The Coleman Hughes vs. TED story continues with Hughes putting up a “final response” to his mistreatment by TED. If you recall (or read my posts here), Hughes gave a full TED talk that was vetted by the organization well in advance. But then his talk was “heterodox,” incorporating Martin Luther King’s mantra into the claim that if you want to improve society, you should do it “color blind” manner. As Hughes emphasized, this doesn’t mean that you ignore color, but you help the underprivileged based on class, not race.
This, of course, didn’t go down well with today’s Authoritarian Leftists, who want race not just to be seen, but to be the dominant characteristic for fixing society. A subgroup of TED employees, ed “Black@TED“, argued that they had been “harmed” by Hughes talk, a ludicrous claim that shouldn’t be taken seriously.
Then TED, via its head Chris Anderson, did several things to try to put an “asterisk” by Hughes’s talk, including asking him to include a “moderated discussion” at the end of his talk’s video, something unique for TED. Hughes quite properly refused. Anderson then agreed to have Hughes’s video go up alone, but that there would be a separately posted video debate with another person; the person turned out to be NYT writer Jamelle Bouie. This condition is again insupportable, further showing TED’s disaffection with Hughes’s views. Finally, according to Hughes, TED did not abide by its agreement to publicize Hughes’s talk like they publicized other talks, resulting in its getting fewer views than comparable talks. That lack of views is important because views are important in boosting the careers of young people (Hughes is just 27).
Finally, as Hughes wrote on The Free Press, he was hit after the talk by a claim from sociologist Adam Grant, who joined Anderson in a Free Press critique of Hughes’s arguments. Grant claimed that a meta-analysis of 167 papers showed that “color blind” approaches to alleviating inequality were not as effective as socioeconomic approaches, for color blind methods were apparently were worse at creating “improved intergroup relations.” Hughes didn’t know of this meta-analysis when he wrote his talk, and, apparently, neither did TED, which was supposed to fact-check Hughes’s claims before the talk. Of course pinning blame is not what we need here: we need to know what the meta-analysis actually said (see below).
Well Anderson’s behavior was reprehensible, but what about that meta-analysis? In a new piece at his Substack, “Coleman’s Corner”, Hughes takes up both issues in a pice called ” My last word on TED”. Click below to read it, but subscribe if you read regularly. Hughes also references Jesse Singal, who wrote his own Substack piece on the controversy, strongly defending Hughes.
Re Anderson, Hughes first criticizes the TED-head for not admitting that Hughes’s version of events is right. But there’s more:
Besides that, I have little to say about Chris’s public statements that has not already been said. See Jesse Singal’s substack post, for instance. I will just echo some of Singal’s points here.
Chris seems to view this situation as a dispute between two equally reasonable parties––me on one end and his staff on the other. That is the wrong way to think about this situation.
Here are two key differences between me and his staff:
(1) I believe that there should be all kinds of TED talks: woke ones, anti-woke ones, and apolitical ones. Free speech and viewpoint diversity should reign supreme! But TED’s staff appear to believe that there should be tons of woke talks and zero anti-woke talks. That’s a big difference. I want a bigger tent of allowable ideas, they want a smaller tent.
(2) I believe MLK’s prescription of race-blind, classed-based social policy––as he advocated for in his book Why We Can’t Wait (see point #5 in this post)––is both wise and within the bounds of acceptable opinion. The people on the other side of this appear to believe that anyone who advocates for MLK’s position should be de-platformed. Equally reasonable?
Finally, Chris ought to reframe his view of his staff’s feelings.
For instance, when Chris writes, “Some commenters below just don’t understand how anyone could be upset by a talk arguing for color blindness,” he is straw-manning in spectacular fashion. Sure, somewhere there is probably a person with Asperger’s who truly doesn’t get why someone could get touchy about race. But the vast majority of TED’s critics understand why people get emotional about race––we just don’t think that those emotions should have de facto veto power over what can be argued in a public forum.
Last year, TED had a pro-communism talk (“socialism” is in the title, but “communism” is advocated for in the talk). I bet there was at least one member of the audience who grew up in the Soviet Union or Cuba and was fiercely triggered by this––given the ghastly toll of communism in those nations.
Please realize that this is more than just a contretemps involving a speaker who was ill-treated. It’s about a powerful and influential organization—an organization whose videos may get more views than those from anyplace else—being ideologically captured (partly by Black@TED) in a way that speakers don’t really have freedom of speech. Unless they hew to the approved ideology, speakers may get punished, at Hughes did. (Remember, though, that TED vets all talks beforehand very carefully.)
Should TED be a mouthpiece for only “progressive” views? I don’t think so, as if you already have those views, a contrary TED talk won’t make you think, which the talks are supposed to do. Of course TED has the right to platform any speaker it wants, but an organization with guts should put on some heterodox talks. (Not by cranks, of course.)
To me the meta-analysis, which I didn’t read, was the more serious criticism. If its results were right, Hughes’s suggestion, while worthy of pondering, wouldn’t be as good as “color-awareness.” But Hughes finds faults with even relying on sociological studies:
My argument didn’t rely on social science––purposely so. For starters, there is a replication crisis in social science. By one estimate almost half of social science findings turn out to be BS, and those BS findings are far more likely to be cited than the real ones. What’s more, combining a bunch of BS studies into a “meta-analysis” doesn’t make them any better. (Kind of like CDOs, as explained by Anthony Bourdain in The Big Short).
So instead of relying on a field of research that’s notoriously unreliable, I relied on other arguments: intellectual history, moral philosophy, and recent real-world case studies. Nobody at TED had a problem with this at the time.
Well, yes, there’s a replication crisis in sociology and psychology (in fact, most everywhere), but I don’t think Hughes should have dismissed sociology in this way. For one thing, the meta-analysis may have included some good work instead of comprising just “a bunch of “BS studies”. Further, relying on “intellectual history, moral philosophy, and case studies” seems to come perilously close to “lived experience”, if not “anecdotal data”. Either way, I think Coleman would have been better served by leaving out these two paragraphs and just analyzes the paper. It looks too dismissive, too petulant.
But Hughes does give his take on the paper, and has two beefs.
There are two levels at which this meta-analysis doesn’t refute my talk. First, as mentioned, you should rate meta-analyses of social psychology studies fairly low on the believability scale to begin with. “A grain of salt” does not begin to approach the attitude we should take towards such studies, given the replication crisis. It is the opposite of “rigorous research”.
But let’s, for the sake of argument, assume that the field of social psychology were super-rigorous. What does this meta-analysis actually claim and do those claims challenge the ones I made in my talk?
The overall structure of the meta-analysis is fairly simple: it examines how four different ideologies–– “color-blindness”, “meritocracy,” “assimilation,” and “multiculturalism”––affect four different outcomes––”prejudice,” “discrimination,” “stereotyping,” and… “support for diversity policies” (like “affirmative action and permissive immigration”, the authors clarify).
Yes, you read that right. In this “rigorous” meta-analysis, one of the ways that success is measured is whether the ideology leads to support for policies like affirmative action. Affirmative Action, in other words, is assumed to be good and treated like an effect rather than a cause. That strikes me as backwards. Shouldn’t the point be to study whether policies like racial affirmative action cause good or bad outcomes? That, certainly, was the point of my talk (or one point of it).
Again, he casts a cold eye on sociological meta-analyses, which he didn’t need to do. His point about affirmative action is correct, but Grant argued in the Free Press that the main effect was on “intergroup relations”, not affirmative action. So here’s Hughes on “intergroup relations.”
Grant hangs his argument on the paper’s claim that “multiculturalism is more consistently associated with improved intergroup relations than any identity-blind ideology.” In order for me to be right, he argues, I’d have to show the opposite: that the color-blind approach “has greater efficacy than a multicultural approach that acknowledges differences”. And I didn’t do that, so…game, set, match. Right?
Not exactly. It would depend on what this paper means by “multiculturalism”. They define “multiculturalism” as “acknowledging [cultural] differences by learning about, maintaining, or valuing them.” The problem for Grant is that I support this kind of multiculturalism and not a word of my talk suggests otherwise. I’m not against learning about and celebrating cultural differences. I’m against race essentialism and policies that discriminate on the basis of race. I’m not coming for your school assembly on Diwali or Ramadan or Chinese New Year––that stuff is great. I’m coming for your race-based affirmative action, race-based emergency aid, and so forth. (And again, this “rigorous” meta-analysis does not even ask what the effects of those kinds of policies are. A bit strange, no?)
Besides this conceptually-confused and irrelevant meta-analysis, Adam cites some other studies which are paywalled. I don’t want to spend more time on this, so I will not be reading or addressing those here.
And here it seems that Hughes is right IF “multiculturalism” is defined that way. That is, if Grant construes “improved valuing of multiculturalism” as the same as “an improvement in intergroup relations”, then he’s putting one over on the readers. One is a mental construct; the other involves actual behavior.
Jesse Singal has suggested that he might analyze the paper cited by Grant, and I hope he does, as Singal puts his teeth into a paper like a dog attacking a postman’s leg.
We can suspend judgement on the paper until someone does a rigorous dissection of it, but what is clear is that TED treated Hughes abysmally (Hughes didn’t know about this paper), and that the organization shows every sign of having been captured by the Authoritarian Left.
**********
ADDED NOTE: In comment #3 below, Robert Guttentag, a psychology professor at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, analyzes the meta-analysis and finds it wanting go read for yourself. It’s longer than comments that I usually allow, but it’s also quite important.
**********
h/t: Steve
“moderated discussion”
Or “facilitated conversation”
More accurately, “thought reform”.
Indeed! No-one who claims to have been “harmed” by the opinions of a speaker (no matter how controversial or contrarian) merits being taken seriously by any rational person.
Agreed; as the kids say, “One thousand percent.”
Here is my, rather lengthy, dissection of the Leslie et al meta-analysis:
Does the Leslie et al. (2020) meta-analysis prove that Coleman Hughes was wrong?
Robert Guttentag
Professor Emeritus, Department of Psychology
UNC Greensboro
1. Context
Following the TED (“Ideas worth spreading”) talk by Coleman Hughes (A Case for Color-Blindness), Chris Anderson, the head of TED, received a request from a group of TED staffers called “Black@TED” requesting that the talk not be posted. Although Anderson ultimately did post the talk, he also sought feedback regarding whether the claims made by Hughes are consistent with the best available scientific evidence from Dr. Adam Grant, a popular science author and professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania specializing in organizational psychology. Grant’s report was based heavily on his reading of a single meta-analysis of research on different “diversity ideologies” (the term used by the authors of the meta-analysis); he concluded that existing social science research does not support the claims made by Hughes in his TED talk. Anderson then echoed Grant’s conclusion, writing in a posting on X and a posting on the Free Press blog, specifically referencing the meta-analysis, that: “ As the researchers themselves write: “Multiculturalism is more consistently associated with improved intergroup relations than any identity-blind ideology.”“
The question I address below is whether the findings from the meta-analysis (that served as the foundation for Grant’s summary of the evidence and for Anderson’s claim that Hughes was wrong in his claims about color-blindness) really does provide evidence inconsistent with Hughes’ claims. My own reading of the paper is that it does NOT provide evidence that undermines Hughes’ claims, and that Grant, who is very well qualified to assess the paper, should have noted the rather glaring weaknesses of the paper that I note below.
The reference for the meta-analysis is:
Leslie, L, Bono, J.,Kim, Y., & Beaver, J. (2020). On Melting Pots and Salad Bowls: A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Identity-Blind and Identity-Conscious Diversity Ideologies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 105, 453 – 471.
2. Summary
In short – I argue below that the meta-analysis suffers from several very significant shortcomings that should have been obvious to Dr. Grant. (i) The way in which the paper defines the elements of “high quality intergroup relations” is not based upon evidence of any kind, but instead reflects the progressive political philosophy of the authors, thereby baking into the design of the study the conclusions that the authors ultimately reached. (ii) The authors frequently draw causal conclusions from data which cannot be legitimately utilized as the foundation for a causal conclusion. (iii) In any case, the meta-analysis actually finds an association between color-blind beliefs and lower levels of prejudice and stereotyping. (iv) The claims by the authors of the meta-analysis (and by Grant and Anderson) notwithstanding, the study does not in any direct way assess factors contributing to “high quality intergroup relations”, and therefore it is unclear how the results of the meta-analysis actually bear on an assessment of the validity of the claims made in Hughes’ TED talk. Hughes, on the other hand, does provide evidence of a more direct kind supporting his claims regarding color blindness and intergroup relations.
3. What was the nature of the studies included in the meta-analysis?
The meta-analysis included studies that examined the association between one or more “diversity ideologies”, including “color-blindness” and “multiculturalism” (the two diversity ideologies relevant to assessing the validity of Hughes’ claims), and one or more “outcome measures” (scare quotes used here for reasons that will be made obvious in the next section) including prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, and support for particular kinds of diversity policies. According to the paper’s authors, color-blindness “emphasizes minimizing the salience of [group] differences, specifically by ignoring them.” Thus, for example, if a professor grades student papers only after removing all student identity information from each paper, that would be classified as a color-blind approach to grading. According to the authors, multiculturalism, in contrast, “emphasizes acknowledging and valuing [group] differences.”
Most of the studies included in the meta-analysis were correlational studies that involved administering to participants measures of each individual’s belief in one or more diversity ideologies and measures of each individual’s placement on scales of prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, and/or support for particular kinds of diversity policies. A minority (27%) of the studies were experimental in design, involving attempts to modify participant’s beliefs in diversity ideologies while assessing the effects of the change in beliefs on measure of prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, and/or support for diversity policies.
4. The meta-analysis adopts a progressive political bias as part of its definition of “high quality intergroup relations”.
In the abstract of the paper, the authors refer to their focus on “4 indicators of high quality intergroup relations—reduced prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, and increased diversity policy support. Thus, as part of their DEFINITION of “high quality intergroup relations”, the authors include support for what are generally considered to be politically progressive social policies, such as affirmative action, reparations, and granting citizenship automatically to the children of illegal aliens. It is apparently simply a part of the authors’ own political beliefs that support for what are generally considered to be politically progressive social policies is a component of or prerequisite for “high quality intergroup relations”. At a minimum, the authors should have cited actual evidence for this claim. They did not.
5. Correlation does not equal causation
Given that 73% of the studies included in the meta-analysis involved a correlational design, and given that the findings from correlation studies tell us little if anything about causation, the ability of the findings from the meta-analysis to draw strong causal conclusions is highly limited. The authors of the meta-analysis openly acknowledge the limitations of correlational studies, but still slip frequently into the use of causal language when describing results that are based heavily on the findings from correlational studies. Indeed, the simple labeling of discrimination, prejudice, stereotyping and support for diversity policies as “outcome measures” presupposes a particular direction of causation. Throughout the abstract, and in many places throughout the body of the paper, the authors refer to “the effects of” diversity ideologies, implying quite directly that ideologies have causal effects on the so-called outcome variables. Not only is it the case that such conclusions cannnot be conclusively drawn based upon correlational findings, but in at least one of the papers included in the analysis, the authors of the paper specifically argue for a reverse direction of causation (arguing that a so-called “outcome” measure is the real causal variable while adoption of a form of diversity ideology is the “effect”).
The meta-analysis does include the analysis of some experimental studies as well, and drawing causal conclusions is more firmly grounded when based upon evidence from such studies. Unfortunately, the authors do not provide separate analyses of the correlational vs experimental studies, so little can be said about how strongly the experimental findings support the overall conclusions of the paper. What the authors DO say, however, is that they lack sufficient evidence to determine “whether the effect of diversity ideologies on intergroup relations or the effect of intergroup relations on diversity ideologies is stronger”. Of course, the frequent use of causative language throughout the paper (references to the “effects” of diversity ideologies) is wholly inconsistent with the qualification quoted above. There should not have been ANY causal lanauge used when describing the findings from the meta-analysis, and it is surprising that Dr. Grant did not comment on that problematic feature of the meta-analysis paper.
6. Did the meta-analysis actually find that color-blindness was not associated with what the authors define as elements of high quality inter-group relations?
No. What the meta-analysis DID find (a point noted by Hughes in his comments about Anderson’s Free Press comments) is that color blindness was significantly associated with lower levels of stereotyping and prejudice – findings entirely consistent with Hughes’ claims in his TED talk.
7. In that case, what about multiculturalism?
Like color-blindness, multiculturalism was negatively associated with lower levels of stereotyping and prejudice, and was also negatively associated with discrimination. The magnitide of these associations was larger for multiculturalism than color-blindness. However, far and away the biggest difference between color-blindness and multiculturalism is that the former was not positively associated with support for progressive diversity-related social policies whereas , whereas there was a strong association between support for those policies and belief in multiculturalism.
The findings regarding social policy support are not surprising. Indeed, it is essentially a defining feature of belief in color blindness that one would support treating everyone equally, without regard to the individual’s race, whereas a defining feature of belief in multiculturalism (as operationalized in the meta-analysis paper) is that one supports taking race into account as part of governmental and business and educational policies.
As was noted above, however, the authors of the meta-analysis have simply defined support for those kinds of policies as an essential component of “high quality intergroup relations”, but provide zero evidence that intergroup relations actually improve when organizations (whether business or educational or governmental) adopt these kinds of social policies. One might argue that it would have been just as reasonable (and consistent with evidence mentioned below) to have replaced “support for diversity policies” with “support for equality policies” as one of the “outcome” measures in the meta-analysis – in which case, it seems very likely that color-blindness would have emerged as having the strongest relationship with “high quality intergroup relations”. The decision by the authors of the meta-analysis to make support for progressive political policies one of their so-called outcome variables reflected a political value judgment on their part, and was not based on a scintilla of evidence (certainly not any that they provide).
8. Well, then – what about the quality of “intergroup relations”– the variable that is ostensibly the focus of the meta-analysis?
The four “outcome” variable included in the meta-analysis serve, within the analysis, as proxies for the quality of intergroup relations. However, very few of the studies surveyed included any more direct kind of measure of intergroup relations, and the authors of the meta-analysis seem very comfortable completely ignoring the absence of that evidence (evidence that would seem to be required for them to make the arguments that they make in the discussion and conclusion sections of the paper).
Ironically, given Grant’s and Anderson’s claim that the findings from the meta-analysis disprove the thesis of Hughes’ talk, it was Hughes who presented evidence more directly bearing on the question of the relationship between diversity ideologies and the quality of intergroup relations. Hughes presented the findings from a large scale survey (just one of a number of surveys that have shown the same pattern) showing that during the past 10-15 years, as the ideology of color blindness has been increasingly and prominently criticized within progressive media and in elite universities, ratings by both racial minorities and whites of the quality of intergroup relations has DECLINED. In other words, coincident with the decline in belief in color blindness and increased adoption of multiculturalism within society, there has been a decline, rather than an increase, in average ratings of intergroup relations. Neither Grant, nor Anderson, nor the authors of the meta-analysis, address this seemingly dramatic contradiction between their claims and what has actually happened in our society during the past one-to-two decades.
+1, thanks.
Thanks for this Robert. Is there a typo in this sentence (delete one of “negatively” or “lower”?)?:
“Like color-blindness, multiculturalism was negatively associated with lower levels of stereotyping and prejudice”.
PS Jerry, a suggestion, you could perhaps make this a “guest post” so that it is seen more widely?
I second that motion. But this probably deserves being directed toward the principle actors of this conflict so that they might comment on it.
Thanks for taking the time to lay this out so clearly and eloquently.
An excellent further analysis and addendum to yet another excellent post by JC. Thank you. I despair at how hard it is to convey the nuances of this debate to my woke friends.
This is very important, I think. All it says is that belief multi-culturalism results in greater implementation of things like affirmative action, not that it results in less discrimination. We have to ask ourselves what our desired outcome is: more social justice policies or less stereotyping, discrimination and prejudice. I’d vote for the latter, principally because it offers the hope of making racism less of a problem in the future, whereas the first option simply prolongs race as a destructive factor in everyday life.
“…the biggest difference between color-blindness and multiculturalism is that the former was not positively associated with support for progressive diversity-related social policies”
Don’t we call that ‘begging the question’?
Great! I’m going to use this example when I have to explain what begging the question means.
Granting citizenship automatically to children of illegal immigrants should not be described as a progressive social policy. It’s not a political policy. Birthright citizenship is taken to be required by the Constitution, and can be changed only by Constitutional amendment.
Perhaps Robert is referring to the Dreamers, in which case the issue is not citizenship but permanent residency. That said, I would point out that the Republicans want to repeal birthright citizenship.
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-column-birthright-citizenship-donald-trump-chapman-20231005-ftb22fxirzfvlguom6hejrriem-story.html
“This, of course, didn’t go down well with today’s Authoritarian Leftists, who want race not just to be seen, but to be the dominant characteristic for fixing society.”
But I thought race wasn’t actually a thing. Is it both the most important thing and not a thing?
Ibram X. Kendi has said that race is an artificial, shallow construct, and racism based on these artificial, shallow constructs is a real thing. Thus, he would agree that race as Americans categorize is not some immutable, inborn thing.
But don’t accept anyone’s claim to be “transracial.”
Yeah, just like gender, where at the same time it is completey unmoored from tangible reality, and you can choose a brand-new one every day, but misgendering someone is among the deadliest of sins.
Don’t think about it, just obey those who know what’s best for the oppressed.
Coincidentally, I recently saw an interview with the comedian Sarah Silverman and her kerfuffle with Chris Anderson and TED. She was invited to give a talk, did so, and was then scolded. Here’s her talk from several years ago: https://youtu.be/ci5p1OdVLAc?si=IPRifUPpkENJ_3FF
“Anecdotal data” is belittled by JC in this post, but anecdotal data is as good as it gets in any authoritarian regime, including in putatively pluralistic societies. That’s why intelligence agencies worldwide have to rely on it. Now, it’s coming to America.
And some additional comments regarding the Coleman Hughes TED talk brouhaha:
https://open.substack.com/pub/carolinacurmudgeon/p/some-additional-thoughts-regarding
Thanks – it would be interesting to see Anderson respond to your excellent points, not least the final paragraph.
Dr. Coyne, please consider featuring as a site guest-essay Robert Guttentag’s comment so it is widely read.
I wonder if Coleman Hughes has seen it. Or for that matter, Jesse Singal, who may be writing an article on the meta-analysis.
I’ll think about it and will alert Coleman
“The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it is the illusion of knowledge.” So said Stephen Hawking.
I actually think it’s right that Coleman points out that the whole “science” of social science is built on very shaky foundations. He perhaps sounds a little defensive and I’m certainly not a fan of anecdotal evidence or “lived experience”, but a poorly done research paper or meta analysis is a very dangerous thing. It gives the impression of being an authoritative source whilst being nothing of the sort. At least anecdotal evidence, expert opinion, or whatever is obviously for what it is.
I think Alexander Pope beat Stephen Hawking to it:
“A little learning is a dangerous thing.
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian Spring;
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
and drinking largely sobers us again.”
I said it before, I’ll say it again ;
Hughes’ talk could have been completely wrong. This can happen to even great speakers/writers – a foolish inconsistency is the hobgoblin of small minds.
The abnormal feature here is the scrutiny upon Hughes’ talk – and exclusively so – by dare I say arbitrary power of N=2. This would be in contrast to users submitting factual input on X (for instance) – or, for instance, the nifty analysis on this very post!
I will say I’m glad to read the material brought to bear. But it will be a long time before TED applies the same scrutiny to any of its other talks (think of TEDx!).
“inconsistency”->consistency.
Thoreau.
Don’t have the reference, but might be Walden.
“Well, yes, there’s a replication crisis in sociology and psychology (in fact, most everywhere), but I don’t think Hughes should have dismissed sociology in this way. …(snip)…..Either way, I think Coleman would have been better served by leaving out these two paragraphs and just analyzes the paper. It looks too dismissive, too petulant.”
I felt the same reading that part of Coleman’s response.
But I notice how it fits in to a bit of a pattern I’ve noticed. Coleman is certainly a reasonable guy, and I’m a “fan.”
But I’ve noticed recently that he has some of the cynical/contrarian traits that greased the slide of some others down some rabbit holes. Many of us where pretty shocked to see that Coleman was granting some level of credence RFK Jr’s anti-vax stance, to the point some other podcasters had Coleman on to do an “intervention” with Coleman. Then there is the recent Coleman podcast with Scott Adams. I was shocked to see the deference and respect Coleman gave to Adams and his cynicism and arguments through much of the podcast! Coleman basically painted himself as something of a fan of Adams, who is about as blatantly amoral a troll as you find on the internet. Adams traffics in peddling cynicism, his mission is to undermine trust in virtually everything, especially expertise or institutions of any kind. I hadn’t realized how much of Adams’ cynicism Coleman shares.
And now seeing Coleman breezily dismiss arguments from social science if it contradicts his thesis…hmmm..
I hope Coleman can keep “on the rails” because a lot of folks with that mindset have had their cynicism turbo-charged when that great cynical audience finds them and provides vocal and monetary support for such cynicism.
“Sure, somewhere there is probably a person with Asperger’s who truly doesn’t get why someone could get touchy about race.”
Why is he gratuitously insulting people with Asperger’s? I have Asperger’s, and I understand perfectly well why someone could get touchy about race. Asperger’s doesn’t affect a person’s ability to grasp complex issues. We’re not idiots. He could have left out the words “with Asperger’s” and made exactly the same point without maligning people born with a mental disorder that Coleman clearly “doesn’t get.”