative idea of the “multi-verse,” then almost anything is possible. Maybe self-awareness, human rationality,purpose-seeking, etc. are all unplanned results of natural selection. However I don’t see why ‘they’ would work in life if the entire cosmos was so unrational, purpose-less, etc.

            I spent 58 years seeking evidence for the purpose claimed by the religion I was raised in and came up empty. So I guess that does argue that many of us seek meaning where it isn’t.

          5. It is the overwhelming conclusion of every last branch of science that there is no cosmic purpose. We could go into the details if you like, but suggesting otherwise in this day and age is no different from insisting that Helios really does draw the Sun in his chariot across the dome of the Firmament.

            Cheers,

            b&

          6. As a thought experiment, imagine that there is indeed a purpose or meaning to the universe — BUT it’s not a purpose or meaning that appeals to you, personally, at all. You think it’s awful or trite or disgusting or wicked.

            Now then … Overwhelming Cosmic Purpose vs. insignificant little old you and what you care about. Which one do you go for? When push comes to shove, which one is trumps?

          7. As for myself, I think it makes more sense to think there is some kind of cosmic purpose than to think the human primate brain is the only self-conscious, sometimes rational, purposeful ‘thing’ in all of existence.

            Well obviously it isn’t. There are cat brains and dolphin brains and elephant brains that also fit those criteria. And, given the number of planets and galaxies out there, there are likely loads more similar examples.

            Given that, why is it sensible to believe in a “cosmic purpose” applying to the whole universe? Is there actually any evidence for it, or do you just like the idea?

        2. Why are such ritual actions created which seem to serve no evolutionary advantage?

          Why do cats play with cat toys?

          1. Those were the days!

            Speaking of which, I hope the Tigers aren’t rained out again today.

    4. Polysemy, Daniel.

      The issue you raise is one of language, not philosophy or science. “Why” can be used in more ways than the narrow one you circumscribe in your comment. We can ask “why things fall to the ground” just as legitimately as we can ask “how are things?” We understand that the first question is properly answered with an explanation of gravity and not with some grand purpose that involves things falling to the ground; similarly, we understand that the second question is properly answerd with a summary of the state of affairs in the questionee’s life and not an invocation of the laws of physics explaining how things come to exist.

      “Why” is a perfectly acceptable way to ask for an explanation, and “how” doesn’t necessarily mean the questioner is looking for a scientific explanation. Context is key.

      1. I agree, musical beef.

        In my original post, I wrote too quickly and didn’t revise. Being retired and in a hurry doesn’t excuse my lack of clarity, especially since, once, I was a writing teacher.

        My original intent was a limited, specific question concerning evolutionists, T.D., etc., who are also theists who don’t subscribe to the god-of-the-gaps,
        but I got us all side-tracked.

    5. “Why” questions generally come in two forms.

      The first is as a shorthand for “how.” For example, “Why do things fall down?” can very legitimately be answered with a discourse on gravity.

      The second form is teleological, and only makes sense when an intelligent agent is involved; otherwise, it’s either question-begging or simply incoherent. “Why is that rock red as opposed to some other particular color?” only makes sense if it’s been painted, or if a person has picked it out of a pile of rocks of various colors because of its red color. (Or, of course, as a proxy for, “What are the properties of that rock that cause it to appear red?”) Otherwise, you might as well ask why the rock chose to be red this morning as opposed to green.

      Religions generally see mindful purpose in literally everything. In modern times, that traces almost invariably directly to Aristotelian metaphysics, which required, for example, a Prime Mover to keep the planets in motion. For some reason people today don’t continue to think that inertia needs to be moved upon by some motionless mover so inertia may in turn move the planets…but it’s still very common to think that all sorts of other actions require intentional causes. Why this is so likely traces its roots to long before Aristotle, when somebody more likely to attribute a rustling in the grass to the intentional actions of a predator than to “shit happens” was more likely to survive. We seem to be very, very, very good at discerning mindful intention everywhere, even when the mere notion is ludicrous. Aristotle codified that in his metaphysics, and many people have yet to get the memo that it just ain’t so.

      Cheers,

      b&

      1. Thanks for the long reply. Sorry for the confusion, as I explained in a previous post.

        I think theistic scientists such as Theodosius Dobzhansky would disagree with your statement: “discerning mindful intention everywhere, even when the mere notion is ludicrous.”

        The idea that “intention” only exists as an anomaly in the human brain in a meaningless cosmos isn’t the only reasonable position (though I do agree that we humans tend to look for it everywhere, even where it clearly isn’t).

        Philosophers from Plato to Whitehead, and many scientists past and present don’t think the “notion” of “intention” is ludicrous.

        1. Nobody thinks that intention “only exists as an anomaly in the human brain.” Many living things have intentions or intentional stances to one degree or another. We’re surrounded by non-humans with goals. My cat’s current goal is to get me to feed her.

          In the past, the significance of the brain wasn’t understood. Now that it is, ascribing agency to things which do not have the neurological structure to support that possibility is an anachronism left over from an earlier age (that of humanity or that of the individual.) Religion encourages this and dresses scientific absurdity up as philosophical depth.

  4. A lot of the ‘faithful’ want god to be real. It therefore follows that god must do ‘real things’ if god is real – hence gaps. Just like the gremlins around your house only do things when you are not looking.

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