Several readers astutely mentioned in comments on today’s Hili Dialogue that a primary goal of the American attack on Iran wasn’t to democratize the country, but to remove Iran as a Chinese proxy. As Haviv Rettig Gur, a journalist who writes for the Times of Israel, argues in the piece given below, a mutualistic relationship between Iran and China has developed, with Iran providing China with cheap oil that allows the People’s Republic to build a strategic petroleum reserve (nobody else will buy that oil), and China providing Iran with missiles and sophisticated weapons to go after Israel and the West. As Gur says:
Iran is to America what Hezbollah is to Israel—the smaller second-front proxy you have to take out to have a clean shot at the main foe later on.
This is also why President Trump seems to be pursuing a strange sort of regime change—something very different from what George W. Bush or the neocons meant by the term. Trump doesn’t care one whit about democratization, or, as Venezuela showed us, about changing any element of a regime that doesn’t stand in America’s way. He’s interested in regime change in Iran only because it is fundamentally, in its founding theology, unswervingly anti-American. It is thus not swayable from the Chinese orbit by any other means.
He doesn’t need a democratic Iran, he just needs a not-anti-American Iran.
Why are we so worried about China? Because, says Gur, a potential conflict with China is in the offing—over Taiwan:
The picture that emerges from all of this is of a Chinese forward base, a linchpin of the country’s naval architecture; cyber efforts; an economic Belt and Road influence program—every element of Chinese power projection and empire-building—positioned at the throat of the global oil supply, armed with weapons designed to penetrate advanced American defenses and kill American sailors, and embedded in a strategic architecture whose explicit purpose is to constrain American military freedom in any future conflict over Taiwan.
When Iran began to look like that, it stopped being Israel’s problem and became America’s.
Click below to read, but only if you have a subscription to TFP. They don’t allow their articles to be archived.
Gur begins by noting that this is not one war but two: America’s on the one hand and Israel on the other, with Israel having existential worries as opposed to America’s concern with China:
. . . across the world, from Brazil to Beijing, London to Karachi, the argument is the same: America is fighting Israel’s war.
But this isn’t true. And the confusion matters, because if you misread what this war is actually about, you will misread everything that follows.
This is not a war about Israel. This is not a war for Israel’s sake. Israel is a beneficiary, a capable and willing local partner, but it is not the reason America is in this fight. America is playing a much bigger game, about more than what happens in the Middle East. The subtext, that Israel exercises outsize influence or “drags Americans into wars they don’t want,” borders on the conspiratorial.
This isn’t one war, but two. There is a regional chessboard, on which Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the other Gulf states all play. Iran’s proxies, its drones and ballistic missiles, its nuclear ambitions, its funding of Hezbollah and the Houthis: All of that belongs primarily to this smaller game. Israel has always understood this board. So have the Saudis. So has everyone in the neighborhood.
But there is a second chessboard, vastly larger, on which the United States and China are the primary players. On this board, the central question of the next 30 years is being worked out: whether the American-led global order survives, or whether China displaces it. Every significant American foreign policy decision, from the pivot to Asia to the tariff wars to the posture in the Pacific, is ultimately a move on this board.
Of course dodos like me (I never claimed to be a pundit) have missed all this, but Gur gives reasons why the U.S. decided to attack now (remember that China has said it will go after Taiwan within seven years):
. . . Reports emerged in late February of a near-finalized deal to supply Iran with supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles capable of speeds exceeding Mach 3 and engineered to evade the Aegis defense systems deployed on American carrier strike groups. China was replacing Iranian government and military software with closed Chinese systems, hardening Iran against CIA and Mossad cyber operations. Joint naval exercises between China, Russia, and Iran in the Straits of Hormuz were becoming regular events, building real-time operational familiarity between the three navies. Iran had switched from the GPS system to the Chinese BeiDou system. And Iran was providing China with the port at Jask, as part of China’s “string of pearls” base system in the Indian Ocean.
The picture that emerges from all of this is of a Chinese forward base, a linchpin of the country’s naval architecture; cyber efforts; an economic Belt and Road influence program—every element of Chinese power projection and empire-building—positioned at the throat of the global oil supply, armed with weapons designed to penetrate advanced American defenses and kill American sailors, and embedded in a strategic architecture whose explicit purpose is to constrain American military freedom in any future conflict over Taiwan.
Gur adds that the U.S. has had a hard time articulating this, but I can understand why they would not want to, even if that articulation would lessen America’s opposition to the war (more than 50%). But it wouldn’t, since the American public doesn’t think much about China.
Now the first thing I asked myself why I saw Gur’s thesis was this: What is the evidence that this is the real American strategy? Here is what counts as evidence:
The Americans went to war together with the Israelis because that’s the best way to fight a war like this. Having a capable and loyal local ally willing to deal damage and absorb blowback lowers the costs to America and increases the chances of success. If America ever finds itself in a kinetic fight with China, it presumably expects Japan and Taiwan and South Korea to play a similar role in the fighting. It’s one hell of an operational advantage.
To Gur, the targets give away Trump’s intentions:
. . .In the first 24 hours of the war, American strikes, as confirmed by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), focused on Iranian naval vessels, submarines, ports, and anti-ship missile positions along the southern coast. The port of Bandar Abbas, headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, was hit. So was Jask, which China had hoped would become a permanent naval foothold on the Indian Ocean. Isfahan and Tabriz, hubs of ballistic missile production and drone assembly, were struck. The goal, explicitly stated by American officials, was not merely to degrade existing stockpiles but to destroy the industrial base from which those weapons are produced, so that China cannot spend the next few years quietly rebuilding it.
President Trump announced the operation in terms that could not have been more direct, explicitly mentioning all those elements of Iranian power—the navy, the missile production sites—that would serve as that second front in a war with China.
Many of these targets so central to CENTCOM’s efforts are no threat whatsoever to Israel.
So far from China: crickets. It’s been silent and has left Iran hanging. In truth, there’s little that China can do save join the war itself—and it’s clearly not keen to do that. As for Trump’s notable omission of words about freeing the Iranian people, or creating a democracy in Iran, Gur says “He doesn’t need a democratic Iran, he just needs a not-anti-American Iran.” Finally, as to why the U.S. has remained mum about what are supposedly its real goals, Gur says this:
So why can’t Secretary Rubio say it? Why hem and haw and offer half-hearted non-explanations to a question that has set the conservative movement aflame?
One obvious answer: They don’t want to push the Chinese to more overt responses. One should always give one’s enemy an excuse not to respond in kind, on the off chance that they don’t want to. It’s a sensible ambiguity on the world stage, but it’s causing damage at home. It may be time for the administration to speak clearly on its grand strategy—not in policy papers, but in clearly articulated statements that actually answer the good-faith questions of a great many Americans.
America went to war in Iran because Iran made itself a Chinese weapon. It didn’t need to do this, to invest so much of the administration’s political capital and of the military’s firepower, just to shore up a second-run Israeli operation. This isn’t about Israel. Iran has been a growing threat to Israel for decades, and yet Trump has always resisted intervening.
As I said, I’m no pundit, and although this all sounds plausible, it hasn’t convinced me completely. Gur makes a good argument, and one that several readers agree with. Perhaps they’re right, and if so kudos to them. But I’m depressed at the thought that if Gur is right, Trump doesn’t give a fig for freeing the beleaguered Iranian people, or about creating a democratic regime. The Iranian people are hoping for that, and perhaps we’re deceiving them.
And if we ever go to war with China, Ceiling Cat help us all!
This article connects the dots: Panama, Venezuela, Greenland, Iran, Cuba.
https://nypost.com/2026/03/02/opinion/trump-hit-iran-but-hes-really-got-china-in-his-crosshairs/
Well, that was interesting!
The argument about keeping mum about the real (Chinese) reason for this war feels a bit fabricated. I could argue that Trump is doing this because he is erratic and a bit crazy, and we have some evidence for that. And what difference would keeping this secret make to China? I don’ see how their regional interests should change whether this thing is made public or not. If this really is the reason, they damn well should realize it without being told.
And, um, the admittedly uncomfortable question is: Why should we go to war over Taiwan? Are we seriously planning to do that? I didn’t think we would, beyond doing all we can to make it difficult for China. We no longer have a major military base there, which would be a significant deterrent, and we had decades to do that.
Two reasons that immediately come to mind are semiconductors and denying China greater influence in the region. That’s leaving aside the moral dimension of preventing a dictatorship from taking over the lives of 23 million more people.
I can’t see Trump caring about Taiwan. Although the chip factories there are very important from what I’ve read. I’m no judge of that.
My impression is he won’t go to war over Taiwan, partly based on his extreme deference to Russia.
Remember that big report not long ago: carving the world up into spheres of influence: the US, China and Russia.
The National Security Strategy. It was much criticized at the time.
Trump might not care much about Taiwan, but if Taiwan falls, China has full access to the Pacific with a base to strike out from. Naval freedom is a strategic necessity in order to project power.
We see the difference between the current Russia and China who cannot project and the US who can pick off misaligned nations because it can project power.
I think we are in a new Cold War with China. They’ve been trying to project power all over the globe under Xi with massive investment and control under the Belt and Road initiative. China has for years been expanding into contested islands near the Philippines, literally expanding the islands. The Biden Admin pretty much rolled over for China. (Remember that spy balloon that went across the whole country before the DOD got the balls to shoot it down and probably after it has collected all the data it was intended to.) The Trump Admin has been pushing back on this, for example, in Panama where China was set to take a major stake in the Canal, a crucial part of our naval strategy. This has prompted others to take action, like Australia, which has ended at least one deal for China to run a port. I have also read, but can’t say that this is true, that there are groups on the right and left that think we would lose a war with China, so it’s better to undercut our own power so that we realized we can’t win and avoid the danger. I think the Admin’s strategy is smart.
Nial Ferguson reported Henry Kissinger (whose biography he is writing) said, a decade ago “We are in the foothills of a Cold War with China” and more recently said we are in it. I believe them.
There’s all sorts of metrics and data that say Xi is deadly serious about Taiwan, despite the fact most western media are very “Meh” about it.
I listen/read a lot from the Hoover Intuition, btw. Top notch brains.
D.A.
NYC
(approaching Roolz criminal velocity, sorry)
I’ve been making this point for awhile, as have some other observers. Energy is a big part of it. China gets about 15% of its energy from Iran, but accounts for 80% of Iran’s import dollars (deeply discounted, like Russian oil, b/c Iran and Russia have so much trouble selling their on the open market).
Any disruption to China’s energy is curtains for its (very obvious, very loud) ill intentions towards Taiwan: a battle/game that would make all this Iran kerfuffle look like toy cap guns. One we COULD lose.
Containment of China HAS to be the priority this century for the west. Plus, there’s the general good of getting the Ayatollahs shaken up/disrupted/ killed. For our allies not the least Israel.
I was against Afghanistan and Iraq (b/c I understood the M.E.) but I’m all for Trump’s various planetary re-arrangements.
D.A.
NYC
See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaB-GNL-dso.
Interesting theory that assumes Mr. Trump can pay attention to anything for more than a few microseconds.
Mr. Trump could not even pay attention to the sacrifice of four US servicemen–instead pointing out the beautiful drapes behind him. It’s difficult to imagine him leading a strategy session on China. Taiwan? Does anyone think Trump could find it on a map?
Assuming that’s true, does he really have to? All he has to do is agree to a strategy developed by others.
As we did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, you can now read everything through the China lens. And you can’t be proven wrong because every significant military and diplomatic act will impinge in some way on other great powers. It’s not that Gur is incorrect; it’s that the general frame of the argument can be populated with details from other times and places, and it would equally apply to other great power competitions.
The target set tells a simpler, regional story: Iran’s 1) ballistic missiles, 2) navy, and 3) nuclear weapons production. Danger from nukes is mostly self- explanatory.
Ballistic missiles and drones. A mass-versus-quality race is tipping quickly in favor of mass, as evidenced in Ukraine. Downing a $20,000 drone with a $4 million missile is not sustainable in terms of either money or relative production schedules. Once you overwhelm the missile defenses with cheap assets, follow-on conventional or nuclear-armed missiles can execute leadership decapitation strikes, sink an aircraft carrier, or terrorize a population. Rubio was right: if we allowed Iran’s inventory to grow, we could no longer operate freely in the region. That would hinder U.S. effectiveness significantly—regardless of what China might do.
Navy. This is standard sea-lane protection. Between 20-30% of global oil transits the Strait of Hormuz, and the U.S. Fifth Fleet operates in the region. Iran has threatened repeatedly to shut this down with mines, drones, missiles, subs, and surface ships. Again, the U.S. wants to retain freedom of navigation here independent of what China may do.
The United States always considers how our actions position us relative to chief competitors. In Gur’s words: we always play on the global chessboard. But simply because an operation strengthens one relative to China does not mean that it was initiated principally because of China. Selection effect is at work here: one refrains if possible from anything that would weaken us relative to China, therefore our “real” motivations look to be always about China.
I don’t need to identify the more important bird if I can strike both with one stone. Would Trump have assisted Israel in trying to eliminate Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear capacity even if China didn’t exist? I don’t care. Nor does China. They are assessing how it affects them regardless of Trump’s motivation. Just as we assess how China’s integration with Iran affects our Middle East interests independent of our other China concerns.
This comment exceeds the word limit but I will let it pass. However, please try to keep comments shorter rather than submit essays. Thank you.
I agree with you, Doug. Only a true believer in the China theory would find that evidence convincing. The targets are just standard results of trying to disarm the enemy. The evidence is pretty much neutral with respect to the China theory.
Trump himself explicitly stated now that the goal of the war is to control Iran’s oil. This may incidentally be part of a larger anti-China strategy, but it would be enough by itself to motivate Trump to go to war.
What we can all agree on, I think, is that Trump is not doing any of this for the Iranian people.
Triggernometry posted a good analysis of the motivations and strategies behind the recent response of the US to Iran’s decades of international bastardry.
The Best Iran War Breakdown on the Internet with Aimen Dean & Richard Miniter
Excellent video. They don’t foresee change unless the ICRG can be dismantled.
This sort of air war has no chance of causing regime change. The IRGC makes up more than 1% of the total population of Iran. These fighters are indoctrinated, fundamentalist supporters of the theocratic system. I expect, that once the bombing stops they will start a slaughter of possible internal opponents. It seems that it will put a dent in China’s ambitions.
An official from the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK) says Kurdish armed groups based in Iraq have already begun a military offensive against Iranian regime forces.
According to the official, Kurdish fighters affiliated with the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) began taking combat positions inside Iranian territory on Monday, March 2.
https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/artc-exclusive-thousands-of-kurdish-fighters-launch-ground-offensive-into-iran-against-regime-official-says
I doubt this will deter China in any way, and this is a 4-d chess analysis that Trump et al. doesn’t play. Lots of American military commanders claim this is a religious war for what that’s worth. Why did we go to war? I’d say the Occam’s reason was oil, and/or something like “no one else could/would do it” legacy building, megalomania and a wish and a prayer, the Great Trump shall have a statue in every corner of the world + a Nobel!
Back to China, I suspect their Iran strategy was just one tine on a many tined fork. Or to borrow another cliche, China doesn’t put all its eggs in one basket, and Iran wasn’t some sort of lynch-pin in their strategy of world dominance. China will eventually come out on top with people like Trump and his war-hawks in charge, that’s a given as far as I’m concerned. America is always short sighted, that’s a fact, China looks a hundred years into the future. And Xi has as many kidneys, livers and hearts as he wants for immortality! Of course I’m being facetious there with a reference to Putin’s weird comment about that.
Control of Iran’s oil would be a perfectly valid reason all by itself for going to war. The world runs on oil and the world should want to keep China from getting any. China is resourceful, sure, but demographically they are running out of time, having got old before they got rich. Why make it easy for them by letting them control Iran? Why would America not base its geopolitical strategy around oil? Maybe you can’t say so in so many words, but if that oil starts flowing to the United States again under a Pax Trumpiana, everyone will be happy that gas prices come down.
Not so good for Canada. Increasingly (as our conventional reserves in the southern part of Alberta run down) our oil will be bitumen dug (not pumped) out of the ground as tar shales in the far North and liquified at great expense before it will even flow in a pipeline to a refinery in the United States. Our Prime Minister wants to sunset the industry, because Just Stop Oil, and because the stuff has to be upgraded on site with substantial combustion of natural gas, which increases the CO2 emissions that are booked in our country, never mind where it is eventually burned in car and truck engines. If Iran and Venezuela resume legitimate production, no one will want Canada’s “dirty” oil. Having resources isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. Brains go further. But brains move to the U.S.
“Control of Iran’s oil would be a perfectly valid reason all by itself for going to war.”
Perhaps your comment is valid in the oil-addicted world that currently exists, but without serious boots on the ground in Iran, American control of Iran’s oil ain’t gonna happen…and even boots on the ground doesn’t ensure any type of stable, strategic control of Iranian oil.
Interesting angle re. Canada. Thanks for the comment.
Edit: dammit, meant to be a reply to Leslie…not a stand alone post
Regarding allies in wars against countries located far from US shores, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the importance becomes clear when one recognizes that, er the years, the US Navy has declined (quantitatively) and can definitely use forward bases, in addition to the direct military help of those countries.
Same with Israel. Israel should be seen as a stable, stationary aircraft carrier for use by US planes, equipment and supplies at need—such as we see now with using IAF bases for the extremely valuable F-22s. Until the unlikely time that US and Israeli strategies diverge (which I hope will never happen). Israel itself is an irreplaceable, reliable asset to the US—simply because of location.