Peace for our time? (. . and a poll)

“Peace for our time” was, of course, the phrase uttered by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain on September 30, 1938 after he returned from signing The Munich Agreement with Hitler. That treaty allowed Nazi Germany to occupy the Sudetenland, part of Czechoslovakia, in return for Hitler’s promise to leave the rest of Czechoslovakia—and Europe—alone. That was a lie, of course, and Germany invaded Poland, beginning World War II, on September 1, 1939. Chamberlain, and other dupes who believed Hitler, had thought that the treaty would avert war in Europe.  Skeptics like Churchill disagreed, and Chamberlain resigned on May 10, 1940, giving the PM slot to Churchill.

Now we are told by Trump and others that we’re close to peace for our time in Iran; here’s Trump’s announcement, bereft of details, from Truth Social:

It doesn’t say much about Israel except Trump had a “very good call” with Netanyahu. Israel is being shoved aside in Trump’s hell-bent desire to get some kind of peace with Iran. But what kind will we get? We can see more details in The Times of Israel. which partly quotes the NYT (headings below are mine, extracts from the ToI are indented, and my words are flush left):

Uranium:

Iran has agreed to give up its stockpile of highly enriched uranium as part of an agreement with the US to end the war, two US officials tell the New York Times.

According to the officials, Iran has committed in a general statement to giving up the uranium, rather than reaching an agreement with the US on exactly how it will relinquish it. Instead, the exact details will be worked out during the negotiations that will begin once a deal is reached.

The report comes days after Iranian sources claimed that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, had issued a directive that the near-weapons-grade uranium should not be sent abroad.

Iran has a stockpile of more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium in its possession, which Israeli officials have said is sufficient for 11 nuclear bombs if enriched further.

Earlier this month, a senior Israeli military official said if the uranium wasn’t removed, the war launched in February could be considered “one big failure.”

More on uranium:

And, reports the Times, the officials say issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program will be put off, to be negotiated within 30 to 60 days.

The Times adds the caveat that it is “not clear if the proposal Iranian officials said they had agreed to was what President Trump was referring to in his post on social media.”

Citing Middle East officials, The Times also says the leaders of Arab and Muslim-majority countries with whom Trump spoke in a conference earlier today told him that they support the proposal and urged him to accept it.

The Strait of Hormuz:

While Iran’s Fars news has derided President Donald Trump’s talk of a deal being nearly done, with the Strait of Hormuz to reopen, three senior Iranian officials tell the New York Times that Tehran has agreed to “a memorandum of understanding that would stop the fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.”

The deal would release $25 billion in Iranian assets frozen overseas, the officials are quoted as saying.

The Times says the officials say the agreement “would halt fighting on all fronts, including in Lebanon.”

They add that its terms focus “on opening the strait— including lifting the US naval blockade against Iran and allowing free commercial traffic without Iran charging any tolls.”’

. . .Iran’s Fars news agency says the Strait of Hormuz will remain under Iran’s management under the provisions of the latest exchanged text for a deal between Iran and the US.

Fars, a semi-state outlet close to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, dismisses as “incomplete and inconsistent with reality” Trump’s announcement two hours ago that the deal was now being finalized and would include the reopening of the strait.

Trump posted on social media that an agreement with Iran “has been largely negotiated.” He specified that the deal would include the opening of the strait, the key pathway for the global oil supply that Tehran has largely blocked since the beginning of the war some three months ago.

Regime change: 

None, of course. Although some in the Trump administration say there has been regime change, all that means is that the Ayatollah Khamenei is dead, his son, the Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, may be alive but isn’t doing much, and military hard-liners still run the country and the war. The Iranian people are no closer to freedom than they were before the war.

Lebanon and Hezbollah:

No information yet; see Segal’s excerpt below in which Iranian sources claim that the agreement would stop fighting in Lebanon (but would presumably not require Hezbollah to disarm).

As you see, not much is clear, and the fate of Iran’s uranium stockpile—the reason Trump says we attacked Iran—remains unclear.

Over at It’s Noon in Israel, Amit Segal’s post about it is called “The art of a bad deal,” with the subtitle, “Trump’s proposed deal threatens to leave Iran stronger than it was before Operation Epic Fury.”  Excerpt:

t’s Sunday, May 24, and at the outset of Operation Roaring Lion, there were two definitions of victory on the table: capturing Iran’s enriched uranium or toppling the regime altogether. Given that regime change does not appear to be materializing and one of the parties appears hesitant to make the necessary investments for such an outcome, the sole remaining path to victory appears to be securing the uranium.

The most recent proposal—which Donald Trump claims is already “largely negotiated”—seemingly attempts to follow this path. According to a report from Channel 12, the agreement would reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the lifting of the naval blockade and substantial financial relief. However, the core issues regarding the nuclear program and the extraction of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile would not be resolved upfront; instead, they would be deferred for separate negotiations over a 60-day period. Critically, Senior Iranian sources speaking with The New York Times said the deal would release $25 billion in Iranian assets frozen overseas. They added that the agreement “would halt fighting on all fronts, including in Lebanon.”

If the enriched uranium is indeed surrendered to the United States, it is indeed a notable achievement, but there are two caveats:

The first caveat concerns the actual scope and reality of the nuclear concessions. According to current reports, the negotiations slated to follow the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will focus exclusively on uranium enriched to 60 percent—the roughly 440 kilograms currently believed to be buried beneath the rubble of the Natanz facility. Meanwhile, the tons of uranium enriched to three percent appear destined to remain inside Iran, with any future restrictions on its enrichment left dangerously ambiguous. Compounding this uncertainty, a senior Iranian official bluntly told Reuters today that Tehran has not actually agreed to hand over any material at all, emphasizing that the preliminary agreement does not even formally address the nuclear issue.

The second caveat is procedural, but no less critical. The framework currently on the table is not a finalized treaty, but merely a temporary Memorandum of Understanding meant to serve as a baseline for future talks. All the thorny details regarding the nuclear stockpile are slated to be ironed out over a 60-day negotiation window. The official justification for this delay is logistical—that safely extracting highly enriched uranium from bombed-out, irradiated rubble is a highly complex operation. In practice, however, it is far more likely a calculated delay, offering Tehran an extended opportunity to rest and recover before entering their next phase of nuclear intractability.

Israel has greeted the news with deep skepticism and more than a touch of fear. The reported memorandum makes zero mention of ballistic missile restrictions. What began largely as a defensive shield for Iran’s nuclear ambitions has mutated into a formidable threat in its own right. Even without the ultimate deterrent of a nuclear warhead, an Iranian ballistic arsenal numbering in the tens of thousands is more than sufficient to paralyze any military action against the Islamic Republic. According to Channel 12, this critical issue—whether through an immediate American concession or a simple lack of interest—never even made it to the negotiating table.

The current form of the deal also leaves the Islamic Republic holding another critical asset: the Strait of Hormuz. While the strategic waterway is slated to reopen, it does so not by virtue of an American victory, but rather by Iran’s sufferance. The current framework temporarily ensures toll-free passage, but absolutely nothing in the agreement guarantees that Tehran won’t eventually set up a toll booth—or abruptly choke off shipping the moment they feel the subsequent 60-day negotiations are stalling.

A secondary, but equally pressing concern in Jerusalem is that the regime has not yet fallen. While never explicitly declared as a military objective, regime change has been the unofficial policy undercurrent of the entire conflict. So far, Tehran has successfully managed to cling to power. Yet, senior Israeli intelligence officials maintain that a collapse from within remains a distinct possibility—provided the crippling economic blockade is sustained through the end of 2026. If the blockade and economic warfare are traded away for a partial agreement today, that window permanently closes. Meanwhile, domestic repression continues apace; just this morning, Iran executed a man accused of sending information to the US and Israel during the war. Cutting this deal now would not just throw Tehran a financial lifeline—it would constitute a total abandonment of the Iranian protesters who began this entire conflict.

Segal also discusses Lebanon, where fighting has escalated but Israel has pretty much held its fire until Iran stopped fighting. Tehran wants to link the Iran peace deal to Lebanon, allowing Hezbollah to continue attacking Israel.  Israelis won’t stand for that, or so I think. Segal sums up the deal this way:

For a leader who has spent decades building his brand as the sole guarantor of Israeli security, accepting a deal that leaves the regime intact, Hezbollah armed, the ballistic missile program recovering, and Tehran flush with sanctions relief is electoral assisted suicide for Netanyahu. Hanging in the balance of these negotiations is the fate of more than one regime.

To me, this seems like a bad deal for the U.S. and especially for Israel. Nuclear enrichment could continue with the unenriched uranium possessed by Iran, it could eventually build a bomb, Hezbollah might persist as a threat to Israel, there is no regime change (we’re blowing a chance for one, says Segal), and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz remains unclear. Trump just keeps putting up deadline after deadline and then ignoring them, hoping that something will fall into place.

So I ask readers to weigh in by checking one box in this unscientific poll. I’ve given a deadline, but am just assessing reader sentiment here; so please check a box: